by Kirzner
[Front Matter and Publication Details]: Title pages, series information, and publication metadata for Israel M. Kirzner's 'The Economic Point of View'. Includes references to other works in the 'Studies in Economic Theory' series such as those by Rothbard and Mises. [Foreword by Ludwig von Mises]: Ludwig von Mises provides a foreword discussing the emergence of economics as a systematic science during the Enlightenment. He highlights the transition of economics from a science of wealth to a science of human action and praises Kirzner's historical account of the epistemological debates surrounding the definition of the economic field. [Introduction to the Second Edition]: Laurence S. Moss introduces the second edition by contrasting the subjectivist approach of Mises and Kirzner with positivism and statistical modeling. He argues that economic explanations must be grounded in the purposes and plans of individuals (praxeology) rather than mere correlations of statistical aggregates. Moss specifically critiques modern treatments of 'cost' and 'unemployment' that ignore the qualitative choices of acting individuals. [Author's Preface]: Kirzner outlines the scope of his study, which focuses on the 'point of view' or perspective that defines economic inquiry. He acknowledges his intellectual debt to Ludwig von Mises and describes the evolution of the project from his doctoral research at New York University. [Acknowledgments and Table of Contents]: A comprehensive list of acknowledgments for permissions to quote from major economic thinkers and publishers, followed by the initial section of the Table of Contents covering Chapter 1. [Table of Contents and Chapter Outlines]: This segment provides the detailed table of contents for chapters two through seven of Kirzner's work. It outlines the historical progression of economic definitions from the science of wealth and welfare to the science of avarice, the market-based 'catallactics', the role of money as a measuring rod, and finally the modern definitions centered on scarcity, economizing, and the praxeological view of human action. [Chapter 1: On Defining the Economic Point of View]: Kirzner introduces the problem of defining the 'economic point of view,' distinguishing it from the mere scope of the subject matter. He argues that defining the discipline is an epistemological task that reveals the 'nature' of the concept rather than just providing a nominal label. The chapter sets the stage for a topical, rather than chronological, history of how economists have attempted to isolate the economic aspect of social phenomena, addressing the controversy over whether such definitions are scientifically useful or merely sterile logomachy. [The Significance and Utility of Definition in Economics]: This section examines the debate regarding the utility of defining economics. While some thinkers like Pareto and Myrdal view definitions as arbitrary boundary-drawing, Kirzner aligns with Robbins and Knight in arguing that a precise definition is essential for scientific progress and for understanding the unique 'nature' of the discipline. He explores the logical distinction between nominal and real definitions, suggesting that a real definition of economics involves an analysis of a unique element in human experience that only prolonged study can reveal. [The Evolution of Economic Definitions: From Classical to Modern]: Kirzner provides a historical overview of how the definition of economics has shifted. He begins with the classical economists' focus on wealth, moves through the methodological self-consciousness of the 1830s (Mill, Senior), and discusses the impact of the Methodenstreit on defining the economic point of view. He highlights the 20th-century transition from 'Type A' definitions (departmental/wealth-based) to 'Type B' definitions (aspect-based/scarcity), culminating in the praxeological view of economics as a science of human action. [Chapter 2: The Science of Wealth and Welfare]: This chapter explores the earliest and most persistent definition of economics: the science of wealth. Kirzner analyzes why wealth emerged as the primary subject matter, citing the influence of mercantilist practical goals, the intellectual interest in private property, the ethical debates over egoism vs. altruism, and the prestige of the natural sciences. He argues that this 'objectivist' outlook treated economics as the study of a specific class of objects (wealth) rather than a specific type of human behavior. [The Definition of Wealth: Material vs. Immaterial]: Kirzner examines the classical controversy over whether 'wealth' should be restricted to material goods. Writers like Malthus and McCulloch favored a material definition for analytical precision and to avoid subsuming other sciences (like medicine or politics) into economics. Conversely, Ricardo and others focused on the distribution of material wealth. This debate illustrates the classical school's struggle to define the boundaries of their science while maintaining an objectivistic focus on tangible commodities. [The Science of Subsistence and the Materialist Interpretation]: This section discusses the 'subsistence' view of economics, which identifies the discipline with the provision of biological necessities. This perspective is most prominent in the Marxist materialist interpretation of history, where the 'economic' is equated with the production of the means of support. Kirzner also notes Veblen's similar focus on the 'material means of life.' He critiques this view for reducing human action to biological tropisms, thereby removing the teleological element of choice and purpose from economic science. [The Persistence of the Wealth Criterion and the Struggle with Nature]: Despite the rise of new theories, the definition of economics as the science of wealth persisted through the late 19th century. Kirzner highlights the views of Cairnes and members of the Historical School who clung to wealth as the defining object. He also introduces a variation of this view: economics as the study of man's struggle against the 'external world' (Schäffle, Storch, Tuttle). This shifted the focus slightly from the goods themselves to the interaction between human resources and the physical environment. [The Transition from Wealth to Welfare]: Kirzner traces the evolution of economic definitions from 'wealth' to 'welfare,' a shift facilitated by the marginal utility revolution. This neoclassical approach, championed by Marshall, Cannan, and Pigou, moved the focus from objective goods to the human happiness or 'material well-being' they provide. While more subjective, this view remained 'departmental' by limiting economics to a specific type of welfare. The section also addresses the ethical challenges and the 'sordid' reputation economics acquired by being associated with 'lower' physical needs. [Chapter 3: The Science of Avarice and the Economic Principle]: This chapter examines definitions that characterize economics as the science of self-interest or avarice. Kirzner focuses on J. S. Mill's construction of 'economic man'—a being motivated solely by the desire for wealth. This marked a shift from studying wealth as an object to studying a specific pattern of human behavior. This evolved into the 'economic principle' or the maximization principle (getting the most for the least), which Senior and others identified as the fundamental law of economic activity. [The Economic Impulse and the Rejection of Avarice]: Kirzner discusses the eventual rejection of a specifically 'economic' motive (avarice). Critics like Cliffe Leslie argued that the desire for wealth encompasses all human motives. Wicksteed famously 'shattered' the myth of economic man by introducing 'non-tuism'—the idea that economic relations are defined by a lack of regard for the other party's interests, not necessarily by selfishness. Macfie is noted for attempting to salvage 'economy' as an intrinsic value or ethical end in itself, regardless of the specific motives involved. [Economics and the Analogy of Mechanics]: The focus on maximization and self-interest led many economists to model their science after mechanics. Jevons, Edgeworth, and Pantaleoni used the 'economic calculus' to treat human motives as forces tending toward equilibrium. Kirzner highlights Schumpeter's early work as the extreme of this 'mechanical' view, where human behavior is excluded in favor of studying functional relationships between objective 'economic quantities.' This approach was criticized by Croce for treating the science of man as a natural science. [Chapter 4: Economics, the Market, and Society]: This chapter explores 'Catallactics,' or the science of exchanges. Originating with Whately, this view defines the economic sphere through the act of exchange rather than the nature of wealth. Kirzner examines three aspects of this view: exchange as a uniquely motivated human act (the 'propensity to truck'), exchange as the mechanism for the division of labor and social cooperation (Smith's 'invisible hand'), and exchange as a purely formal concept for changing economic quantities (Schumpeter). [The Economic System and the Volkswirtschaft]: Kirzner analyzes the conception of economics as the study of an organized 'system' or 'organism.' Bastiat and Hayek are cited as proponents of the view that the market's spontaneous order is the primary object of economic study. The section also explores the German concept of 'Volkswirtschaft' (national economy), which emphasizes the social and historical character of economic phenomena, often in opposition to individualistic 'economizing' definitions. Amonn's insistence on the social nature of economic relationships is a key theme here. [Economics as a Subsystem of Sociology]: This section reviews the relationship between economics and the broader social sciences. It covers the extreme view of Comte (denying economics a separate status) and the more moderate views of Pareto and Parsons. Pareto saw economics as a first abstraction from sociology, while Parsons eventually defined the 'economy' as a specific subsystem of society characterized by its 'adaptive function'—the control of the environment to attain goals. This 'sociological' outlook defines the economic point of view by its location within a general theory of social systems. [Chapter 5: Economic Affairs, Money, and Measurement]: Kirzner examines the role of money in defining economics. One view identifies economics with the 'business world' where pecuniary self-interest is dominant (Bagehot, Lowe). A more sophisticated view, developed by Marshall and Pigou, defines economics as the study of motives that can be measured by the 'measuring rod of money.' This section explores how the existence of a monetary bridge between production and consumption created a seemingly distinct area of activity susceptible to precise economic analysis. [Critique of the Money Measure and Price-Economics]: This section critiques the 'money as a measuring rod' definition. Kirzner notes that money does not truly measure subjective desires, but merely reflects them in exchange ratios. He discusses Simon Patten's distinction between 'positive' and 'absolute' utilities and the rise of 'price-economics' (Pareto, Cassel, Mitchell), which sought to avoid subjective categories by focusing on objective market prices. The essentiality of money for rational economic calculation is highlighted, particularly in the context of the socialist calculation debate. [Money as an Active Economic Institution]: Kirzner concludes the discussion on money by considering it as an active institution that shapes human habits of thought. Unlike Marshall, who saw money as a passive tool for measurement, Mitchell and Veblen argued that the use of money 'exerts a distinct and independent influence' on behavior, promoting a specific type of rationality and monetary calculus. While money facilitates economic logic, Kirzner notes that restricting economics to monetary phenomena may be seen as an arbitrary institutional limitation. [Chapter 6: Economics and Economizing]: This chapter introduces the modern 'Type B' definition of economics, most famously articulated by Lionel Robbins. This view defines economics not by its subject matter (wealth or money), but by the aspect of scarcity: the necessity of choosing between competing ends with limited means. Kirzner notes that this definition is 'formal' and 'neutral' regarding the nature of the ends themselves. It represents a major shift toward seeing economics as a science of choice and economizing, building on the work of Wicksteed. [The Economics of Professor Robbins]: This segment introduces Lionel Robbins' influential definition of economics as the study of human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means with alternative uses. Kirzner explores how Robbins shifted the focus from specific types of behavior to the 'economic aspect' of all behavior, centered on the necessity of choice under conditions of scarcity. [Scarcity and Economics]: Kirzner traces the historical development of scarcity as a defining criterion in economic thought, from the Physiocrats and Classical economists to the subjective turn in the late 19th century. He highlights Carl Menger's role in placing scarcity at the forefront of 'economizing' and discusses how later thinkers like Walras and various German writers integrated scarcity into their definitions of the discipline. [Economizing and Maximization]: This section distinguishes between the concept of 'maximization' (getting the most out of the least) and Robbins' concept of 'economizing.' Kirzner argues that while they are related, economizing is a superior analytical framework because it avoids the pitfalls of cardinal utility and focuses on the actual allocation of resources among multiple intermediate ends rather than a single ultimate goal like 'satisfaction.' [The Character and Breadth of Robbins' Definition]: Kirzner analyzes the 'analytical' rather than 'classificatory' nature of Robbins' definition, which focuses on an aspect of behavior rather than a specific type of act. He addresses early criticisms that this definition was too broad, potentially including non-market activities like chess or romance, and explains how Robbins defended the focus on the 'economic aspect' of all human action. [The "Formalism" of Robbins' Definition]: This segment details the debate over the 'formalism' of Robbins' approach, specifically the critique by R.W. Souter who favored a more 'organic' and empirical 'Living Classical Faith.' Kirzner uses Talcott Parsons' appraisal to clarify that Robbins' formalism is an analytical abstraction necessary for theory, contrasting it with the total repudiation of theory found in extreme empiricism. [The Nature of Ends and Means]: Kirzner examines technical criticisms of the ends-means schema, noting that critics like Souter and Macfie found Robbins' treatment too 'positivistic' or 'behavioristic' by ignoring the purposive, forward-looking nature of human action. He also discusses the difficulty of distinguishing economics from technology when every means can be viewed as an intermediate end. ["Given" Ends and Means and the Role of the Specialist]: The discussion focuses on the assumption that ends and means are 'given' data for the economist. Kirzner explains that while this allows for scientific 'Wertfreiheit' (ethical neutrality), it also limits the economist's scope, requiring them to ignore how tastes and values are formed. He argues this is a necessary division of labor rather than a failure to recognize the complexity of reality. [Single End vs. Multiple Ends and the Economic Motive]: Kirzner explores the tension between viewing economics as the allocation among multiple ends versus the maximization of a single ultimate end (like satisfaction). He highlights Robbins' and Hayek's view of the 'economic motive' as a desire for general power (money) to achieve unspecified future ends, which bridges the gap between specific goals and general welfare maximization. [Economics and Ethics: The Positive and the Normative]: This section examines the 'logical gulf' Robbins placed between positive and normative studies. Kirzner contrasts Robbins' strict neutrality with Macfie's view that 'economy' itself is a human value and therefore economics is inherently normative. He also notes similarities between Macfie's 'value of economy' and Veblen's 'instinct for workmanship.' [The Significance of Macroeconomics and Idle Resources]: Kirzner addresses the critique that Robbins' scarcity-based definition excludes macroeconomics and the study of idle resources (Keynesian economics). He argues that even unemployed resources are 'scarce' relative to human desire, and that the failure to utilize them is a form of misallocation that falls squarely within the economic point of view. [Economics as a Science of Human Action: The Praxeological View]: Kirzner introduces the praxeological view of economics, which sees the discipline as a branch of a more general science of human action. This view, championed by Mises, focuses on the purposeful nature of human behavior. Economics is distinguished not by its subject matter (wealth or money) but by its reliance on the logic of choice and the 'residual element' of human action that cannot be explained by physical or psychological sciences alone. [The Praxeological Element and the Logic of Reason]: This segment explains the core of praxeology: the isolation of the 'human' element in conduct—purposeful, rational action. Kirzner argues that while external factors influence action, the specifically human element is the mandate of reason that selects a path among alternatives. This allows for a unique type of scientific explanation based on the logic of the actor. [The Emergence of Praxeology: Sherwood and Croce]: Kirzner traces the origins of the praxeological view to Sidney Sherwood and Benedetto Croce. Sherwood envisioned a 'master science' of conscious activities, while Croce, in his debate with Pareto, insisted that economics is a 'mathematic applied to the concept of human action,' rooted in the 'inner nature' of conscious choice and will rather than mere external observation. [Max Weber and the Limits of Verstehen]: Kirzner evaluates Max Weber's contribution to praxeology through the concept of 'Verstehen' (understanding). He argues that while Weber recognized the teleological nature of action, he failed to see it as a source of logical constraint. Instead, Weber relied on 'ideal types' of rational action, which Kirzner suggests makes his economics an artificial abstraction rather than a pure science of human action. [Mises, Robbins, and the Systematic Unity of Praxeology]: Kirzner compares the 'economizing' view of Robbins with the 'human action' view of Mises. He argues that Mises' praxeological approach is more fundamental, as it provides an epistemological rationale for economic theorems as logical corollaries of purposeful behavior. While Robbins focuses on the pattern of allocation, Mises focuses on the act of 'doing' and the systematic unity derived from the category of action. [Praxeology and Purpose: The Teleological Foundation]: Kirzner discusses the central role of purpose in the praxeological system. Unlike other views that merely 'take purpose into account' as a causal factor, praxeology uses it as the sole foundation for the concept of action. This teleological orientation allows for a unique kind of explanation where theorems are derived from the constraint that purposefulness imposes on behavior. [The Praxeological Concept of Rationality]: Kirzner defends the praxeological postulate that all action is rational by definition. Using Tagliacozzo's analysis of 'economic error' (the Rhine-wine case), he explains that 'irrationality' is simply a change in the actor's 'program' or ends. Rationality in praxeology is not a testable empirical claim but a formal requirement of purposeful action: the necessity of adapting means to whatever ends are currently sought. [The Assumption of Constant Wants and Theoretical Relativity]: This segment explains why praxeological theorems must treat purposes as 'given' and 'constant' data. Kirzner argues that this 'relativity' to a specific program is not a weakness but a scientific achievement, as it allows the theorist to isolate determinate causal forces within the 'jungle' of empirical facts. Theory provides the explanatory key by arresting program changes mentally to see their logical consequences. [Praxeology, Apriorism, and the Nature of Economic Knowledge]: Kirzner clarifies the a priori nature of praxeology. He argues that while economics must refer to real-world facts to be useful, the *procedure* of economic reasoning is independent of those facts. It is a product of pure logic derived from the category of action. He defends this against 'operationalist' critiques, asserting that introspection provides a valid and necessary source of knowledge for understanding social phenomena. [The Economic Point of View as the Praxeological Point of View]: In the concluding section of the chunk, Kirzner identifies the economic point of view with the praxeological one. He argues that traditional definitions (wealth, money, market) are arbitrary slices of a larger 'pie' which is human action. Even Robbins' ends-means definition is seen as a technical subset of the broader praxeological truth: that economics is the study of the consequences of purposeful human behavior in all its forms. [Notes to Chapter I]: This segment contains the comprehensive endnotes for Chapter I, providing bibliographic references and supplementary commentary on the history and definition of the economic point of view. It cites a wide array of thinkers including Marshall, Croce, Pareto, Robbins, and Menger, while also addressing specific methodological debates such as the distinction between real and nominal definitions, the impact of mathematical programming on economic scope, and early critiques of economics by Auguste Comte. The notes document the evolution of economic definitions across English, French, German, and Italian scholarship during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. [Notes to Chapter I (Continued) and Notes to Chapter II (1-10)]: This segment contains the concluding bibliographic note for Chapter I and the first ten notes for Chapter II. It addresses the definition of economics as a discipline, Adam Smith's conception of the subject as both science and art, and the influence of private property rights on early economic thinkers like Samuel Read. It also traces the intellectual ancestry of classical political economy to moral and political traditions. [Notes to Chapter II (11-23): Wealth, Distribution, and the Scope of Political Economy]: Notes 11 through 23 discuss the evolution of the concept of wealth and the shift toward distribution as the primary focus of economics. It highlights the debates between Malthus and Ricardo regarding the 'grand object' of economic inquiry, with Ricardo increasingly emphasizing the laws of distribution over the causes of wealth. [Notes to Chapter II (24-32): Wealth as Surplus and Materialist Interpretations]: Notes 24 through 32 examine the 'surplus' view of wealth, where wealth is defined as a surplus over current expenditure for wants, and its implications for the classical attitude toward consumption. It also provides references for the materialist interpretation of history, specifically citing Karl Marx's Capital and his critique of political economy. [Bibliographical Notes on Materialism and Economic Definitions]: A collection of bibliographical references (notes 33-41) focusing on the materialist interpretation of history and the definition of economics in terms of 'subsistence' and 'material means of life.' It cites works by Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and extensively documents Thorstein Veblen's use of the material-means-of-life criterion. [Bibliographical Notes on the Wealth-Focus and Human Economy]: Bibliographical notes (42-46) tracing the distinction between human economy and biological analogues, and the persistence of the 'wealth-focus' in 19th-century economic thought. Includes references to Cairnes, Price, Jevons, and Marshall regarding the 'laws of wealth' as the essence of political economy. [Bibliographical Notes on German and French Economic Methodology]: Notes (47-55) documenting German and French perspectives on the object of economics. It highlights the use of terms like 'Güter' (goods) and 'richnesses', the struggle of man against nature, and the methodology of social economics, citing thinkers such as Dietzel, Menger, Ely, and Storch. [Notes on the Evolution of Economic Definitions and Subjectivity]: This segment contains detailed bibliographic notes (56-79) supporting the historical analysis of the economic point of view. It documents the transition from objective definitions of wealth to subjective interpretations of welfare and human action. Key references include Schäffle's emphasis on the external world (Aussenwelt), the continuity between classical wealth analysis and modern welfare theory, and the debates surrounding Alfred Marshall's and Lionel Robbins' definitions of the science. It also cites various French, German, and American economists who contributed to the subjective turn in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. [Notes to Chapter II (Continued)]: Concluding footnotes for Chapter II, citing works by Whately, Longfield, Jennings, Bagehot, Jevons, and Edgeworth. Includes a reference to Hayek regarding the potential dangers of viewing economic affairs as 'sordid'. [Notes to Chapter III: The Development of the Economic Man]: Extensive notes for Chapter III detailing the evolution of the 'economic man' concept and the definition of political economy. It highlights J.S. Mill's shift toward a science of 'laws of mind' and Samuel Bailey's independent move toward a science of man. The notes trace the transition from wealth-centric definitions to those based on the 'economic principle' (maximizing utility or minimizing effort), citing thinkers like Senior, Jevons, Menger, and Dietzel. It also notes the debate over self-interest and the eventual rejection of the material-welfare criterion by later economists like Robbins. [Notes to Chapter III (Continued)]: Continuation of endnotes for Chapter III, detailing various scholarly perspectives on the economic principle, the motivation of economic activities, and the definition of the economic point of view. It includes references to Wicksteed's 'non-tuism', Schumpeter's views on economic quantities and human agency, and the relationship between economics and mechanics as influenced by Ernst Mach. [Notes to Chapter IV: The Catallactic Point of View]: Comprehensive notes for Chapter IV focusing on the history and development of the catallactic (exchange-based) definition of economics. The notes track the evolution of the term from Whately and the Dublin School through American economists like Perry and Walker, to the more modern interpretations by Schumpeter and Mises. It highlights debates over whether exchangeability is a prerequisite for wealth and the inclusion of government services/taxation within the scope of exchange. [Notes to Chapter IV (Continued)]: Continuation of endnotes for Chapter IV. These notes reference debates on the social character of economic affairs, the concept of 'Volkswirtschaft' (national economy), and the distinction between purely economic categories and social elements. Key figures cited include Knight, Menger, Schmoller, and Amonn. [Notes to Chapter V]: Endnotes for Chapter V focusing on the 'measuring rod of money' and the definition of economics as the science of business or price-phenomena. It documents the transition from Marshallian welfare concerns to the more technical 'price-economics' and 'catallactic' viewpoints, citing Mises, Mitchell, and Pigou. [Notes to Chapter VI]: Endnotes for Chapter VI regarding the scarcity-based definition of economics popularized by Lionel Robbins. The notes trace the intellectual precursors of this view in the works of Menger, Dietzel, and Weber, while also referencing the relationship between scarcity and welfare economics. [Notes to Chapter VI: The Scarcity View of Economics]: Comprehensive endnotes for Chapter VI, providing bibliographic references and brief commentary on the scarcity definition of economics. It cites key works by Lionel Robbins, Frank Knight, and Talcott Parsons regarding the distinction between economic action and technology, the role of purposive behavior, and the debate over the positive versus normative nature of economic science. [Notes to Chapter VII: Economics as a Science of Human Action]: Endnotes for the beginning of Chapter VII, tracing the history and philosophical foundations of 'praxeology' or the science of human action. References include early glimpses of the concept in the 19th century, Benedetto Croce's philosophical system, and Max Weber's methodological contributions to social science and economic understanding. [Notes on the Praxeological View and Economic Methodology]: This segment contains detailed bibliographic notes and scholarly commentary supporting the discussion on the praxeological view of economics. It includes references to Mises, Hayek, Robbins, and Knight regarding the nature of human action, the identification of rationality with purposefulness, and the debate over the a priori status of economic theory. Notable commentary includes a comparison between Mises and Croce on the nature of economic error and Northrop's critique of the possibility of a theoretical science of economic dynamics based on the formal nature of human wants. [Notes on Praxeology and Economic Methodology]: Concluding footnotes for the final chapter, referencing works by Rothbard, Knight, Mises, and Robbins regarding the systematic place of economics within the praxeological sciences and the boundaries of economic science. [Index of Subjects]: A comprehensive subject index for 'The Economic Point of View', covering key themes such as human action, catallactics, the definition of economics across different schools, the relationship between ends and means, and the evolution of the concept of wealth. [Index of Subjects (Continued)]: Continuation of the subject index, focusing on topics from 'Purpose' through 'Welfare', including entries for rationalism, scarcity, and the teleological nature of wealth. [Index of Authors]: A detailed author index listing the major economists and philosophers cited in the text, including classical figures like Smith and Mill, and Austrian school thinkers like Menger, Mises, and Hayek, with specific page references to their contributions to economic thought.
Title pages, series information, and publication metadata for Israel M. Kirzner's 'The Economic Point of View'. Includes references to other works in the 'Studies in Economic Theory' series such as those by Rothbard and Mises.
Read full textLudwig von Mises provides a foreword discussing the emergence of economics as a systematic science during the Enlightenment. He highlights the transition of economics from a science of wealth to a science of human action and praises Kirzner's historical account of the epistemological debates surrounding the definition of the economic field.
Read full textLaurence S. Moss introduces the second edition by contrasting the subjectivist approach of Mises and Kirzner with positivism and statistical modeling. He argues that economic explanations must be grounded in the purposes and plans of individuals (praxeology) rather than mere correlations of statistical aggregates. Moss specifically critiques modern treatments of 'cost' and 'unemployment' that ignore the qualitative choices of acting individuals.
Read full textKirzner outlines the scope of his study, which focuses on the 'point of view' or perspective that defines economic inquiry. He acknowledges his intellectual debt to Ludwig von Mises and describes the evolution of the project from his doctoral research at New York University.
Read full textA comprehensive list of acknowledgments for permissions to quote from major economic thinkers and publishers, followed by the initial section of the Table of Contents covering Chapter 1.
Read full textThis segment provides the detailed table of contents for chapters two through seven of Kirzner's work. It outlines the historical progression of economic definitions from the science of wealth and welfare to the science of avarice, the market-based 'catallactics', the role of money as a measuring rod, and finally the modern definitions centered on scarcity, economizing, and the praxeological view of human action.
Read full textKirzner introduces the problem of defining the 'economic point of view,' distinguishing it from the mere scope of the subject matter. He argues that defining the discipline is an epistemological task that reveals the 'nature' of the concept rather than just providing a nominal label. The chapter sets the stage for a topical, rather than chronological, history of how economists have attempted to isolate the economic aspect of social phenomena, addressing the controversy over whether such definitions are scientifically useful or merely sterile logomachy.
Read full textThis section examines the debate regarding the utility of defining economics. While some thinkers like Pareto and Myrdal view definitions as arbitrary boundary-drawing, Kirzner aligns with Robbins and Knight in arguing that a precise definition is essential for scientific progress and for understanding the unique 'nature' of the discipline. He explores the logical distinction between nominal and real definitions, suggesting that a real definition of economics involves an analysis of a unique element in human experience that only prolonged study can reveal.
Read full textKirzner provides a historical overview of how the definition of economics has shifted. He begins with the classical economists' focus on wealth, moves through the methodological self-consciousness of the 1830s (Mill, Senior), and discusses the impact of the Methodenstreit on defining the economic point of view. He highlights the 20th-century transition from 'Type A' definitions (departmental/wealth-based) to 'Type B' definitions (aspect-based/scarcity), culminating in the praxeological view of economics as a science of human action.
Read full textThis chapter explores the earliest and most persistent definition of economics: the science of wealth. Kirzner analyzes why wealth emerged as the primary subject matter, citing the influence of mercantilist practical goals, the intellectual interest in private property, the ethical debates over egoism vs. altruism, and the prestige of the natural sciences. He argues that this 'objectivist' outlook treated economics as the study of a specific class of objects (wealth) rather than a specific type of human behavior.
Read full textKirzner examines the classical controversy over whether 'wealth' should be restricted to material goods. Writers like Malthus and McCulloch favored a material definition for analytical precision and to avoid subsuming other sciences (like medicine or politics) into economics. Conversely, Ricardo and others focused on the distribution of material wealth. This debate illustrates the classical school's struggle to define the boundaries of their science while maintaining an objectivistic focus on tangible commodities.
Read full textThis section discusses the 'subsistence' view of economics, which identifies the discipline with the provision of biological necessities. This perspective is most prominent in the Marxist materialist interpretation of history, where the 'economic' is equated with the production of the means of support. Kirzner also notes Veblen's similar focus on the 'material means of life.' He critiques this view for reducing human action to biological tropisms, thereby removing the teleological element of choice and purpose from economic science.
Read full textDespite the rise of new theories, the definition of economics as the science of wealth persisted through the late 19th century. Kirzner highlights the views of Cairnes and members of the Historical School who clung to wealth as the defining object. He also introduces a variation of this view: economics as the study of man's struggle against the 'external world' (Schäffle, Storch, Tuttle). This shifted the focus slightly from the goods themselves to the interaction between human resources and the physical environment.
Read full textKirzner traces the evolution of economic definitions from 'wealth' to 'welfare,' a shift facilitated by the marginal utility revolution. This neoclassical approach, championed by Marshall, Cannan, and Pigou, moved the focus from objective goods to the human happiness or 'material well-being' they provide. While more subjective, this view remained 'departmental' by limiting economics to a specific type of welfare. The section also addresses the ethical challenges and the 'sordid' reputation economics acquired by being associated with 'lower' physical needs.
Read full textThis chapter examines definitions that characterize economics as the science of self-interest or avarice. Kirzner focuses on J. S. Mill's construction of 'economic man'—a being motivated solely by the desire for wealth. This marked a shift from studying wealth as an object to studying a specific pattern of human behavior. This evolved into the 'economic principle' or the maximization principle (getting the most for the least), which Senior and others identified as the fundamental law of economic activity.
Read full textKirzner discusses the eventual rejection of a specifically 'economic' motive (avarice). Critics like Cliffe Leslie argued that the desire for wealth encompasses all human motives. Wicksteed famously 'shattered' the myth of economic man by introducing 'non-tuism'—the idea that economic relations are defined by a lack of regard for the other party's interests, not necessarily by selfishness. Macfie is noted for attempting to salvage 'economy' as an intrinsic value or ethical end in itself, regardless of the specific motives involved.
Read full textThe focus on maximization and self-interest led many economists to model their science after mechanics. Jevons, Edgeworth, and Pantaleoni used the 'economic calculus' to treat human motives as forces tending toward equilibrium. Kirzner highlights Schumpeter's early work as the extreme of this 'mechanical' view, where human behavior is excluded in favor of studying functional relationships between objective 'economic quantities.' This approach was criticized by Croce for treating the science of man as a natural science.
Read full textThis chapter explores 'Catallactics,' or the science of exchanges. Originating with Whately, this view defines the economic sphere through the act of exchange rather than the nature of wealth. Kirzner examines three aspects of this view: exchange as a uniquely motivated human act (the 'propensity to truck'), exchange as the mechanism for the division of labor and social cooperation (Smith's 'invisible hand'), and exchange as a purely formal concept for changing economic quantities (Schumpeter).
Read full textKirzner analyzes the conception of economics as the study of an organized 'system' or 'organism.' Bastiat and Hayek are cited as proponents of the view that the market's spontaneous order is the primary object of economic study. The section also explores the German concept of 'Volkswirtschaft' (national economy), which emphasizes the social and historical character of economic phenomena, often in opposition to individualistic 'economizing' definitions. Amonn's insistence on the social nature of economic relationships is a key theme here.
Read full textThis section reviews the relationship between economics and the broader social sciences. It covers the extreme view of Comte (denying economics a separate status) and the more moderate views of Pareto and Parsons. Pareto saw economics as a first abstraction from sociology, while Parsons eventually defined the 'economy' as a specific subsystem of society characterized by its 'adaptive function'—the control of the environment to attain goals. This 'sociological' outlook defines the economic point of view by its location within a general theory of social systems.
Read full textKirzner examines the role of money in defining economics. One view identifies economics with the 'business world' where pecuniary self-interest is dominant (Bagehot, Lowe). A more sophisticated view, developed by Marshall and Pigou, defines economics as the study of motives that can be measured by the 'measuring rod of money.' This section explores how the existence of a monetary bridge between production and consumption created a seemingly distinct area of activity susceptible to precise economic analysis.
Read full textThis section critiques the 'money as a measuring rod' definition. Kirzner notes that money does not truly measure subjective desires, but merely reflects them in exchange ratios. He discusses Simon Patten's distinction between 'positive' and 'absolute' utilities and the rise of 'price-economics' (Pareto, Cassel, Mitchell), which sought to avoid subjective categories by focusing on objective market prices. The essentiality of money for rational economic calculation is highlighted, particularly in the context of the socialist calculation debate.
Read full textKirzner concludes the discussion on money by considering it as an active institution that shapes human habits of thought. Unlike Marshall, who saw money as a passive tool for measurement, Mitchell and Veblen argued that the use of money 'exerts a distinct and independent influence' on behavior, promoting a specific type of rationality and monetary calculus. While money facilitates economic logic, Kirzner notes that restricting economics to monetary phenomena may be seen as an arbitrary institutional limitation.
Read full textThis chapter introduces the modern 'Type B' definition of economics, most famously articulated by Lionel Robbins. This view defines economics not by its subject matter (wealth or money), but by the aspect of scarcity: the necessity of choosing between competing ends with limited means. Kirzner notes that this definition is 'formal' and 'neutral' regarding the nature of the ends themselves. It represents a major shift toward seeing economics as a science of choice and economizing, building on the work of Wicksteed.
Read full textThis segment introduces Lionel Robbins' influential definition of economics as the study of human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means with alternative uses. Kirzner explores how Robbins shifted the focus from specific types of behavior to the 'economic aspect' of all behavior, centered on the necessity of choice under conditions of scarcity.
Read full textKirzner traces the historical development of scarcity as a defining criterion in economic thought, from the Physiocrats and Classical economists to the subjective turn in the late 19th century. He highlights Carl Menger's role in placing scarcity at the forefront of 'economizing' and discusses how later thinkers like Walras and various German writers integrated scarcity into their definitions of the discipline.
Read full textThis section distinguishes between the concept of 'maximization' (getting the most out of the least) and Robbins' concept of 'economizing.' Kirzner argues that while they are related, economizing is a superior analytical framework because it avoids the pitfalls of cardinal utility and focuses on the actual allocation of resources among multiple intermediate ends rather than a single ultimate goal like 'satisfaction.'
Read full textKirzner analyzes the 'analytical' rather than 'classificatory' nature of Robbins' definition, which focuses on an aspect of behavior rather than a specific type of act. He addresses early criticisms that this definition was too broad, potentially including non-market activities like chess or romance, and explains how Robbins defended the focus on the 'economic aspect' of all human action.
Read full textThis segment details the debate over the 'formalism' of Robbins' approach, specifically the critique by R.W. Souter who favored a more 'organic' and empirical 'Living Classical Faith.' Kirzner uses Talcott Parsons' appraisal to clarify that Robbins' formalism is an analytical abstraction necessary for theory, contrasting it with the total repudiation of theory found in extreme empiricism.
Read full textKirzner examines technical criticisms of the ends-means schema, noting that critics like Souter and Macfie found Robbins' treatment too 'positivistic' or 'behavioristic' by ignoring the purposive, forward-looking nature of human action. He also discusses the difficulty of distinguishing economics from technology when every means can be viewed as an intermediate end.
Read full textThe discussion focuses on the assumption that ends and means are 'given' data for the economist. Kirzner explains that while this allows for scientific 'Wertfreiheit' (ethical neutrality), it also limits the economist's scope, requiring them to ignore how tastes and values are formed. He argues this is a necessary division of labor rather than a failure to recognize the complexity of reality.
Read full textKirzner explores the tension between viewing economics as the allocation among multiple ends versus the maximization of a single ultimate end (like satisfaction). He highlights Robbins' and Hayek's view of the 'economic motive' as a desire for general power (money) to achieve unspecified future ends, which bridges the gap between specific goals and general welfare maximization.
Read full textThis section examines the 'logical gulf' Robbins placed between positive and normative studies. Kirzner contrasts Robbins' strict neutrality with Macfie's view that 'economy' itself is a human value and therefore economics is inherently normative. He also notes similarities between Macfie's 'value of economy' and Veblen's 'instinct for workmanship.'
Read full textKirzner addresses the critique that Robbins' scarcity-based definition excludes macroeconomics and the study of idle resources (Keynesian economics). He argues that even unemployed resources are 'scarce' relative to human desire, and that the failure to utilize them is a form of misallocation that falls squarely within the economic point of view.
Read full textKirzner introduces the praxeological view of economics, which sees the discipline as a branch of a more general science of human action. This view, championed by Mises, focuses on the purposeful nature of human behavior. Economics is distinguished not by its subject matter (wealth or money) but by its reliance on the logic of choice and the 'residual element' of human action that cannot be explained by physical or psychological sciences alone.
Read full textThis segment explains the core of praxeology: the isolation of the 'human' element in conduct—purposeful, rational action. Kirzner argues that while external factors influence action, the specifically human element is the mandate of reason that selects a path among alternatives. This allows for a unique type of scientific explanation based on the logic of the actor.
Read full textKirzner traces the origins of the praxeological view to Sidney Sherwood and Benedetto Croce. Sherwood envisioned a 'master science' of conscious activities, while Croce, in his debate with Pareto, insisted that economics is a 'mathematic applied to the concept of human action,' rooted in the 'inner nature' of conscious choice and will rather than mere external observation.
Read full textKirzner evaluates Max Weber's contribution to praxeology through the concept of 'Verstehen' (understanding). He argues that while Weber recognized the teleological nature of action, he failed to see it as a source of logical constraint. Instead, Weber relied on 'ideal types' of rational action, which Kirzner suggests makes his economics an artificial abstraction rather than a pure science of human action.
Read full textKirzner compares the 'economizing' view of Robbins with the 'human action' view of Mises. He argues that Mises' praxeological approach is more fundamental, as it provides an epistemological rationale for economic theorems as logical corollaries of purposeful behavior. While Robbins focuses on the pattern of allocation, Mises focuses on the act of 'doing' and the systematic unity derived from the category of action.
Read full textKirzner discusses the central role of purpose in the praxeological system. Unlike other views that merely 'take purpose into account' as a causal factor, praxeology uses it as the sole foundation for the concept of action. This teleological orientation allows for a unique kind of explanation where theorems are derived from the constraint that purposefulness imposes on behavior.
Read full textKirzner defends the praxeological postulate that all action is rational by definition. Using Tagliacozzo's analysis of 'economic error' (the Rhine-wine case), he explains that 'irrationality' is simply a change in the actor's 'program' or ends. Rationality in praxeology is not a testable empirical claim but a formal requirement of purposeful action: the necessity of adapting means to whatever ends are currently sought.
Read full textThis segment explains why praxeological theorems must treat purposes as 'given' and 'constant' data. Kirzner argues that this 'relativity' to a specific program is not a weakness but a scientific achievement, as it allows the theorist to isolate determinate causal forces within the 'jungle' of empirical facts. Theory provides the explanatory key by arresting program changes mentally to see their logical consequences.
Read full textKirzner clarifies the a priori nature of praxeology. He argues that while economics must refer to real-world facts to be useful, the *procedure* of economic reasoning is independent of those facts. It is a product of pure logic derived from the category of action. He defends this against 'operationalist' critiques, asserting that introspection provides a valid and necessary source of knowledge for understanding social phenomena.
Read full textIn the concluding section of the chunk, Kirzner identifies the economic point of view with the praxeological one. He argues that traditional definitions (wealth, money, market) are arbitrary slices of a larger 'pie' which is human action. Even Robbins' ends-means definition is seen as a technical subset of the broader praxeological truth: that economics is the study of the consequences of purposeful human behavior in all its forms.
Read full textThis segment contains the comprehensive endnotes for Chapter I, providing bibliographic references and supplementary commentary on the history and definition of the economic point of view. It cites a wide array of thinkers including Marshall, Croce, Pareto, Robbins, and Menger, while also addressing specific methodological debates such as the distinction between real and nominal definitions, the impact of mathematical programming on economic scope, and early critiques of economics by Auguste Comte. The notes document the evolution of economic definitions across English, French, German, and Italian scholarship during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Read full textThis segment contains the concluding bibliographic note for Chapter I and the first ten notes for Chapter II. It addresses the definition of economics as a discipline, Adam Smith's conception of the subject as both science and art, and the influence of private property rights on early economic thinkers like Samuel Read. It also traces the intellectual ancestry of classical political economy to moral and political traditions.
Read full textNotes 11 through 23 discuss the evolution of the concept of wealth and the shift toward distribution as the primary focus of economics. It highlights the debates between Malthus and Ricardo regarding the 'grand object' of economic inquiry, with Ricardo increasingly emphasizing the laws of distribution over the causes of wealth.
Read full textNotes 24 through 32 examine the 'surplus' view of wealth, where wealth is defined as a surplus over current expenditure for wants, and its implications for the classical attitude toward consumption. It also provides references for the materialist interpretation of history, specifically citing Karl Marx's Capital and his critique of political economy.
Read full textA collection of bibliographical references (notes 33-41) focusing on the materialist interpretation of history and the definition of economics in terms of 'subsistence' and 'material means of life.' It cites works by Marx, Engels, Kautsky, and extensively documents Thorstein Veblen's use of the material-means-of-life criterion.
Read full textBibliographical notes (42-46) tracing the distinction between human economy and biological analogues, and the persistence of the 'wealth-focus' in 19th-century economic thought. Includes references to Cairnes, Price, Jevons, and Marshall regarding the 'laws of wealth' as the essence of political economy.
Read full textNotes (47-55) documenting German and French perspectives on the object of economics. It highlights the use of terms like 'Güter' (goods) and 'richnesses', the struggle of man against nature, and the methodology of social economics, citing thinkers such as Dietzel, Menger, Ely, and Storch.
Read full textThis segment contains detailed bibliographic notes (56-79) supporting the historical analysis of the economic point of view. It documents the transition from objective definitions of wealth to subjective interpretations of welfare and human action. Key references include Schäffle's emphasis on the external world (Aussenwelt), the continuity between classical wealth analysis and modern welfare theory, and the debates surrounding Alfred Marshall's and Lionel Robbins' definitions of the science. It also cites various French, German, and American economists who contributed to the subjective turn in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Read full textConcluding footnotes for Chapter II, citing works by Whately, Longfield, Jennings, Bagehot, Jevons, and Edgeworth. Includes a reference to Hayek regarding the potential dangers of viewing economic affairs as 'sordid'.
Read full textExtensive notes for Chapter III detailing the evolution of the 'economic man' concept and the definition of political economy. It highlights J.S. Mill's shift toward a science of 'laws of mind' and Samuel Bailey's independent move toward a science of man. The notes trace the transition from wealth-centric definitions to those based on the 'economic principle' (maximizing utility or minimizing effort), citing thinkers like Senior, Jevons, Menger, and Dietzel. It also notes the debate over self-interest and the eventual rejection of the material-welfare criterion by later economists like Robbins.
Read full textContinuation of endnotes for Chapter III, detailing various scholarly perspectives on the economic principle, the motivation of economic activities, and the definition of the economic point of view. It includes references to Wicksteed's 'non-tuism', Schumpeter's views on economic quantities and human agency, and the relationship between economics and mechanics as influenced by Ernst Mach.
Read full textComprehensive notes for Chapter IV focusing on the history and development of the catallactic (exchange-based) definition of economics. The notes track the evolution of the term from Whately and the Dublin School through American economists like Perry and Walker, to the more modern interpretations by Schumpeter and Mises. It highlights debates over whether exchangeability is a prerequisite for wealth and the inclusion of government services/taxation within the scope of exchange.
Read full textContinuation of endnotes for Chapter IV. These notes reference debates on the social character of economic affairs, the concept of 'Volkswirtschaft' (national economy), and the distinction between purely economic categories and social elements. Key figures cited include Knight, Menger, Schmoller, and Amonn.
Read full textEndnotes for Chapter V focusing on the 'measuring rod of money' and the definition of economics as the science of business or price-phenomena. It documents the transition from Marshallian welfare concerns to the more technical 'price-economics' and 'catallactic' viewpoints, citing Mises, Mitchell, and Pigou.
Read full textEndnotes for Chapter VI regarding the scarcity-based definition of economics popularized by Lionel Robbins. The notes trace the intellectual precursors of this view in the works of Menger, Dietzel, and Weber, while also referencing the relationship between scarcity and welfare economics.
Read full textComprehensive endnotes for Chapter VI, providing bibliographic references and brief commentary on the scarcity definition of economics. It cites key works by Lionel Robbins, Frank Knight, and Talcott Parsons regarding the distinction between economic action and technology, the role of purposive behavior, and the debate over the positive versus normative nature of economic science.
Read full textEndnotes for the beginning of Chapter VII, tracing the history and philosophical foundations of 'praxeology' or the science of human action. References include early glimpses of the concept in the 19th century, Benedetto Croce's philosophical system, and Max Weber's methodological contributions to social science and economic understanding.
Read full textThis segment contains detailed bibliographic notes and scholarly commentary supporting the discussion on the praxeological view of economics. It includes references to Mises, Hayek, Robbins, and Knight regarding the nature of human action, the identification of rationality with purposefulness, and the debate over the a priori status of economic theory. Notable commentary includes a comparison between Mises and Croce on the nature of economic error and Northrop's critique of the possibility of a theoretical science of economic dynamics based on the formal nature of human wants.
Read full textConcluding footnotes for the final chapter, referencing works by Rothbard, Knight, Mises, and Robbins regarding the systematic place of economics within the praxeological sciences and the boundaries of economic science.
Read full textA comprehensive subject index for 'The Economic Point of View', covering key themes such as human action, catallactics, the definition of economics across different schools, the relationship between ends and means, and the evolution of the concept of wealth.
Read full textContinuation of the subject index, focusing on topics from 'Purpose' through 'Welfare', including entries for rationalism, scarcity, and the teleological nature of wealth.
Read full textA detailed author index listing the major economists and philosophers cited in the text, including classical figures like Smith and Mill, and Austrian school thinkers like Menger, Mises, and Hayek, with specific page references to their contributions to economic thought.
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