by Kerschagl
[Title Page and Dedication]: Title page, publication details from 1922, and dedication to Dr. Alexander Spitzmüller, Governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. [Table of Contents]: The table of contents listing chapters on internal and external currency value, causes of depreciation, inflation and deflation problems, statistics, and the Brussels Financial Conference. [Preface]: Kerschagl outlines the three central problems of the book: currency value changes, quantity theory (inflation/deflation), and the technical/economic fight against inflation. He acknowledges the influence of his teachers Friedrich Wieser and Othmar Spann, emphasizing an organic-logical understanding of the economy over mere description. [Internal and External Currency Value]: This section defines the 'internal' (domestic purchasing power) and 'external' (foreign exchange rate) value of money. Kerschagl argues that while a natural tendency toward parity exists, factors like speculation, production crises, and the need for foreign credit create significant gaps between these two values, especially in post-war economies. [The Causes of Monetary Depreciation]: Kerschagl analyzes the causes of currency depreciation, moving beyond simple quantity theory. He emphasizes that inflation is primarily a problem of income redistribution and the loss of connection between goods production and money creation. He notes that hoarding by farmers actually slowed inflation, while psychological loss of trust accelerates it. [The Economic Problem of Inflation and Deflation]: A deep dive into the structural causes of inflation, focusing on the state's credit needs and the role of central banks in monetizing debt. Kerschagl argues that deflation must be treated as an income and production problem, not just a technical monetary one. He critiques the struggle for real income in a shrinking economy and suggests that stabilizing the 'existential minimum' is a prerequisite for successful monetary reform. [The Reduction of Inflation (Abbau der Inflation)]: Kerschagl examines technical methods for reducing the money supply, focusing on the 'Rašín system' in Czechoslovakia, which involved stamping banknotes and withholding a portion as a forced loan. He also discusses capital levies (Vermögensabgabe) and state bankruptcy/depreciation. He concludes that technical measures are only successful if backed by increased production and fiscal discipline. [Statistics and the Inflation Problem]: Kerschagl introduces the statistical analysis of inflation, intending to verify economic theories against data from the Board of Trade and central banks. He notes the difficulty of comparing different central bank systems and returns to the central debate of the 'quantity of money' (Mengenproblem) in economic history. [Statistical Analysis of Global Note Circulation (1913-1920)]: This segment provides a detailed statistical comparison of the increase in paper money circulation across various nations between 1913 and 1920. It examines the absolute and relative growth of note volumes, noting that while neutral states like Sweden and Holland saw significant increases, Germany's inflation was extreme. The author critiques standard bank reporting methods, arguing that they obscure the reality of state-driven money creation through government obligations. The text also challenges the direct proportionality assumed by the quantity theory of money, showing that exchange rate fluctuations (specifically the London exchange) do not always correlate directly with the volume of notes, citing the influence of gold purchase obligations and international credit relations. [Purchasing Power Theory and Income Distribution in Inflation]: Kerschagl explores the relationship between domestic and foreign currency values, specifically examining the purchasing power theory (Dalberg) versus the balance of payments theory. Using index numbers for 1920, he analyzes how price levels in the US, England, and France relate to exchange rates. He argues that inflation is primarily a distribution and income problem, where new money flows unevenly to individuals, affecting prices through subjective valuation. He calls for better statistical data on income shifts and real income reduction (Entgüterung) to better understand the inflationary process beyond mere money quantity. [Deflationary Attempts in England (1919-1920)]: This section details England's attempts to reduce its money supply and return to the gold standard following WWI. It describes three specific attempts at deflation between 1919 and late 1920. The first attempt in early 1919 failed due to industrial resistance and the threat of a production crisis. The second attempt in 1920 involved raising interest rates to 7% and capping 'fiduciary issue,' but led to a severe liquidity crisis. The author highlights the sensitivity of the English financial system and the persistence of British policy in seeking a return to monetary stability despite economic friction. [English Monetary Policy and the Fiduciary Issue (1921)]: The final part of the chunk analyzes the shift in English policy from aggressive deflation to stabilization through the management of the 'fiduciary issue.' By 1921, the focus moved toward improving the coverage ratio and consolidating the state budget. The author notes that while the Pound could not reach full parity with the US Dollar due to America's superior economic strength, the currency achieved a new level of stability. The success of this policy is attributed to the energy of the English government and the underlying wealth of the British Empire, providing a model for systematic, non-precipitate inflation reduction. [III. Mid-March 1921 to Early July 1921: English Deflationary Measures]: This section analyzes the progress of British deflationary measures between March and July 1921. Kerschagl examines the reduction of Currency Notes in circulation, the metal coverage ratios of the Bank of England, and the strategic lowering of the bank rate. He argues that the successful management of the budget surplus and the systematic reduction of the fiduciary limit demonstrate how a state can navigate deflation without destroying industrial production, provided there is a sophisticated coordination of financial and monetary policy. [The Importance of Cashless Payment Transactions]: The author discusses the role of cashless payments (giro and check systems) in mitigating inflation and improving economic efficiency. While acknowledging that cashless systems cannot solve the fundamental problem of state credit-seeking, Kerschagl argues they reduce the technical burden on the printing press, foster trust, and allow for the concentration of capital necessary for production. He highlights the 'unproductive labor' of counting physical cash and suggests that giro accounts act as a stabilizing force by binding capital that would otherwise drive up prices. [The Brussels Financial Conference and Post-War Reconstruction]: This segment evaluates the outcomes of the Brussels Financial Conference, emphasizing the consensus that financial stability is inseparable from general economic health. Kerschagl discusses the necessity of central bank independence from state credit needs, the rejection of 'international gold notes' or artificial currencies, and the critical need for a fixed limit on German reparations. He critiques the social aspect of inflation as a struggle between classes for relative income shares and echoes Gustav Cassel's call for international cooperation and the restoration of a rational global economy. [Bibliography]: A comprehensive list of journals and books cited in the work. It includes major economic journals of the era (e.g., Der Österreichische Volkswirt, The Economist) and seminal texts by authors such as Wieser, Schumpeter, Knapp, Bendixen, Mises, and Cassel, covering topics from the state theory of money to the problems of post-war inflation.
Title page, publication details from 1922, and dedication to Dr. Alexander Spitzmüller, Governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.
Read full textThe table of contents listing chapters on internal and external currency value, causes of depreciation, inflation and deflation problems, statistics, and the Brussels Financial Conference.
Read full textKerschagl outlines the three central problems of the book: currency value changes, quantity theory (inflation/deflation), and the technical/economic fight against inflation. He acknowledges the influence of his teachers Friedrich Wieser and Othmar Spann, emphasizing an organic-logical understanding of the economy over mere description.
Read full textThis section defines the 'internal' (domestic purchasing power) and 'external' (foreign exchange rate) value of money. Kerschagl argues that while a natural tendency toward parity exists, factors like speculation, production crises, and the need for foreign credit create significant gaps between these two values, especially in post-war economies.
Read full textKerschagl analyzes the causes of currency depreciation, moving beyond simple quantity theory. He emphasizes that inflation is primarily a problem of income redistribution and the loss of connection between goods production and money creation. He notes that hoarding by farmers actually slowed inflation, while psychological loss of trust accelerates it.
Read full textA deep dive into the structural causes of inflation, focusing on the state's credit needs and the role of central banks in monetizing debt. Kerschagl argues that deflation must be treated as an income and production problem, not just a technical monetary one. He critiques the struggle for real income in a shrinking economy and suggests that stabilizing the 'existential minimum' is a prerequisite for successful monetary reform.
Read full textKerschagl examines technical methods for reducing the money supply, focusing on the 'Rašín system' in Czechoslovakia, which involved stamping banknotes and withholding a portion as a forced loan. He also discusses capital levies (Vermögensabgabe) and state bankruptcy/depreciation. He concludes that technical measures are only successful if backed by increased production and fiscal discipline.
Read full textKerschagl introduces the statistical analysis of inflation, intending to verify economic theories against data from the Board of Trade and central banks. He notes the difficulty of comparing different central bank systems and returns to the central debate of the 'quantity of money' (Mengenproblem) in economic history.
Read full textThis segment provides a detailed statistical comparison of the increase in paper money circulation across various nations between 1913 and 1920. It examines the absolute and relative growth of note volumes, noting that while neutral states like Sweden and Holland saw significant increases, Germany's inflation was extreme. The author critiques standard bank reporting methods, arguing that they obscure the reality of state-driven money creation through government obligations. The text also challenges the direct proportionality assumed by the quantity theory of money, showing that exchange rate fluctuations (specifically the London exchange) do not always correlate directly with the volume of notes, citing the influence of gold purchase obligations and international credit relations.
Read full textKerschagl explores the relationship between domestic and foreign currency values, specifically examining the purchasing power theory (Dalberg) versus the balance of payments theory. Using index numbers for 1920, he analyzes how price levels in the US, England, and France relate to exchange rates. He argues that inflation is primarily a distribution and income problem, where new money flows unevenly to individuals, affecting prices through subjective valuation. He calls for better statistical data on income shifts and real income reduction (Entgüterung) to better understand the inflationary process beyond mere money quantity.
Read full textThis section details England's attempts to reduce its money supply and return to the gold standard following WWI. It describes three specific attempts at deflation between 1919 and late 1920. The first attempt in early 1919 failed due to industrial resistance and the threat of a production crisis. The second attempt in 1920 involved raising interest rates to 7% and capping 'fiduciary issue,' but led to a severe liquidity crisis. The author highlights the sensitivity of the English financial system and the persistence of British policy in seeking a return to monetary stability despite economic friction.
Read full textThe final part of the chunk analyzes the shift in English policy from aggressive deflation to stabilization through the management of the 'fiduciary issue.' By 1921, the focus moved toward improving the coverage ratio and consolidating the state budget. The author notes that while the Pound could not reach full parity with the US Dollar due to America's superior economic strength, the currency achieved a new level of stability. The success of this policy is attributed to the energy of the English government and the underlying wealth of the British Empire, providing a model for systematic, non-precipitate inflation reduction.
Read full textThis section analyzes the progress of British deflationary measures between March and July 1921. Kerschagl examines the reduction of Currency Notes in circulation, the metal coverage ratios of the Bank of England, and the strategic lowering of the bank rate. He argues that the successful management of the budget surplus and the systematic reduction of the fiduciary limit demonstrate how a state can navigate deflation without destroying industrial production, provided there is a sophisticated coordination of financial and monetary policy.
Read full textThe author discusses the role of cashless payments (giro and check systems) in mitigating inflation and improving economic efficiency. While acknowledging that cashless systems cannot solve the fundamental problem of state credit-seeking, Kerschagl argues they reduce the technical burden on the printing press, foster trust, and allow for the concentration of capital necessary for production. He highlights the 'unproductive labor' of counting physical cash and suggests that giro accounts act as a stabilizing force by binding capital that would otherwise drive up prices.
Read full textThis segment evaluates the outcomes of the Brussels Financial Conference, emphasizing the consensus that financial stability is inseparable from general economic health. Kerschagl discusses the necessity of central bank independence from state credit needs, the rejection of 'international gold notes' or artificial currencies, and the critical need for a fixed limit on German reparations. He critiques the social aspect of inflation as a struggle between classes for relative income shares and echoes Gustav Cassel's call for international cooperation and the restoration of a rational global economy.
Read full textA comprehensive list of journals and books cited in the work. It includes major economic journals of the era (e.g., Der Österreichische Volkswirt, The Economist) and seminal texts by authors such as Wieser, Schumpeter, Knapp, Bendixen, Mises, and Cassel, covering topics from the state theory of money to the problems of post-war inflation.
Read full text