by Menger
[Title Page and Publication Details]: The title page of Carl Menger's 1884 work 'Errors of Historicism in German Political Economy', including author credentials and publication information. [Preface (Vorwort)]: Menger critiques the 'historical school' of German economists for their lack of clarity regarding the goals and methods of political economy. He argues that the reform of the science must come from within its own theoretical problems rather than through the external imposition of historical, mathematical, or physiological methods, and he announces his intention to defend his 'Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences' against recent attacks. [Table of Contents (Inhalt)]: A detailed table of contents listing sixteen 'letters' that address various methodological errors of historicism and specific critiques of Gustav Schmoller. [First Letter: The Utility of Superficial Criticism]: Menger responds to a friend's suggestion to ignore Gustav Schmoller's harsh review of his work. He argues that even superficial and ill-informed criticism provides a valuable opportunity to clarify complex ideas for a broader audience and to expose the misunderstandings prevalent among certain circles of readers. [Second Letter: Addressing Personal Attacks and Misrepresentation]: Menger addresses the personal and 'vulgar' nature of Schmoller's polemical style, citing previous complaints by Treitschke. He justifies his public response as a duty to protect the integrity of the science and to break the 'terrorism' exercised by certain editors who misrepresent the work of others. [Third Letter: Directions of Research in Economics]: Menger distinguishes between historical-statistical research (the study of individual phenomena) and theoretical research (the study of general forms and laws). He critiques the German historical school for conflating these distinct tasks and emphasizes the necessity of both empirical and 'exact' directions in theoretical research to understand the economic side of social life. [Fourth Letter: Distinguishing History from Theory]: Menger argues against Schmoller's attempt to blur the lines between history and theory. While acknowledging that history serves as an auxiliary science to theory, he insists that they have fundamentally different goals: history deals with concrete, individual events in time and space, while theory seeks to identify types and typical relations (laws). [Fifth Letter: Schmoller's Motives for Blurring Boundaries]: Menger suggests that Schmoller's refusal to recognize strict boundaries between history and theory stems from a desire to maintain the status of a political economist while only performing historical-statistical 'miniature painting.' He argues that Schmoller's 'historical walks' in Strasbourg do not constitute theoretical economic research. [Sixth Letter: The Overestimation of Historical Studies]: Menger critiques the 'one-sidedness' of the German historical school, which focuses almost exclusively on history at the expense of theory. He argues that even if history were a part of political economy rather than just an auxiliary, its current dominance leads to a harmful neglect of the theoretical reform that the science urgently needs. [Seventh Letter: The Fallacy of the Historical 'Understructure']: Menger attacks Schmoller's claim that a complete historical-descriptive 'understructure' must be built before theoretical work can resume. He argues that this would delay theory for eons, as historical material is infinite and constantly renewing, and he accuses Schmoller of using this as an excuse for dilettantism in history while neglecting his duties as an economist. [Eighth Letter: History as the Sole Empirical Basis]: Menger refutes the idea that history is the sole empirical basis for economics. He argues that theory also relies on common life experience and the understanding of individual economic motives, which history cannot provide. Furthermore, practical sciences like economic policy and finance require knowledge of current exigencies and technical progress that goes beyond historical study. [Ninth Letter: The Degradation of Theory to Description]: Menger describes the extreme form of historicism where theory is replaced by historical-statistical material ordered by scientific categories. He traces the decline of the German school from theory mixed with history to the point where history is expected to 'speak for itself,' which he views as the lowest possible level for a social science. [Tenth Letter: Practical Sciences and 'Recipe Collections']: Menger defends the nature of practical sciences (economic policy and finance) against Schmoller's dismissal of them as mere 'recipe collections.' He argues that practical sciences provide principles for action based on theory, similar to how surgery and therapy relate to anatomy and physiology. [Eleventh Letter: The Absurdity of 'Elevating' Practical Sciences to Theory]: Menger critiques Schmoller's idea of 'elevating' practical sciences to the rank of theoretical sciences. He argues that sciences are distinguished by their tasks, not their rank; trying to turn economic policy into a theory is as nonsensical as trying to turn surgery into physiology. [Twelfth Letter: Schmoller's Vision of Practical Economics]: Menger examines Schmoller's specific proposal to 'strip the gown of the art-doctrine' from practical economics by replacing it with detailed historical accounts of agrarian and trade policy. Menger mocks this as replacing a practical science with a historical one, which serves no theoretical purpose. [Thirteenth Letter: The Confusion of General and Special Theory]: Menger critiques Schmoller's second attempt to define the 'elevation' of practical sciences, which involves ordering historical images under theoretical categories. Menger argues this merely results in a historical treatment of theory and fails to provide the principles for action that define a practical science. [Fourteenth Letter: Schmoller's Mode of Combat]: Menger characterizes Schmoller's critical style as one of 'inflated unscientificness.' He highlights a specific instance where Schmoller presents Menger's own theory of 'collective observation' in history as if it were a correction of Menger's views, demonstrating Schmoller's failure to understand the work he is reviewing. [Fifteenth Letter: Misrepresentations and Political Labels]: Menger lists several 'untruthful assertions' made by Schmoller, including claims that Menger attacked Roscher and Hildebrand or dismissed Knies. He particularly rejects the label of 'Manchesterism,' clarifying that his pursuit of economic laws is not a service to capitalism and that he sympathizes with social reforms while maintaining scientific rigor. [Sixteenth Letter: Conclusion and Errata]: Menger concludes by expressing confidence that the future will vindicate his methodological investigations. He believes he has performed a 'good work' for German economics by exposing the flaws in Schmoller's approach. The segment ends with a list of corrections for the text.
The title page of Carl Menger's 1884 work 'Errors of Historicism in German Political Economy', including author credentials and publication information.
Read full textMenger critiques the 'historical school' of German economists for their lack of clarity regarding the goals and methods of political economy. He argues that the reform of the science must come from within its own theoretical problems rather than through the external imposition of historical, mathematical, or physiological methods, and he announces his intention to defend his 'Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences' against recent attacks.
Read full textA detailed table of contents listing sixteen 'letters' that address various methodological errors of historicism and specific critiques of Gustav Schmoller.
Read full textMenger responds to a friend's suggestion to ignore Gustav Schmoller's harsh review of his work. He argues that even superficial and ill-informed criticism provides a valuable opportunity to clarify complex ideas for a broader audience and to expose the misunderstandings prevalent among certain circles of readers.
Read full textMenger addresses the personal and 'vulgar' nature of Schmoller's polemical style, citing previous complaints by Treitschke. He justifies his public response as a duty to protect the integrity of the science and to break the 'terrorism' exercised by certain editors who misrepresent the work of others.
Read full textMenger distinguishes between historical-statistical research (the study of individual phenomena) and theoretical research (the study of general forms and laws). He critiques the German historical school for conflating these distinct tasks and emphasizes the necessity of both empirical and 'exact' directions in theoretical research to understand the economic side of social life.
Read full textMenger argues against Schmoller's attempt to blur the lines between history and theory. While acknowledging that history serves as an auxiliary science to theory, he insists that they have fundamentally different goals: history deals with concrete, individual events in time and space, while theory seeks to identify types and typical relations (laws).
Read full textMenger suggests that Schmoller's refusal to recognize strict boundaries between history and theory stems from a desire to maintain the status of a political economist while only performing historical-statistical 'miniature painting.' He argues that Schmoller's 'historical walks' in Strasbourg do not constitute theoretical economic research.
Read full textMenger critiques the 'one-sidedness' of the German historical school, which focuses almost exclusively on history at the expense of theory. He argues that even if history were a part of political economy rather than just an auxiliary, its current dominance leads to a harmful neglect of the theoretical reform that the science urgently needs.
Read full textMenger attacks Schmoller's claim that a complete historical-descriptive 'understructure' must be built before theoretical work can resume. He argues that this would delay theory for eons, as historical material is infinite and constantly renewing, and he accuses Schmoller of using this as an excuse for dilettantism in history while neglecting his duties as an economist.
Read full textMenger refutes the idea that history is the sole empirical basis for economics. He argues that theory also relies on common life experience and the understanding of individual economic motives, which history cannot provide. Furthermore, practical sciences like economic policy and finance require knowledge of current exigencies and technical progress that goes beyond historical study.
Read full textMenger describes the extreme form of historicism where theory is replaced by historical-statistical material ordered by scientific categories. He traces the decline of the German school from theory mixed with history to the point where history is expected to 'speak for itself,' which he views as the lowest possible level for a social science.
Read full textMenger defends the nature of practical sciences (economic policy and finance) against Schmoller's dismissal of them as mere 'recipe collections.' He argues that practical sciences provide principles for action based on theory, similar to how surgery and therapy relate to anatomy and physiology.
Read full textMenger critiques Schmoller's idea of 'elevating' practical sciences to the rank of theoretical sciences. He argues that sciences are distinguished by their tasks, not their rank; trying to turn economic policy into a theory is as nonsensical as trying to turn surgery into physiology.
Read full textMenger examines Schmoller's specific proposal to 'strip the gown of the art-doctrine' from practical economics by replacing it with detailed historical accounts of agrarian and trade policy. Menger mocks this as replacing a practical science with a historical one, which serves no theoretical purpose.
Read full textMenger critiques Schmoller's second attempt to define the 'elevation' of practical sciences, which involves ordering historical images under theoretical categories. Menger argues this merely results in a historical treatment of theory and fails to provide the principles for action that define a practical science.
Read full textMenger characterizes Schmoller's critical style as one of 'inflated unscientificness.' He highlights a specific instance where Schmoller presents Menger's own theory of 'collective observation' in history as if it were a correction of Menger's views, demonstrating Schmoller's failure to understand the work he is reviewing.
Read full textMenger lists several 'untruthful assertions' made by Schmoller, including claims that Menger attacked Roscher and Hildebrand or dismissed Knies. He particularly rejects the label of 'Manchesterism,' clarifying that his pursuit of economic laws is not a service to capitalism and that he sympathizes with social reforms while maintaining scientific rigor.
Read full textMenger concludes by expressing confidence that the future will vindicate his methodological investigations. He believes he has performed a 'good work' for German economics by exposing the flaws in Schmoller's approach. The segment ends with a list of corrections for the text.
Read full text