by Mises
[Front Matter and Table of Contents]: Title page, copyright information, and a detailed table of contents for 'Theory and History'. The book is divided into four parts: Value, Determinism and Materialism, Epistemological Problems of History, and The Course of History. [Table of Contents Continued and Preface by Murray N. Rothbard]: Murray Rothbard's 1985 preface identifies 'Theory and History' as Mises' most neglected masterpiece. Rothbard argues that the book provides the essential methodological and philosophical foundation for Mises' economic theories, specifically defending 'praxeology' against the 'scientism' of mainstream economics which attempts to apply the methods of physics to human action. [Introduction: Methodological Dualism and Economics]: Mises introduces methodological dualism as a necessary tool for science, distinguishing between the realm of external natural events and the realm of human thought and action. He critiques positivism and behaviorism for attempting to deny human purposefulness and argues that while nature exhibits regularity, human action is characterized by the absence of such universally prevailing regularity. [Introduction: Limitations of Knowledge, Regularity, and Choosing]: Mises discusses the limits of human cognition and the necessity of assuming regularity in nature for action. He contrasts this with the field of human action, where there are no constant relations or 'behavior constants,' rendering mathematical and econometric approaches to human history fundamentally flawed. He defines action as conduct directed by choices between means and ends. [Chapter 1: Judgments of Value]: Mises distinguishes between existential propositions (facts) and judgments of value (feelings/preferences). He argues that value is not intrinsic to objects but resides in the valuing subject. While value judgments are subjective and cannot be proven true or false, they are the 'springs of human action' and must be understood by historians to explain the course of human affairs. [Chapter 2: Knowledge and Value]: Mises critiques the 'bias doctrine,' which claims economic theories are merely expressions of the author's class or group interests. He defends the Classical economic doctrine of the 'harmony of interests' against socialist and nationalist claims of irreconcilable conflict. He argues that economics is a value-free (wertfrei) science that analyzes the suitability of means to reach ends defined by Western civilization. [Chapter 3: The Quest for Absolute Values (Sections 1-7)]: Mises examines the historical search for absolute, eternal values, critiquing the idea of a normative science of ethics. He analyzes the doctrine of Natural Law, noting its evolution toward rationalism and utilitarianism. He argues that social cooperation is the primary means for human survival and that 'justice' is not an arbitrary intuition but is defined by social utility—conduct that preserves social cooperation. [The Utilitarian Doctrine Restated]: Mises restates the essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy, emphasizing that social cooperation under the division of labor is the primary means for individuals to attain their ends. He defends utilitarianism against charges of ethical materialism, arguing that it is a philosophy of individualism that rejects the notion of the collective as an ultimate end. The section contrasts this with collectivist doctrines, which Mises argues are based on arbitrary personal value judgments and ultimately rely on violence and the suppression of dissenting minorities. [On Aesthetic Values]: This section explores the subjectivity of aesthetic values, noting that unlike ethics—where social cooperation provides a common ground for evaluating means—aesthetics lacks any objective standard for reconciling conflicting judgments. Mises argues that beauty is defined simply as 'that which pleases' and rejects the possibility of a normative discipline of aesthetics, asserting that even the most eminent critics' judgments remain personal and subjective. [The Historical Significance of the Quest for Absolute Values]: Mises examines the political consequences of the search for absolute values, linking the rise of totalitarianism and socialism to the abandonment of Enlightenment ideals of freedom. He critiques the Aristotelian classification of government, favoring David Hume's insight that all government rests on public opinion. Mises warns that the most dangerous form of absolutism is the 'despotism of public opinion' and the unbridled rule of an intolerant majority, which socialists have used to justify the liquidation of dissenters in the name of absolute values. [The Negation of Value]: Mises introduces the negation of value by defining value judgments as ultimate data that the human mind cannot currently trace back to physical or biological causes. He sets the stage for a critique of materialism by arguing that while man is part of the universe, the necessary connection between external events and the ideas they produce remains unknown to the natural sciences. [Determinism and its Critics]: A comprehensive analysis of determinism as the epistemological basis for human knowledge. Mises distinguishes between mechanical determinism (materialism) and the determinism required for human action, which involves mental causation. He critiques the free-will controversy, fatalism (including Marxian 'inevitability'), and the use of statistics to deny human agency. He also addresses the implications of quantum mechanics, arguing that statistical laws in physics do not prove indeterminism in the sense of human-like 'choice' in atoms. He concludes by asserting the autonomy of the sciences of human action based on the current impossibility of reducing ideas to physical factors. [Materialism]: Mises critiques ontological materialism, which views thoughts as products of physical and chemical processes. He argues that mechanistic and physiological analogies (such as the 'secretion' analogy) fail to explain the content or diversity of ideas. He suggests that materialism's persistence is due more to its political utility in fighting religious and aristocratic institutions than to its scientific validity, noting that it should logically have been replaced by agnosticism. [Dialectical Materialism]: Mises analyzes the core tenets of Marxian dialectical materialism. He critiques the attempt to transplant Hegelian dialectics into a materialistic system, labeling Engels' applications of 'negation of the negation' to biology and geology as mere wordplay. The section focuses on the 'material productive forces'—which Mises identifies as technological equipment—and argues that Marx's theory is circular: technology (an intellectual product) cannot be the ultimate cause of the social relations (like the division of labor) that are required for technology to exist in the first place. [The Class Struggle in Marxian Theory]: Mises critiques the Marxian doctrine of class struggle, arguing that it fails to explain why individuals would prioritize class interests over personal ones. He distinguishes between a status or caste society, where legal disabilities are shared, and a capitalistic society where class membership is fluid and determined by the 'daily plebiscite' of consumers. Mises contends that in a market economy, there are no inherent conflicts of interest between classes, as access to any class is free and success depends on serving consumers. [Liberalism vs. Communism and the Nature of Property]: This section contrasts the liberal view of equality before the law with the communist claim that private ownership constitutes a feudal-like privilege. Mises argues that while feudal property was derived from conquest and independent of the market, capitalist property is earned and maintained only by serving consumers. He highlights that the 'bourgeois revolution' replaced legal status with a system where wealth is contingent upon daily service to the public. [The Failure of the Law of Progressive Impoverishment]: Mises examines Marx's 'iron law of wages' and the prediction of the progressive impoverishment of the working class. He points out that this law has been discredited and that, empirically, the standard of living for wage earners has improved dramatically under capitalism. Since the collapse of capitalism was predicated on this increasing misery, Mises argues that the failure of this law pulls the foundation from under the entire Marxian economic system. [Concentration of Wealth and Mass Consumption]: Mises refutes the Marxian idea that wealth is concentrating in fewer hands, noting that the rise of corporations has led to a wider distribution of ownership through stocks and bonds. He emphasizes that capitalism is essentially mass production for the masses; the workers themselves consume the vast majority of goods produced. Economic power, therefore, rests with the buying public rather than a small class of 'parasites.' [The Circular Reasoning of Socialist Inevitability]: Mises exposes the circular logic in Marx's argument for socialism: socialism is considered better because it is the next stage of history, and it is the next stage because the workers will rebel due to impoverishment. However, since workers are not becoming impoverished, the motive for revolution disappears. Mises also notes that the intellectual fathers of socialism were not proletarians but members of the 'bourgeois' intelligentsia, such as Marx and Engels themselves. [The Ideological Impregnation of Thought]: Mises analyzes the Marxian doctrine that all thought is 'ideologically tainted' by class interest. He argues that this was a makeshift device invented by Marx to discredit economists whose arguments he could not refute. Mises points out the logical flaw: if the goal of theory is successful action, a true theory is always more useful than a false (ideological) one. He describes how Marx used the term 'ideology' to dismiss 'vulgar economists' without engaging their arguments. [The Critique of 'Bourgeois' Economics as Ideology]: Mises argues that even within the Marxian framework, 'ideological' distortions of truth would be useless. If historical evolution is determined solely by material productive forces, no 'bourgeois ideology' could delay the inevitable transition to socialism. He contrasts Marx's 'scientific' socialism with 'utopian' socialism, noting that Marx's own system implies that the capitalists are merely 'tools of history' and thus require no moral justification or false consciousness. [The Conflict of Ideologies and Marxian Orthodoxy]: Mises discusses how Marxism treats dissent as either 'bourgeois idiocy' or 'proletarian treason.' Because Marxism denies that differences can be settled by reason or majority vote, it leads inevitably to civil war and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'—which in practice means the rule of a self-appointed minority. He traces the evolution of this intolerance from Marx and Engels to the physical liquidations carried out by Lenin and Stalin. [Ideas vs. Interests: A Fundamental Critique]: Mises argues that 'interests' do not exist independently of 'ideas.' What a person considers their interest is a result of their ideas and value judgments. He points out that Marx himself often contradicted his own determinism by criticizing the 'policies' of the bourgeoisie or unions, which implies that classes have choices and that ideas (not just material forces) influence history. If different policies can be chosen, then the merits of those ideas must be debated logically, which reopens the door to the economic critique of socialism. [Human Wants, Freedom, and the Socialist Paradise]: Mises critiques the Marxian view of human needs as purely biological and quantitative. He argues that civilized man must choose between qualitative satisfactions, and these choices are guided by ideas. Under socialism, an authority decides what people 'ought' to need, which is the essence of slavery. Marx avoids these economic problems by assuming socialism will be a 'land of Cockaigne' where all needs are met without effort or choice. [The Class Interests of the Bourgeoisie and Pro-Labor Legislation]: Mises argues that, from a strictly Marxian perspective, 'pro-labor' legislation and unionism are actually reactionary because they delay the maturity and collapse of capitalism. Conversely, the 'selfish' actions of capitalists in a laissez-faire system accelerate the path to socialism. He also notes that established big businesses often favor interventionism to protect themselves from new competitors, meaning that the 'bourgeoisie' is not a monolithic class with a single interest in laissez-faire. [The Circularity of Marxian Materialism]: Mises critiques the 'materialism' of Marx and Engels as circular, noting that tools and machines (the material productive forces) are themselves products of the human mind. He dismisses Engels' later 'truism'—that men must eat before they can philosophize—as a mere eristic trick that fails to support the specific claims of historical materialism. The doctrine never explains the actual mechanism by which the 'material base' produces the 'ideological superstructure.' [Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Religion]: Mises contrasts Marxism with Freud's psychoanalysis, arguing they are fundamentally different: Marxism is materialist, while psychoanalysis treats the mental as an autonomous field. He also critiques the tendency of modern Christian theologians to adopt Marxian 'scientific sociology,' pointing out the absurdity of reconciling the Nicene creed with a doctrine that views religion as a mere superstructure of material forces. [Marxian Materialism and the Taboo on Economic Analysis]: Mises concludes that Marx's 'scientific' and 'materialistic' labels were political tools used to grant prestige to his doctrine and to taboo any economic analysis of socialism as 'utopian.' By claiming socialism was inevitable and 'higher,' Marx avoided having to prove its merits. Mises asserts that while refuting dialectical materialism invalidates Marx's specific vindication of socialism, only economic analysis can demonstrate that socialism is actually unrealizable and destructive. [The Theme of History]: Mises defines history as the study of human action, focusing on individual judgments of value, ends sought, and means employed. He argues that while individuals are born into specific social and natural milieus, their actions are guided by ideologies which are products of the human mind and subject to change. He rejects attempts to explain the birth of ideas through purely geographical or biological factors, asserting that the ultimate data of history are human ideas and the conscious ends of acting men. [The Theme of the Philosophy of History]: This section contrasts history with the philosophy of history, which assumes a superhuman entity or Providence directs events toward a preordained goal. Mises critiques various systems (Hegel, Comte, Marx) for relying on intuition to 'divine' these hidden plans. He distinguishes between philosophies that rely on charismatic leaders as instruments of Providence and those, like Kant and Hegel, that posit a 'cunning of reason' where individual impulses unwittingly serve a higher plan. [The Difference between the Point of View of History and That of Philosophy of History]: Mises traces the shift from providential interpretations of history to the mundane social philosophy of the Enlightenment. Using Adam Smith and Mandeville as examples, he explains how the 'invisible hand' was a way to reconcile religious belief with the observation that self-interested actions can produce beneficial social outcomes. He also distinguishes between the 'stages' of history in philosophical systems (which imply a final goal) and the 'periods' used by historians as mere classificatory tools. [Philosophy of History and the Idea of God]: Mises argues that the 19th-century philosophies of Hegel, Comte, and Marx are secularized versions of the Christian doctrine of salvation. While the Enlightenment replaced God with Reason, it maintained the theological certainty of inevitable progress toward perfection. Mises critiques Marx for adopting this teleological optimism without the theological foundation of a benevolent God, arguing that an atheistic system cannot logically assume an irresistible trend toward a perfect socialist state. [Activistic Determinism and Fatalistic Determinism]: Mises distinguishes between 'activistic determinism' (the recognition of cause and effect as a prerequisite for action) and 'fatalistic determinism' (the belief that future events are preordained regardless of human effort). He argues that true free will exists within the margin of causality, allowing man to choose between alternatives and even die for a cause. He dismisses the 'omniscience' claimed by philosophers of history as a form of fatalism that paralyzes the human will. [Chapter 9: The Concept of Historical Individuality]: Mises introduces the concept of the 'ultimate given' in history: the individuality of human ideas and value judgments that cannot be further reduced by reason. He critiques philosophies of history and materialism for attempting to bypass this individuality by positing prime movers like 'Geist' or 'material productive forces.' He asserts that all historical research eventually encounters these 'irrational' facts of individual choice and character. [The Role of the Individual in History]: Mises defends the significance of the individual against collectivist views that see people as mere tools of destiny. He critiques Engels' claim that 'another would have filled the place' of great men like Napoleon or Shakespeare. While acknowledging that even geniuses act within the 'climate of opinion' of their age, Mises insists that new ideas originate in individual minds and are the true drivers of social and technological change. [The Chimera of the Group Mind]: Mises attacks the concept of the 'group mind' or 'Volksgeist' as a mythical construction used to deny individual agency. He examines the origins of this idea in German philology and jurisprudence (Savigny) and its later adoption by French positivists (Durkheim). Mises asserts that only individuals think and act; 'groups' are merely aggregations of individuals who influence one another. He argues that even collective achievements like language or technology are the result of individual innovations spread through imitation. [Planning History]: Mises discusses the impossibility of 'planning history.' While individuals act with intent, the historical process is the composite, often unintended, outcome of all human interactions. He critiques utopian authors and 'social engineers' who seek to freeze history into a single, rigid plan. Mises warns that such attempts to suppress individual choice and 'alter human nature' lead to totalitarianism and potentially the destruction of civilization. [Chapter 10: Historicism - The Meaning of Historicism]: Mises defines historicism as the epistemological doctrine that there is no knowledge of human action except that provided by history, thereby rejecting the possibility of universal economic laws. He critiques 'periodalism'—the idea that different historical ages have their own unique economic laws—as a circular argument. He argues that without universal praxeological laws, it is impossible to make any predictions about the future or even to interpret the past coherently. [The Rejection of Economics]: Mises defends economics against the historicist charge that it assumes a narrow, egoistic 'economic man.' He clarifies that modern subjective economics deals with all human valuations, regardless of their content (material or spiritual). He demonstrates that categories like 'cost' (the value of the next best alternative sacrificed) and 'profit' (the increase in satisfaction) are universal features of human action, applicable to both market and socialist systems. [The Quest for Laws of Historical Change]: Mises argues that the search for 'laws of historical change' is a logical error because history deals with unique, unrepeatable events. He contrasts this with the natural sciences, where laws describe repeatable processes. He critiques the misapplication of thermodynamics and Darwinian evolution to human history, asserting that while praxeology provides universal laws of action, it does not provide a roadmap for the future of historical evolution. [Historicist Relativism]: Mises critiques historicist relativism, which claims that economic principles vary by age. He uses the failure of price controls and the necessity of capital accumulation to show that certain economic realities are constant. He also attacks the romanticized view of 'untouched nature,' arguing that the 'desecration' of nature through civilization is the price men willingly pay for longer, healthier lives and increased prosperity. [Dissolving History: The Critique of Cyclical Civilizations]: Mises critiques the 'dissolving' of history into biological analogies where civilizations are viewed as living entities that must inevitably decay. He specifically targets the doctrines of Spengler and Toynbee, arguing that their neglect of economics and their anti-capitalistic bias lead to a false determinism. Mises asserts that history is the record of human action and ideas, which are unique and incommensurable, rather than a series of repetitive, predictable cycles. [Undoing History: Linguistic and Cultural Restorationism]: This section examines the historicist impulse to 'undo' history by returning to extinct conditions, particularly regarding language. Mises uses the Irish attempt to revive Gaelic as a primary example, arguing that languages are instruments of thought adjusted to the mentality of their age. He concludes that history is an irreversible process and that attempting to revive dead idioms or elevate local dialects to literary status is often an exercise in nostalgic insincerity. [Undoing Economic History: The Division of Labor and Its Critics]: Mises defends the progressive intensification of the division of labor against historicist critics like Sombart and Tawney who romanticize the Middle Ages. He argues that while economic innovations may hurt short-term vested interests, they benefit the vast majority by increasing productivity and material well-being. He characterizes the desire to return to more primitive production methods as a dangerous rejection of the very foundations of modern civilization. [The Challenge of Scientism: Positivism and Behaviorism]: Mises critiques the application of natural science methods to human action, a trend he labels 'scientism.' He analyzes positivism, behaviorism, and panphysicalism, arguing that they fail because they ignore the role of conscious purpose (teleology) and meaning in human conduct. He suggests that these doctrines often serve as a pretext for totalitarian social engineering, where the 'scientist' acts as a dictator over a passive population treated like machines. [The Collectivist Dogma and the Social Sciences]: Mises attacks the collectivist assumption that social entities (like the state or society) have an existence independent of or superior to individuals. He traces this 'conceptual realism' through Hegel and Marx, arguing that 'society' is merely an aspect of individual cooperation. He further critiques the 'social sciences' for attempting to study group activities while ignoring the individual choices and ideologies that actually constitute those groups. [The Nature of Mass Phenomena and the Role of the Individual]: Mises argues that mass phenomena are simply the frequent repetition of individual actions and cannot be understood apart from the ideas that motivate those individuals. He rejects the 'mass psyche' and the idea of biological equality, emphasizing that historical change is driven by pioneering individuals and leaders rather than anonymous masses or the 'common man.' Statistics, while useful for recording individual traits within groups, cannot establish invariable laws of human action. [Psychology and Thymology: Understanding Human Valuations]: Mises introduces 'thymology' as the study of human valuations and volitions, distinguishing it from naturalistic psychology (physiology). He argues that while praxeology deals with the formal mechanics of choice and action, thymology deals with the content of human desires and the specific understanding of historical actors. He also defends a refined rationalism, noting that even 'irrational' or neurotic behavior is often a purposeful, if mistaken, attempt to reach an end. [History, Fiction, and the Ineffable]: Mises compares the methods of history and fiction, noting that both rely on thymological experience to understand human reactions. While history seeks to describe real events, fiction is free to create imaginary plots provided they remain thymologically plausible. He critiques the 'naturalistic' school of literature (e.g., Zola) for trying to turn the novel into a social science, reasserting that the true subject of literature is the individual man and his personal response to existence (Erlebnis). [Rationalization and the Choice of Means]: Mises discusses the thymological analysis of human action, specifically focusing on the choice of means to attain ends. He explores the concept of 'rationalization'—a term borrowed from psychoanalysis—where individuals or social groups construct pretexts to justify conduct that stems from repressed urges or erroneous thinking. He notes that while individual rationalizations are often debunked by others, group-level rationalizations in political ideologies are more persistent because they lack internal criticism. [Introspection and the Categories of Action]: This segment defends introspection as a necessary tool for understanding human action. Mises argues that the categories of value and action are primary, aprioristic elements of the human mind. He distinguishes between the realm of human affairs (final causes) and nonhuman things (causality), asserting that one cannot understand human behavior without referring to the conscious aiming at chosen ends. [Chapter 13: Meaning and Use of the Study of History]: Mises critiques the positivist and historicist views on the utility of history. Positivists seek 'social laws' for engineering, while historicists seek 'trend lines' for evolution. Mises argues that history's true task is not to record all past events but to identify those that are historically meaningful, rejecting the idea of knowledge for its own sake as a sufficient criterion. [The Historical Situation and the Present]: Mises explains that every action is a response to a specific historical situation. He defines the 'present' not as a chronometrical notion but as a praxeological one, referring to the continuation of conditions for action. He argues that any analysis of the present is necessarily a historical account of the past, providing a diagnosis that informs the actor's choice of ends and means. [History of the Remote Past and Falsification]: Mises defends the study of the remote past, arguing that events from thousands of years ago (like the development of Christianity or Judaism) still influence modern life. He also addresses the problem of historical falsification by statesmen and the more subtle danger of historians being misled by spurious social and economic doctrines, particularly historicism's rejection of economics. [History, Humanism, and the Rise of Nationalism]: Mises describes history as the foremost approach to humanism and a liberal education, as it allows individuals to partake in the spiritual legacy of mankind. He critiques how modern historians, often ignorant of economics, have popularized neomercantilist fallacies that lead to aggressive nationalism and the belief that one nation's gain is another's loss. [History and Judgments of Value]: Mises argues for the neutrality of history regarding value judgments (Wertfreiheit). He contends that terms like 'cruelty' or 'prostitution' can be used objectively to describe facts without implying a valuation. While a historian may have personal biases, scientific history requires that these preferences do not distort the reporting of events or the choice of theories used for interpretation. [Chapter 14: Prediction in the Natural Sciences and History]: Mises compares prediction in the natural sciences with prediction in the field of human action. Natural sciences rely on induction and the assumption of invariable uniformity. In contrast, human action is characterized by the 'ultimate given' of value judgments, which lack the inexorable regularity of natural phenomena, making historical prediction categorically different from scientific forecasting. [The Specific Understanding of History and Thymology]: Mises defines 'specific understanding' as the mental procedure used to grasp the meaning of human actions and anticipate future conduct. This relies on 'thymology'—the study of human value judgments and ideas derived from experience and introspection. He distinguishes 'case probability' (likelihood) in history from 'class probability' in mathematics, noting the difficulty in weighing the influence of various factors in human affairs. [Real Types and Ideal Types]: Mises distinguishes between 'real types' (class concepts based on definable traits like nationality) and 'ideal types' (conceptual tools that imply specific ways of valuing and acting). Ideal types are used to simplify the complexity of human affairs for the purpose of understanding and forecasting. He warns against confusing ideal types with 'ought types' (moral obligations) or with specific organizations. [Part Four: Philosophical Interpretations of History]: Mises distinguishes between 'philosophies of history' (which seek a preordained end) and 'philosophical interpretations' (which analyze factors determining events). He critiques environmentalism, arguing that while geography and social milieu provide the situation and stimulus for action, they do not determine the human response, which is a product of reason and individuality. [The Egalitarian and Racial Interpretations of History]: Mises critiques the egalitarian interpretation of history, which attributes all human differences to environment and views history as a process of class-based usurpation. He also examines the racial interpretation, noting that while Western (white) civilization has historically achieved the most in terms of material and spiritual well-being, this does not justify racism or predict future racial superiority, as biology has found no anatomical limits on the mental faculties of other races. [Secularism and the Rejection of Capitalism]: Mises defends the secularism of Western civilization, arguing that it was religious indifference and individualism that allowed for genuine religious freedom. He critiques 'antisecularists' who condemn capitalism on moral or religious grounds, arguing that they have uncritically adopted socialist economic fallacies. He asserts that any system that improves material conditions and reduces mortality cannot be fundamentally 'unjust' compared to systems that spread poverty. [Chapter 16: Present-Day Trends and the Future]: Opening of the final chapter regarding contemporary trends and the outlook for the future. [The Reversal of the Trend toward Freedom]: Mises analyzes the historical shift from the Enlightenment's pursuit of liberty toward modern totalitarianism. He argues that while 19th-century liberals viewed the trend toward freedom as irresistible, a new generation of radicals and socialists rejected these ideals, viewing 'bourgeois' liberty as a sham. He highlights how socialist movements used liberal rights as a temporary tool to seize power, eventually establishing despotic regimes that claim the title of 'people's democracies' while negating all civic liberties. [The Rise of the Ideology of Equality in Wealth and Income]: This section critiques the egalitarian ideology, particularly the 'pernicious illusion' of equal land distribution. Mises explains that modern prosperity relies on the division of labor and technological progress, which are incompatible with primitive agrarian utopias. He argues that the popular appeal of socialism and communism is rooted in envy rather than realistic economic planning. Furthermore, he notes that the global condemnation of American prosperity stems from this same egalitarian mentality, which threatens the future of Western civilization. [The Chimera of a Perfect State of Mankind]: Mises critiques the concept of a 'perfect state' or 'equilibrium' in human affairs. He argues that history is a record of change and that a state of perfection would imply the end of history and a reduction of man to a vegetative existence. He specifically attacks mathematical economists who treat the 'static state' or 'equilibrium' as a normative ideal, explaining that competition and entrepreneurial activity only exist because of the inherent disequilibrium of the real world. [The Alleged Unbroken Trend toward Progress]: Mises challenges the idea that material progress is an inevitable law of history. He defines economic progress as the result of capital accumulation exceeding population growth, a feat achieved uniquely by capitalism. He warns that there is no guarantee this trend will continue under different social organizations, particularly socialism, which lacks the capacity for economic calculation and may lead to capital decumulation and decay. [The Suppression of “Economic” Freedom]: Mises argues that freedom is indivisible; the suppression of economic freedom inevitably leads to the loss of all civil liberties. He contrasts the individualistic spirit of the West, which fostered innovation and prosperity, with the stagnation of Eastern cultures dominated by orthodoxy. He contends that central planning by an authority precludes individual initiative and bars the path for innovators, as the planning board would only support ideas that conform to established doctrines. [The Uncertainty of the Future]: In the concluding section of the book, Mises emphasizes the inherent unpredictability of history. He critiques 'soothsayers' like Hegel, Comte, and Marx who claimed to know the final end of history. Mises asserts that history is driven by new ideas that cannot be anticipated. He concludes that as long as individuals retain the innate disposition to think and apply reason, no apostle of stabilization can truly petrify the future of mankind. [Index]: A comprehensive alphabetical index of terms, concepts, and historical figures discussed throughout the work, ranging from 'Adjustment' to 'Zola'.
Title page, copyright information, and a detailed table of contents for 'Theory and History'. The book is divided into four parts: Value, Determinism and Materialism, Epistemological Problems of History, and The Course of History.
Read full textMurray Rothbard's 1985 preface identifies 'Theory and History' as Mises' most neglected masterpiece. Rothbard argues that the book provides the essential methodological and philosophical foundation for Mises' economic theories, specifically defending 'praxeology' against the 'scientism' of mainstream economics which attempts to apply the methods of physics to human action.
Read full textMises introduces methodological dualism as a necessary tool for science, distinguishing between the realm of external natural events and the realm of human thought and action. He critiques positivism and behaviorism for attempting to deny human purposefulness and argues that while nature exhibits regularity, human action is characterized by the absence of such universally prevailing regularity.
Read full textMises discusses the limits of human cognition and the necessity of assuming regularity in nature for action. He contrasts this with the field of human action, where there are no constant relations or 'behavior constants,' rendering mathematical and econometric approaches to human history fundamentally flawed. He defines action as conduct directed by choices between means and ends.
Read full textMises distinguishes between existential propositions (facts) and judgments of value (feelings/preferences). He argues that value is not intrinsic to objects but resides in the valuing subject. While value judgments are subjective and cannot be proven true or false, they are the 'springs of human action' and must be understood by historians to explain the course of human affairs.
Read full textMises critiques the 'bias doctrine,' which claims economic theories are merely expressions of the author's class or group interests. He defends the Classical economic doctrine of the 'harmony of interests' against socialist and nationalist claims of irreconcilable conflict. He argues that economics is a value-free (wertfrei) science that analyzes the suitability of means to reach ends defined by Western civilization.
Read full textMises examines the historical search for absolute, eternal values, critiquing the idea of a normative science of ethics. He analyzes the doctrine of Natural Law, noting its evolution toward rationalism and utilitarianism. He argues that social cooperation is the primary means for human survival and that 'justice' is not an arbitrary intuition but is defined by social utility—conduct that preserves social cooperation.
Read full textMises restates the essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy, emphasizing that social cooperation under the division of labor is the primary means for individuals to attain their ends. He defends utilitarianism against charges of ethical materialism, arguing that it is a philosophy of individualism that rejects the notion of the collective as an ultimate end. The section contrasts this with collectivist doctrines, which Mises argues are based on arbitrary personal value judgments and ultimately rely on violence and the suppression of dissenting minorities.
Read full textThis section explores the subjectivity of aesthetic values, noting that unlike ethics—where social cooperation provides a common ground for evaluating means—aesthetics lacks any objective standard for reconciling conflicting judgments. Mises argues that beauty is defined simply as 'that which pleases' and rejects the possibility of a normative discipline of aesthetics, asserting that even the most eminent critics' judgments remain personal and subjective.
Read full textMises examines the political consequences of the search for absolute values, linking the rise of totalitarianism and socialism to the abandonment of Enlightenment ideals of freedom. He critiques the Aristotelian classification of government, favoring David Hume's insight that all government rests on public opinion. Mises warns that the most dangerous form of absolutism is the 'despotism of public opinion' and the unbridled rule of an intolerant majority, which socialists have used to justify the liquidation of dissenters in the name of absolute values.
Read full textMises introduces the negation of value by defining value judgments as ultimate data that the human mind cannot currently trace back to physical or biological causes. He sets the stage for a critique of materialism by arguing that while man is part of the universe, the necessary connection between external events and the ideas they produce remains unknown to the natural sciences.
Read full textA comprehensive analysis of determinism as the epistemological basis for human knowledge. Mises distinguishes between mechanical determinism (materialism) and the determinism required for human action, which involves mental causation. He critiques the free-will controversy, fatalism (including Marxian 'inevitability'), and the use of statistics to deny human agency. He also addresses the implications of quantum mechanics, arguing that statistical laws in physics do not prove indeterminism in the sense of human-like 'choice' in atoms. He concludes by asserting the autonomy of the sciences of human action based on the current impossibility of reducing ideas to physical factors.
Read full textMises critiques ontological materialism, which views thoughts as products of physical and chemical processes. He argues that mechanistic and physiological analogies (such as the 'secretion' analogy) fail to explain the content or diversity of ideas. He suggests that materialism's persistence is due more to its political utility in fighting religious and aristocratic institutions than to its scientific validity, noting that it should logically have been replaced by agnosticism.
Read full textMises analyzes the core tenets of Marxian dialectical materialism. He critiques the attempt to transplant Hegelian dialectics into a materialistic system, labeling Engels' applications of 'negation of the negation' to biology and geology as mere wordplay. The section focuses on the 'material productive forces'—which Mises identifies as technological equipment—and argues that Marx's theory is circular: technology (an intellectual product) cannot be the ultimate cause of the social relations (like the division of labor) that are required for technology to exist in the first place.
Read full textMises critiques the Marxian doctrine of class struggle, arguing that it fails to explain why individuals would prioritize class interests over personal ones. He distinguishes between a status or caste society, where legal disabilities are shared, and a capitalistic society where class membership is fluid and determined by the 'daily plebiscite' of consumers. Mises contends that in a market economy, there are no inherent conflicts of interest between classes, as access to any class is free and success depends on serving consumers.
Read full textThis section contrasts the liberal view of equality before the law with the communist claim that private ownership constitutes a feudal-like privilege. Mises argues that while feudal property was derived from conquest and independent of the market, capitalist property is earned and maintained only by serving consumers. He highlights that the 'bourgeois revolution' replaced legal status with a system where wealth is contingent upon daily service to the public.
Read full textMises examines Marx's 'iron law of wages' and the prediction of the progressive impoverishment of the working class. He points out that this law has been discredited and that, empirically, the standard of living for wage earners has improved dramatically under capitalism. Since the collapse of capitalism was predicated on this increasing misery, Mises argues that the failure of this law pulls the foundation from under the entire Marxian economic system.
Read full textMises refutes the Marxian idea that wealth is concentrating in fewer hands, noting that the rise of corporations has led to a wider distribution of ownership through stocks and bonds. He emphasizes that capitalism is essentially mass production for the masses; the workers themselves consume the vast majority of goods produced. Economic power, therefore, rests with the buying public rather than a small class of 'parasites.'
Read full textMises exposes the circular logic in Marx's argument for socialism: socialism is considered better because it is the next stage of history, and it is the next stage because the workers will rebel due to impoverishment. However, since workers are not becoming impoverished, the motive for revolution disappears. Mises also notes that the intellectual fathers of socialism were not proletarians but members of the 'bourgeois' intelligentsia, such as Marx and Engels themselves.
Read full textMises analyzes the Marxian doctrine that all thought is 'ideologically tainted' by class interest. He argues that this was a makeshift device invented by Marx to discredit economists whose arguments he could not refute. Mises points out the logical flaw: if the goal of theory is successful action, a true theory is always more useful than a false (ideological) one. He describes how Marx used the term 'ideology' to dismiss 'vulgar economists' without engaging their arguments.
Read full textMises argues that even within the Marxian framework, 'ideological' distortions of truth would be useless. If historical evolution is determined solely by material productive forces, no 'bourgeois ideology' could delay the inevitable transition to socialism. He contrasts Marx's 'scientific' socialism with 'utopian' socialism, noting that Marx's own system implies that the capitalists are merely 'tools of history' and thus require no moral justification or false consciousness.
Read full textMises discusses how Marxism treats dissent as either 'bourgeois idiocy' or 'proletarian treason.' Because Marxism denies that differences can be settled by reason or majority vote, it leads inevitably to civil war and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'—which in practice means the rule of a self-appointed minority. He traces the evolution of this intolerance from Marx and Engels to the physical liquidations carried out by Lenin and Stalin.
Read full textMises argues that 'interests' do not exist independently of 'ideas.' What a person considers their interest is a result of their ideas and value judgments. He points out that Marx himself often contradicted his own determinism by criticizing the 'policies' of the bourgeoisie or unions, which implies that classes have choices and that ideas (not just material forces) influence history. If different policies can be chosen, then the merits of those ideas must be debated logically, which reopens the door to the economic critique of socialism.
Read full textMises critiques the Marxian view of human needs as purely biological and quantitative. He argues that civilized man must choose between qualitative satisfactions, and these choices are guided by ideas. Under socialism, an authority decides what people 'ought' to need, which is the essence of slavery. Marx avoids these economic problems by assuming socialism will be a 'land of Cockaigne' where all needs are met without effort or choice.
Read full textMises argues that, from a strictly Marxian perspective, 'pro-labor' legislation and unionism are actually reactionary because they delay the maturity and collapse of capitalism. Conversely, the 'selfish' actions of capitalists in a laissez-faire system accelerate the path to socialism. He also notes that established big businesses often favor interventionism to protect themselves from new competitors, meaning that the 'bourgeoisie' is not a monolithic class with a single interest in laissez-faire.
Read full textMises critiques the 'materialism' of Marx and Engels as circular, noting that tools and machines (the material productive forces) are themselves products of the human mind. He dismisses Engels' later 'truism'—that men must eat before they can philosophize—as a mere eristic trick that fails to support the specific claims of historical materialism. The doctrine never explains the actual mechanism by which the 'material base' produces the 'ideological superstructure.'
Read full textMises contrasts Marxism with Freud's psychoanalysis, arguing they are fundamentally different: Marxism is materialist, while psychoanalysis treats the mental as an autonomous field. He also critiques the tendency of modern Christian theologians to adopt Marxian 'scientific sociology,' pointing out the absurdity of reconciling the Nicene creed with a doctrine that views religion as a mere superstructure of material forces.
Read full textMises concludes that Marx's 'scientific' and 'materialistic' labels were political tools used to grant prestige to his doctrine and to taboo any economic analysis of socialism as 'utopian.' By claiming socialism was inevitable and 'higher,' Marx avoided having to prove its merits. Mises asserts that while refuting dialectical materialism invalidates Marx's specific vindication of socialism, only economic analysis can demonstrate that socialism is actually unrealizable and destructive.
Read full textMises defines history as the study of human action, focusing on individual judgments of value, ends sought, and means employed. He argues that while individuals are born into specific social and natural milieus, their actions are guided by ideologies which are products of the human mind and subject to change. He rejects attempts to explain the birth of ideas through purely geographical or biological factors, asserting that the ultimate data of history are human ideas and the conscious ends of acting men.
Read full textThis section contrasts history with the philosophy of history, which assumes a superhuman entity or Providence directs events toward a preordained goal. Mises critiques various systems (Hegel, Comte, Marx) for relying on intuition to 'divine' these hidden plans. He distinguishes between philosophies that rely on charismatic leaders as instruments of Providence and those, like Kant and Hegel, that posit a 'cunning of reason' where individual impulses unwittingly serve a higher plan.
Read full textMises traces the shift from providential interpretations of history to the mundane social philosophy of the Enlightenment. Using Adam Smith and Mandeville as examples, he explains how the 'invisible hand' was a way to reconcile religious belief with the observation that self-interested actions can produce beneficial social outcomes. He also distinguishes between the 'stages' of history in philosophical systems (which imply a final goal) and the 'periods' used by historians as mere classificatory tools.
Read full textMises argues that the 19th-century philosophies of Hegel, Comte, and Marx are secularized versions of the Christian doctrine of salvation. While the Enlightenment replaced God with Reason, it maintained the theological certainty of inevitable progress toward perfection. Mises critiques Marx for adopting this teleological optimism without the theological foundation of a benevolent God, arguing that an atheistic system cannot logically assume an irresistible trend toward a perfect socialist state.
Read full textMises distinguishes between 'activistic determinism' (the recognition of cause and effect as a prerequisite for action) and 'fatalistic determinism' (the belief that future events are preordained regardless of human effort). He argues that true free will exists within the margin of causality, allowing man to choose between alternatives and even die for a cause. He dismisses the 'omniscience' claimed by philosophers of history as a form of fatalism that paralyzes the human will.
Read full textMises introduces the concept of the 'ultimate given' in history: the individuality of human ideas and value judgments that cannot be further reduced by reason. He critiques philosophies of history and materialism for attempting to bypass this individuality by positing prime movers like 'Geist' or 'material productive forces.' He asserts that all historical research eventually encounters these 'irrational' facts of individual choice and character.
Read full textMises defends the significance of the individual against collectivist views that see people as mere tools of destiny. He critiques Engels' claim that 'another would have filled the place' of great men like Napoleon or Shakespeare. While acknowledging that even geniuses act within the 'climate of opinion' of their age, Mises insists that new ideas originate in individual minds and are the true drivers of social and technological change.
Read full textMises attacks the concept of the 'group mind' or 'Volksgeist' as a mythical construction used to deny individual agency. He examines the origins of this idea in German philology and jurisprudence (Savigny) and its later adoption by French positivists (Durkheim). Mises asserts that only individuals think and act; 'groups' are merely aggregations of individuals who influence one another. He argues that even collective achievements like language or technology are the result of individual innovations spread through imitation.
Read full textMises discusses the impossibility of 'planning history.' While individuals act with intent, the historical process is the composite, often unintended, outcome of all human interactions. He critiques utopian authors and 'social engineers' who seek to freeze history into a single, rigid plan. Mises warns that such attempts to suppress individual choice and 'alter human nature' lead to totalitarianism and potentially the destruction of civilization.
Read full textMises defines historicism as the epistemological doctrine that there is no knowledge of human action except that provided by history, thereby rejecting the possibility of universal economic laws. He critiques 'periodalism'—the idea that different historical ages have their own unique economic laws—as a circular argument. He argues that without universal praxeological laws, it is impossible to make any predictions about the future or even to interpret the past coherently.
Read full textMises defends economics against the historicist charge that it assumes a narrow, egoistic 'economic man.' He clarifies that modern subjective economics deals with all human valuations, regardless of their content (material or spiritual). He demonstrates that categories like 'cost' (the value of the next best alternative sacrificed) and 'profit' (the increase in satisfaction) are universal features of human action, applicable to both market and socialist systems.
Read full textMises argues that the search for 'laws of historical change' is a logical error because history deals with unique, unrepeatable events. He contrasts this with the natural sciences, where laws describe repeatable processes. He critiques the misapplication of thermodynamics and Darwinian evolution to human history, asserting that while praxeology provides universal laws of action, it does not provide a roadmap for the future of historical evolution.
Read full textMises critiques historicist relativism, which claims that economic principles vary by age. He uses the failure of price controls and the necessity of capital accumulation to show that certain economic realities are constant. He also attacks the romanticized view of 'untouched nature,' arguing that the 'desecration' of nature through civilization is the price men willingly pay for longer, healthier lives and increased prosperity.
Read full textMises critiques the 'dissolving' of history into biological analogies where civilizations are viewed as living entities that must inevitably decay. He specifically targets the doctrines of Spengler and Toynbee, arguing that their neglect of economics and their anti-capitalistic bias lead to a false determinism. Mises asserts that history is the record of human action and ideas, which are unique and incommensurable, rather than a series of repetitive, predictable cycles.
Read full textThis section examines the historicist impulse to 'undo' history by returning to extinct conditions, particularly regarding language. Mises uses the Irish attempt to revive Gaelic as a primary example, arguing that languages are instruments of thought adjusted to the mentality of their age. He concludes that history is an irreversible process and that attempting to revive dead idioms or elevate local dialects to literary status is often an exercise in nostalgic insincerity.
Read full textMises defends the progressive intensification of the division of labor against historicist critics like Sombart and Tawney who romanticize the Middle Ages. He argues that while economic innovations may hurt short-term vested interests, they benefit the vast majority by increasing productivity and material well-being. He characterizes the desire to return to more primitive production methods as a dangerous rejection of the very foundations of modern civilization.
Read full textMises critiques the application of natural science methods to human action, a trend he labels 'scientism.' He analyzes positivism, behaviorism, and panphysicalism, arguing that they fail because they ignore the role of conscious purpose (teleology) and meaning in human conduct. He suggests that these doctrines often serve as a pretext for totalitarian social engineering, where the 'scientist' acts as a dictator over a passive population treated like machines.
Read full textMises attacks the collectivist assumption that social entities (like the state or society) have an existence independent of or superior to individuals. He traces this 'conceptual realism' through Hegel and Marx, arguing that 'society' is merely an aspect of individual cooperation. He further critiques the 'social sciences' for attempting to study group activities while ignoring the individual choices and ideologies that actually constitute those groups.
Read full textMises argues that mass phenomena are simply the frequent repetition of individual actions and cannot be understood apart from the ideas that motivate those individuals. He rejects the 'mass psyche' and the idea of biological equality, emphasizing that historical change is driven by pioneering individuals and leaders rather than anonymous masses or the 'common man.' Statistics, while useful for recording individual traits within groups, cannot establish invariable laws of human action.
Read full textMises introduces 'thymology' as the study of human valuations and volitions, distinguishing it from naturalistic psychology (physiology). He argues that while praxeology deals with the formal mechanics of choice and action, thymology deals with the content of human desires and the specific understanding of historical actors. He also defends a refined rationalism, noting that even 'irrational' or neurotic behavior is often a purposeful, if mistaken, attempt to reach an end.
Read full textMises compares the methods of history and fiction, noting that both rely on thymological experience to understand human reactions. While history seeks to describe real events, fiction is free to create imaginary plots provided they remain thymologically plausible. He critiques the 'naturalistic' school of literature (e.g., Zola) for trying to turn the novel into a social science, reasserting that the true subject of literature is the individual man and his personal response to existence (Erlebnis).
Read full textMises discusses the thymological analysis of human action, specifically focusing on the choice of means to attain ends. He explores the concept of 'rationalization'—a term borrowed from psychoanalysis—where individuals or social groups construct pretexts to justify conduct that stems from repressed urges or erroneous thinking. He notes that while individual rationalizations are often debunked by others, group-level rationalizations in political ideologies are more persistent because they lack internal criticism.
Read full textThis segment defends introspection as a necessary tool for understanding human action. Mises argues that the categories of value and action are primary, aprioristic elements of the human mind. He distinguishes between the realm of human affairs (final causes) and nonhuman things (causality), asserting that one cannot understand human behavior without referring to the conscious aiming at chosen ends.
Read full textMises critiques the positivist and historicist views on the utility of history. Positivists seek 'social laws' for engineering, while historicists seek 'trend lines' for evolution. Mises argues that history's true task is not to record all past events but to identify those that are historically meaningful, rejecting the idea of knowledge for its own sake as a sufficient criterion.
Read full textMises explains that every action is a response to a specific historical situation. He defines the 'present' not as a chronometrical notion but as a praxeological one, referring to the continuation of conditions for action. He argues that any analysis of the present is necessarily a historical account of the past, providing a diagnosis that informs the actor's choice of ends and means.
Read full textMises defends the study of the remote past, arguing that events from thousands of years ago (like the development of Christianity or Judaism) still influence modern life. He also addresses the problem of historical falsification by statesmen and the more subtle danger of historians being misled by spurious social and economic doctrines, particularly historicism's rejection of economics.
Read full textMises describes history as the foremost approach to humanism and a liberal education, as it allows individuals to partake in the spiritual legacy of mankind. He critiques how modern historians, often ignorant of economics, have popularized neomercantilist fallacies that lead to aggressive nationalism and the belief that one nation's gain is another's loss.
Read full textMises argues for the neutrality of history regarding value judgments (Wertfreiheit). He contends that terms like 'cruelty' or 'prostitution' can be used objectively to describe facts without implying a valuation. While a historian may have personal biases, scientific history requires that these preferences do not distort the reporting of events or the choice of theories used for interpretation.
Read full textMises compares prediction in the natural sciences with prediction in the field of human action. Natural sciences rely on induction and the assumption of invariable uniformity. In contrast, human action is characterized by the 'ultimate given' of value judgments, which lack the inexorable regularity of natural phenomena, making historical prediction categorically different from scientific forecasting.
Read full textMises defines 'specific understanding' as the mental procedure used to grasp the meaning of human actions and anticipate future conduct. This relies on 'thymology'—the study of human value judgments and ideas derived from experience and introspection. He distinguishes 'case probability' (likelihood) in history from 'class probability' in mathematics, noting the difficulty in weighing the influence of various factors in human affairs.
Read full textMises distinguishes between 'real types' (class concepts based on definable traits like nationality) and 'ideal types' (conceptual tools that imply specific ways of valuing and acting). Ideal types are used to simplify the complexity of human affairs for the purpose of understanding and forecasting. He warns against confusing ideal types with 'ought types' (moral obligations) or with specific organizations.
Read full textMises distinguishes between 'philosophies of history' (which seek a preordained end) and 'philosophical interpretations' (which analyze factors determining events). He critiques environmentalism, arguing that while geography and social milieu provide the situation and stimulus for action, they do not determine the human response, which is a product of reason and individuality.
Read full textMises critiques the egalitarian interpretation of history, which attributes all human differences to environment and views history as a process of class-based usurpation. He also examines the racial interpretation, noting that while Western (white) civilization has historically achieved the most in terms of material and spiritual well-being, this does not justify racism or predict future racial superiority, as biology has found no anatomical limits on the mental faculties of other races.
Read full textMises defends the secularism of Western civilization, arguing that it was religious indifference and individualism that allowed for genuine religious freedom. He critiques 'antisecularists' who condemn capitalism on moral or religious grounds, arguing that they have uncritically adopted socialist economic fallacies. He asserts that any system that improves material conditions and reduces mortality cannot be fundamentally 'unjust' compared to systems that spread poverty.
Read full textOpening of the final chapter regarding contemporary trends and the outlook for the future.
Read full textMises analyzes the historical shift from the Enlightenment's pursuit of liberty toward modern totalitarianism. He argues that while 19th-century liberals viewed the trend toward freedom as irresistible, a new generation of radicals and socialists rejected these ideals, viewing 'bourgeois' liberty as a sham. He highlights how socialist movements used liberal rights as a temporary tool to seize power, eventually establishing despotic regimes that claim the title of 'people's democracies' while negating all civic liberties.
Read full textThis section critiques the egalitarian ideology, particularly the 'pernicious illusion' of equal land distribution. Mises explains that modern prosperity relies on the division of labor and technological progress, which are incompatible with primitive agrarian utopias. He argues that the popular appeal of socialism and communism is rooted in envy rather than realistic economic planning. Furthermore, he notes that the global condemnation of American prosperity stems from this same egalitarian mentality, which threatens the future of Western civilization.
Read full textMises critiques the concept of a 'perfect state' or 'equilibrium' in human affairs. He argues that history is a record of change and that a state of perfection would imply the end of history and a reduction of man to a vegetative existence. He specifically attacks mathematical economists who treat the 'static state' or 'equilibrium' as a normative ideal, explaining that competition and entrepreneurial activity only exist because of the inherent disequilibrium of the real world.
Read full textMises challenges the idea that material progress is an inevitable law of history. He defines economic progress as the result of capital accumulation exceeding population growth, a feat achieved uniquely by capitalism. He warns that there is no guarantee this trend will continue under different social organizations, particularly socialism, which lacks the capacity for economic calculation and may lead to capital decumulation and decay.
Read full textMises argues that freedom is indivisible; the suppression of economic freedom inevitably leads to the loss of all civil liberties. He contrasts the individualistic spirit of the West, which fostered innovation and prosperity, with the stagnation of Eastern cultures dominated by orthodoxy. He contends that central planning by an authority precludes individual initiative and bars the path for innovators, as the planning board would only support ideas that conform to established doctrines.
Read full textIn the concluding section of the book, Mises emphasizes the inherent unpredictability of history. He critiques 'soothsayers' like Hegel, Comte, and Marx who claimed to know the final end of history. Mises asserts that history is driven by new ideas that cannot be anticipated. He concludes that as long as individuals retain the innate disposition to think and apply reason, no apostle of stabilization can truly petrify the future of mankind.
Read full textA comprehensive alphabetical index of terms, concepts, and historical figures discussed throughout the work, ranging from 'Adjustment' to 'Zola'.
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