by Rappard
[Front Matter and Dedication]: Front matter for 'The Quest for Peace since the World War', including library gift records, publication details from 1940, and a dedication to A. Lawrence Lowell. It features a quote from Pascal's Pensées regarding the necessity of combining justice with force. [Preface]: Rappard explains the origins of the book as a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute, written during the onset of WWII. He outlines his methodology: a focus on primary official sources, a desire to be a 'modest producer' of historical facts rather than a playwright, and a commitment to analyzing the past rather than predicting the future. [Table of Contents]: A detailed table of contents covering the six chapters of the book, detailing the evolution of peace as a war aim, the Peace Conference, twenty years of arbitration, the fluctuations of collective security, and the 'tragedy' of disarmament. [Introduction: The Paradox of European Conflict]: Rappard addresses an American audience, acknowledging their disillusionment with European affairs following WWI. He explores the paradox of why European peoples who yearn for peace are repeatedly led into war by their rulers, setting the stage for a detailed examination of failed peace efforts. [Chapter I: Peace as a War Aim - Definitions and Observations]: Rappard defines three types of peace: peace as military victory, peace as a lasting superiority of the victors, and peace as a legal organization of the world (the 'Wilsonian' view). He discusses the difficulties in identifying true national war aims, noting how they fluctuate based on military success and the need to maintain coalitions. [Chapter I, Section II: Origins of the World War and the Emergence of Peace Aims]: The segment analyzes the 1914 origins of WWI, arguing that initial motivations were purely national. It contrasts the German inability to set up a 'world thesis' with the Allied use of humanitarian slogans. It concludes that the sentiment of 'never again' and the goal of making future wars impossible became the dominant popular war aim by 1918. [Evolution of Peace as a War Aim: British and American Perspectives]: This segment traces the evolution of 'peace' from a vague sentiment to a concrete war aim during the early years of World War I. It contrasts the initial British focus on national interests and treaty obligations (neutrality of Belgium) with the later rhetorical shift toward universal principles like the 'enthronement of public right' and the protection of small nationalities. The text highlights the pivotal role of Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in foreshadowing the League of Nations, and details how these ideas were transplanted to the United States. It further examines President Woodrow Wilson's transition from a policy of strict isolationism and being 'too proud to fight' toward an active advocacy for a universal association of nations, influenced by confidential correspondence with British officials. [Wilson's Mediation Efforts and the Shift to Belligerency]: This section analyzes President Wilson's final attempts to mediate the conflict as a neutral party, most notably through his 'peace without victory' address. Rappard explains that while Wilson sought a peace between equals to avoid the 'quicksand' of resentment, both the Central Powers and the Entente were too invested in total victory to accept such terms. Following the escalation of German submarine warfare, Wilson transitioned the U.S. to a belligerent status but maintained his ideological crusade, arguing that political freedom within states is a prerequisite for international peace. The segment also notes Wilson's deliberate avoidance of precise legal definitions for the proposed 'association of nations' to prevent premature controversy. [European Reactions and National War Aims]: Rappard examines the varied reception of the League of Nations idea among the European Allies. In Great Britain, while the government remained skeptical, committees like the Phillimore Committee began technical drafting. In France, the primary focus remained on restitution (Alsace-Lorraine) and security against future invasion, with Clemenceau openly deriding the League as impracticable. The segment also touches upon the purely territorial aims of Italy defined in the Treaty of London and the shift in Russia following the 1917 revolution. It concludes that while the League was a secondary concern for European leaders compared to national security and territorial gains, they adopted the rhetoric to maintain domestic morale and secure continued American support. [The Papal Peace Appeal and Ideological Factors]: This segment discusses the 1917 peace appeal by Pope Benedict XV, which proposed disarmament and obligatory arbitration, but was rejected by the belligerents who were unwilling to accept a stalemate. Rappard then synthesizes the factors that both favored and hindered the evolution of peace as a war aim. Favoring factors included the need to inspire the masses with a 'just cause' and the strategic necessity of enlisting U.S. support. Hindering factors included the reluctance to sacrifice national interests (like the British Grand Fleet), a profound distrust of German signatures, and the psychological reality that wartime leaders (like Clemenceau and Lloyd George) were temperamentally unsuited for pacifist institution-building. It highlights Balfour's prophetic warning against attempting to forcibly modify Germany's internal policy. [The Quest for Peace at the Peace Conference: Introduction]: The final segment of this chunk introduces the dual nature of the 1919 Peace Conference: settling specific national grievances (reparations, territory) while simultaneously establishing a new international order to prevent future anarchy. Rappard argues that these tasks were inextricably linked, as a lasting peace required a settlement that was perceived as just. He notes that even skeptical European leaders wanted a 'strong league' to guarantee the specific territorial gains they had secured. The segment sets the stage for a detailed examination of the Franco-German territorial settlement and the disposal of German colonies as case studies in the tension between national aspirations and the quest for organized peace. [The Franco-German Territorial Settlement and the Rhine Frontier]: Rappard examines the Franco-German territorial settlement following WWI as a case study of the conflict between national aspirations and international peace efforts. He details the internal French divisions over war aims, contrasting the public desire for the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine with secret government designs on the Saar Basin and the left bank of the Rhine. The text highlights the tension between Marshal Foch's military-strategic vision of a Rhine frontier and President Wilson's insistence on self-determination and the avoidance of 'new Alsace-Lorraines.' Ultimately, France accepted a compromise involving the demilitarization of the Rhineland and a tripartite guarantee, though Rappard notes these securities eventually failed. [The Colonial Settlement and the Mandate System]: This section analyzes the disposal of German overseas possessions through the lens of the newly established Mandate System. Rappard describes the military conquest of German territories in Africa and the Pacific and the subsequent secret agreements among the victors (Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Dominions) to divide these spoils. He explains how the Mandate System emerged as a Wilsonian compromise to prevent outright annexation while satisfying the conquerors' demands for control. While acknowledging the hypocrisy and partiality of the settlement, Rappard argues that the transition from sovereignty to international trusteeship under League of Nations supervision represented a significant step toward world organization. [The Quest for an International Order: Divergent Conceptions of Peace]: Rappard transitions to the broader problem of establishing an international order, contrasting the 'New World' idealism of Woodrow Wilson with the 'Old World' security concerns of European leaders. He argues that Wilson's focus on a League of Nations was facilitated by America's geographic isolation, whereas European nations like France were driven by the immediate physical threat of a resurgent Germany. The segment outlines the fundamental Wilsonian propositions accepted at the conference, including open diplomacy, the removal of economic barriers, and the reduction of armaments, while explaining why European victors remained skeptical of moral guarantees in favor of tangible strategic protections. [The Three Pillars of the Quest for Peace: Pacific Settlement, Collective Security, and Disarmament]: Rappard identifies three fundamental ideas essential to the quest for peace: the pacific settlement of international disputes, collective security, and disarmament. He argues that while individuals have courts and legislatures to curb violence, sovereign nations lack supreme judges or legislators, necessitating a subordination of sovereignty to a superior authority to ensure peace. The segment explores how the 1919 peacemakers in Paris perceived these truths but struggled to draw the necessary logical conclusions, ultimately failing to establish a fully secure peace because they were unwilling to sufficiently arm the international community or fully subordinate state sovereignty. [The Genesis of Pacific Settlement and the Permanent Court]: This section traces the origins of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes within the League of Nations. Rappard notes that Wilson initially relied on international morality rather than specific machinery, making the elaboration of these methods a primarily European contribution, specifically through the British Phillimore plan and the French plan led by Léon Bourgeois. While the French proposed a more ambitious system of compulsory settlement and an international tribunal, the final Covenant adopted a more voluntary, political approach based on Anglo-American ideas, though it did eventually include the Permanent Court of International Justice. [The Principle of Collective Security and Article 10]: Rappard discusses the Wilsonian origin of collective security, specifically the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence found in Article 10. He details the internal debates regarding the inflexibility of such guarantees, which led to the inclusion of Article 19 for the periodic revision of obsolete treaties. The segment highlights the tragic irony that Article 10, Wilson's most personal contribution, became the primary reason for the U.S. Senate's rejection of the League, despite warnings from his advisers like David Hunter Miller. [Sanctions and the Military Question in the Covenant]: This section examines the development of Article 16 and the concept of sanctions. While the British Phillimore Commission provided the framework for automatic economic and military sanctions, the French proposed a much more robust system including a permanent international staff and army. However, the Anglo-American preference for maintaining national sovereignty prevailed, leading to a Covenant that rejected a super-state structure. Léon Bourgeois's impassioned warnings about the future impotence of a League without sufficient coercive power are highlighted as prescient. [The Problem of Disarmament and Post-War Atmosphere]: Rappard analyzes the difficulties of defining and implementing disarmament (Articles 8 and 9). The conflict between French security needs and the Anglo-American desire for demobilization resulted in a program of future action rather than immediate reduction. The segment concludes by describing the disillusioned post-war atmosphere in Europe and the paralyzing effect of the United States' refusal to ratify the treaty, which undermined the League's potential for collective security and disarmament from its inception. [The Permanent Court of International Justice: Origins and Jurisdiction]: This section details the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) under the League of Nations. It explores the tension between the desire for compulsory jurisdiction, championed by the Committee of Jurists and figures like Elihu Root and Léon Bourgeois, and the resistance from Great Powers like Britain and France who favored optional jurisdiction. The segment highlights the 'Root-Phillimore' compromise regarding judge selection and the eventual adoption of the 'optional clause' to reconcile the principle of state equality with the practical influence of major powers. [The Ex-Neutrals and the Evolution of Conciliation]: Rappard discusses the role of ex-neutral states, particularly the Scandinavian countries, in pushing for stronger legal and conciliation mechanisms within the League. While this led to the 1922 resolution favoring conciliation conventions, the author notes that the practical results of the hundreds of resulting bilateral commissions were negligible due to the prevailing political climate in Europe. [The Geneva Protocol of 1924: Security through Arbitration]: An analysis of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which attempted to link disarmament, security, and arbitration into a 'water-tight' system. The Protocol aimed to make the PCIJ's jurisdiction compulsory and prohibit aggressive war unconditionally. Rappard explains its failure following the rise of the Conservative government in Britain, which objected to the expansion of collective sanctions and the lack of American participation. [The Locarno Treaties and the General Act of 1928]: This segment covers the regional security efforts of the Locarno Treaties (1925) and the broader General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1928). It describes how Locarno integrated arbitration into a regional framework to build confidence between Germany and its neighbors, while the General Act provided a menu of model conventions for states to adopt according to their willingness to accept compulsory settlement. [The Briand-Kellogg Pact: Renunciation of War]: Rappard critiques the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), noting its symbolic importance in involving the United States but highlighting its practical weakness. Because it failed to define aggression or provide for enforcement, and explicitly allowed for wars of self-defense as determined by each sovereign state, the author argues it was a 'nebulous' document that denounced war without effectively preventing it. [The Will to Peace vs. The Means to Peace]: The author reflects on the failure of international peace mechanisms in the 1930s. He argues that while the 'means' (legal procedures and courts) were highly developed, the 'will' to use them and the 'policeman' (collective security) failed. He specifically addresses the rigidity of Article 19 regarding treaty revision and concludes that the lust for conquest by Japan, Italy, and Germany could not have been satisfied by any peaceful procedure. [The Aaland Islands Dispute: A Case Study in Successful Mediation]: Rappard presents the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden as a counter-example where peace was maintained despite the absence of formal treaties or the World Court. He details the historical context of the islands and the legal conflict between Finland's claim of domestic jurisdiction and the inhabitants' desire for self-determination. The Council of the League utilized a Commission of Jurists (including Max Huber) to resolve the preliminary legal questions. [The League Council's Competence in the Aaland Islands Dispute]: This segment details the League of Nations Council's decision to declare itself competent in the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland. It includes the statement by British member H. A. L. Fisher, who argued that the situation presented an international aspect due to the political transformation of Finland and the public interest of Europe, despite Finland's claims of domestic jurisdiction. [The Commission of Rapporteurs and the Principle of Self-Determination]: Rappard describes the appointment and findings of the Commission of Rapporteurs regarding the Aaland Islands. The commission's report provides a significant theoretical discussion on the principle of self-determination, concluding that while it is a principle of justice, it is not an absolute rule of international law that allows small minorities to secede from a definitely constituted state, as this would lead to international anarchy. [The Final Resolution of the Aaland Islands Dispute]: This segment covers the Council's final decision in June 1921, which recognized Finnish sovereignty over the Aaland Islands while mandating international guarantees for the Swedish population's language and culture. It highlights the 'profound disappointment' expressed by Swedish representative Branting and the eventual agreement between the parties to place these guarantees under the supervision of the League and the Permanent Court of International Justice. [The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute: A Contrast in International Will]: Rappard introduces the Italo-Ethiopian conflict as a stark contrast to the Aaland Islands success. He argues that despite more advanced legal machinery in 1935, the League failed because of Italy's will for war. The segment begins a detailed historical survey of the conflict, referencing the works of Pitman B. Potter and Charles Rousseau, and notes that the procedures of the League served mainly to provide world publicity rather than prevent the conquest. [Historical Background of Italian Interests in Ethiopia]: This section outlines the diplomatic history preceding the 1935 conflict, including the 1896 Treaty of Addis Ababa, the 1906 Tripartite Agreement between France, Great Britain, and Italy regarding the integrity of Ethiopia, and the 1915 Treaty of London where Italy was promised colonial compensation for its participation in WWI. [Ethiopia's Admission to the League and the 1928 Treaty]: The segment describes Ethiopia's admission to the League of Nations in 1923, sponsored by France and eventually supported by Italy. It also discusses the 1928 Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration, which Rappard characterizes as a piece of 'sharply clever diplomacy' by Italy to shield itself from more certain forms of third-party judgment. [Mussolini's Long-Term Planning for Conquest]: Using the memoirs of Marshal De Bono and Marshal Badoglio, Rappard demonstrates that Mussolini had decided on the conquest of Ethiopia as early as 1933. The segment proves that the Italian military buildup in Eritrea was not defensive but a premeditated offensive aimed at the 'utter destruction' of the Ethiopian state, with a target date of October 1935. [The Wal Wal Incident and the Failure of Arbitration]: This segment details the Wal Wal incident of December 1934 and the subsequent legal maneuvering. Italy used the arbitration process to delay League action while continuing military preparations. Despite evidence of Ethiopian sovereignty over Wal Wal, the commission (under Italian pressure and Council restrictions) issued a verdict that failed to find Italy responsible, which Rappard views as a diplomatic victory for the aggressor. [The Italian Memorandum and the End of Peace Efforts]: Rappard analyzes the September 1935 Italian memorandum which argued that Ethiopia had forfeited its rights as a League member due to its 'backward' state. This document signaled the inevitability of war. The segment concludes that the League's failure to apply Article 16 effectively led to the conquest of Ethiopia and the subsequent collapse of international order, highlighting the necessity of a 'policeman' to enforce judicial findings. [Collective Security and the United States]: Rappard examines the origins of collective security in the League of Nations, emphasizing President Woodrow Wilson's pivotal role in drafting Article 10. He discusses how the United States' refusal to ratify the Covenant undermined the moral and physical force of the League, leading to European anxiety that the lack of an American guarantee would eventually lead to renewed attempts to crush the new nations of Europe. [The Destiny of Article 10: Canadian Proposals and Interpretative Resolutions]: This section details the sustained efforts by Canada to amend or delete Article 10 of the Covenant, driven by concerns over national sovereignty and the absence of the United States. Rappard describes the shift from the radical proposal of deletion to more moderate amendments that emphasized geographical circumstances and parliamentary consent. The debate culminated in a 1923 interpretative resolution that, while technically failing due to a negative vote by Persia, effectively weakened the article's status as an automatic mutual guarantee. [The Whittling Down of Article 16: Economic Sanctions and the Blockade Committee]: Rappard analyzes the erosion of Article 16, the 'British contribution' to collective security focused on economic sanctions. He traces the transition from post-war optimism regarding the 'economic weapon' to a more cautious approach as the International Blockade Committee and various Assemblies introduced reservations. Key issues included the right of individual states to judge the casus foederis, the protection of small states' economic security, and the realization that sanctions were less effective without the participation of non-members like the United States. [The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and the Link to Disarmament]: This segment explores the attempts to restore confidence in collective security through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923). Rappard highlights the fundamental disagreement between France, which demanded security guarantees before disarming, and Great Britain, which viewed disarmament as the prerequisite for security. The draft treaty attempted to combine a general non-aggression pact with regional defensive agreements and increased executive powers for the Council, but it was ultimately rejected by the British government and the United States, leaving the League's security framework in a state of failure by 1924. [The Geneva Protocol of 1924]: This section details the emergence and structure of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, described as the boldest attempt to realize collective security. It explains how political shifts in Great Britain and France facilitated the protocol's creation, emphasizing the 'three-legged' relationship between arbitration, security, and disarmament. The text includes a detailed analysis of Article 11, which sought to clarify and strengthen the application of sanctions under the League of Nations Covenant, as explained by Mr. Benes. [The Repudiation of the Geneva Protocol]: Rappard discusses the rapid downfall of the Geneva Protocol following the rise of a Conservative government in Great Britain. Sir Austen Chamberlain's rejection of the protocol is highlighted, based on the argument that organizing peace through the threat of war (sanctions) was contrary to British common sense. The author reflects on the irony of this rejection in light of Britain's later 1939 bilateral treaty with Poland, suggesting that the 'ounce of prevention' offered by the Protocol was lighter than the 'tons of cure' eventually required. [The Locarno Rhine Pact]: This section examines the Locarno Treaties as a regionalized alternative to the universal collective security of the Geneva Protocol. It describes the German initiative to guarantee the territorial status of the Rhine and the subsequent British support for a limited, circumscribed responsibility. The text highlights the roles of Chamberlain and Stresemann in creating a sense of mutual security between Germany and its neighbors within the framework of the League of Nations. [The Aftermath of Locarno and the Decline of Security]: Rappard analyzes the period following Locarno, where the League attempted to generalize regional security agreements. Despite the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, the movement toward disarmament stalled. The text notes a shift back toward traditional defensive alliances and the eventual disintegration of international confidence due to the economic depression, the rise of Hitler, and Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Henri Rolin's eventual despair regarding contractual security is cited as a turning point. [The Convention on Financial Assistance and the Case of Finland]: The final section of the chunk details a 1926 Finnish proposal for a scheme of financial assistance to states that are victims of aggression. The proposal argued that small states without war industries needed pre-arranged credit to fund defense. This led to the 1930 Convention on Financial Assistance, which was ultimately tied to the failed Disarmament Convention. Rappard concludes by noting that when Finland was attacked in 1939, it had to rely on its own credit and voluntary aid rather than the formal League mechanism that never came into force. [Collective Security as an Historical Fact]: Rappard transitions from a theoretical analysis of collective security to an empirical study of its historical failure between the two World Wars. He notes that while statesmen spent significant effort defining schemes for mutual protection, these were rarely put into operation when actual aggression occurred. He lists numerous instances where League members' territorial integrity was violated—including cases involving Poland, Lithuania, Italy, Greece, China, and Finland—concluding that international solidarity was consistently too hesitant or feeble to overcome aggressive law-breakers. [The Application of Economic Sanctions in the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute]: This section examines the final phase of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, focusing on the League's attempt to apply economic sanctions. It details the diplomatic maneuvers in late 1935, including Sir Samuel Hoare's famous speech pledging British support for collective security and Pierre Laval's more ambiguous stance regarding French loyalty to the Covenant versus friendship with Italy. Rappard analyzes the motivations behind the British and French positions, suggesting that domestic pressures and strategic interests in Africa and Europe heavily influenced their willingness to oppose Mussolini's aggression. [The League Assembly and the Declaration of Aggression]: Rappard details the proceedings of the League Assembly in October 1935, where members were asked to record their positions on Italy's resort to war. He highlights the embarrassment of states like Austria, Hungary, and Albania, who were economically or politically dependent on Italy and thus refused to support sanctions. The section also explores Switzerland's complex position, where Foreign Minister Motta attempted to reconcile League solidarity with traditional military neutrality, arguing that economic sanctions should not be viewed as hostile acts. [International Perspectives on Sanctions and the Failure of Enforcement]: This segment surveys the diverse reactions of League members to the Ethiopian crisis, from the USSR's vocal support for collective security to the cautionary warnings of General Nemours of Haiti. Rappard explains how the lack of military resolve from Great Britain and France rendered economic sanctions ineffective. He describes the eventual Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, the use of chemical weapons, and the moving appeal of Emperor Haile Selassie to the League Assembly, where he questioned the value of international promises to small states. [The Assembly of June 1936 and the Abandonment of Sanctions]: Rappard analyzes the 'depressing' Assembly session of June-July 1936, which met to consider the annexation of Ethiopia and the future of sanctions. He contrasts the Italian government's defiant letter (Count Ciano) with the principled but isolated stand of South Africa, which argued that abandoning sanctions would destroy the League's authority. Maxim Litvinov's critique of the 'capitalist' members' failure to fully apply Article 16 is also examined, alongside the general trend among members to prioritize peace over the justice of the Ethiopian cause. [The Final Disintegration of Collective Security]: The final section of the chapter traces the formal abandonment of collective security between 1936 and 1938. Rappard discusses the work of the Committee of Twenty-eight and the various proposals to reform the Covenant. He highlights the shift of many states (the 'ex-neutrals' and others) toward a 'non-obligatory' interpretation of Article 16. The text concludes with a stark contrast between the idealistic proposals of New Zealand and the harsh reality of the Munich Agreement, which saw Czechoslovakia sacrificed while the League Assembly admitted its own corporate impotence. [The Tragedy of Disarmament: Introduction and Logical Framework]: Rappard introduces the 'trinity' of international reform—arbitration, security, and disarmament—arguing that they are logically interdependent. He explores the French view that security must precede disarmament versus the British view that disarmament is a prerequisite for security. The section defines disarmament not merely as a technical goal but as a psychological and political necessity to prevent the insecurity generated by competitive armaments. Rappard justifies the title 'The Tragedy of Disarmament' by noting that despite unprecedented intellectual and diplomatic effort over twenty years, nations have failed to organize a world community that renders armaments obsolete, resulting in a massive return to war preparations. [The Three Periods of Disarmament History (1920–1934)]: The author divides the post-war disarmament efforts into three distinct chronological periods: the Franco-British period (1920–1926) focused on initial League debates and Locarno; the period of global participation (1926–1932) involving Germany, the US, and the USSR; and the final period of failure (1932–1934) marked by the rise of Nazi Germany and its subsequent withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. [The Franco-British Period and Legal Obligations of the Victors]: This section examines the first period of disarmament (1920–1926), focusing on the legal foundations established by the Treaties of Peace and the League Covenant. Rappard highlights that the disarmament of defeated states was intended as a precursor to general international disarmament. He analyzes Article 8 of the Covenant and the specific assurances given by the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany, which framed general disarmament as a 'fruitful preventive of war' and a primary duty of the League. [The Moral and Political Obligations of Disarmament]: Analyzes the legal and moral obligations for general disarmament following the Treaty of Versailles. It discusses the debate over whether the Allied powers were contractually bound to reduce armaments after enforcing German disarmament, citing perspectives from de Madariaga and Paul Boncour. The section also highlights the political pressure from post-war populations for tangible peace measures. [The Permanent Advisory Commission and Early League Initiatives]: Covers the establishment of the Permanent Advisory Commission (PAC) in 1920 under M. Léon Bourgeois. It details the tension between the Commission's technical military focus and the public's desire for general disarmament. It also notes the Council's unsuccessful attempt to invite the United States to participate in a consultative capacity, which was declined by President Wilson. [The First Assembly and the Rise of the Temporary Mixed Commission]: Describes the 'disarmament offensive' during the First Assembly of the League in 1920, led by Scandinavian countries. Christian Lange proposes the 'common factor' of budgetary expenditure as a basis for reduction and suggests a civilian-led commission. This leads to the creation of the Temporary Mixed Commission (TMC) to provide political and economic perspectives that the military-heavy PAC lacked. [The Interplay of Security and Disarmament (1920–1924)]: Examines the early debates in the Sixth Committee and the Assembly regarding the link between security and disarmament. It details the adoption of Resolution 3, which established the TMC and proposed a two-year financial truce on military spending. The section traces how these efforts evolved into the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) and the Geneva Protocol (1924), where disarmament was made contingent on mutual assistance guarantees. [The Direct Method: Washington Naval Treaty and the Esher Scheme]: Contrasts the 'indirect method' of security-first with the 'direct method' exemplified by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. It details Lord Esher's failed attempt to apply the Washington naval ratio model to European land forces. The failure of the Esher scheme highlighted the complexity of land armaments (reserves, material, war potential) compared to naval tonnage. [Locarno and the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference]: Discusses the renewed hope for disarmament following the 1925 Locarno Treaties and Germany's entry into the League. It describes the reorganization of advisory bodies into the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (PCDC), which included non-members like the US and USSR. The section details the political questionnaire designed to define 'armaments' and the start of technical work by Sub-Commissions A (military) and B (economic). [Conflicting National Visions at the Preparatory Commission (1926–1927)]: Details the opening sessions of the Preparatory Commission, highlighting the divergent stances of the Great Powers. Lord Cecil (UK) emphasizes economy and security; Count Bernstorff (Germany) demands equality and the fulfillment of Allied promises; Hugh Gibson (US) advocates for regional land agreements and naval limitation. The section explores the fundamental clash between the French insistence on security/inspection and the German demand for a 'levelling down' of armaments. [The Failure of the Preparatory Commission and the Draft Convention (1928–1930)]: Traces the final years of the Preparatory Commission, marked by the controversial 1928 Anglo-French compromise and Litvinoff's radical Soviet proposals for total disarmament. It describes the eventual adoption of a 'framework' Draft Convention in 1930, which many delegations (especially Germany and the USSR) found deeply disappointing. The section concludes with the Council's decision to finally convene the General Disarmament Conference in 1932 despite a deteriorating political and economic climate. [The Opening and Initial Phases of the Disarmament Conference]: This segment details the opening of the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva on February 2, 1932, highlighting the massive diplomatic and military representation. Rappard outlines the five distinct phases of the conference's life, from its optimistic opening to its eventual agony by mid-1934. He notes the significant impact of external political events, such as the invasion of Manchuria and the rise of Hitler, on the conference's proceedings and eventual failure. [The General Debate: British and French Perspectives]: Rappard describes the initial general debate of February 1932, contrasting the British and French approaches to disarmament. Sir John Simon advocated for the 'direct method' and qualitative disarmament (outlawing specific weapons like gas and submarines), while André Tardieu presented the French case for disarmament only after the organization of collective security through a League-controlled international force. The segment also notes the 'pathetic' reading of petitions from private organizations that based their hopes on the inconceivable nature of failure. [American, German, and Italian Positions in the 1932 Debate]: This section examines the contributions of the United States, Germany, and Italy to the disarmament debate. Hugh Gibson (USA) supported the direct method and qualitative restrictions on offensive arms. Dr. Brüning (Germany) made a moving plea for equality of rights and security, warning that failure would wreck the conference. Dino Grandi (Italy) dismissed the security-first argument as 'sophistry' and supported the abolition of aggressive weapons like capital ships, tanks, and bombing aircraft. [Japanese and Soviet Contributions to the Disarmament Debate]: Rappard analyzes the speeches of Japan and the Soviet Union, noting the irony of Japan's call for peace while invading China. Maxim Litvinoff (USSR) delivered a lengthy, clever critique of the capitalist powers, proposing total and general disarmament as the only way to ensure 'security against war.' Litvinoff also listed specific aggressive weapons for destruction while asserting that the Soviet Union's focus on internal socialist construction made it naturally disinterested in territorial expansion. [The General Commission and the Hoover Proposals]: Following the general debate, the conference shifted to the General Commission and various technical bodies. Rappard discusses the adoption of qualitative disarmament as a principle and the introduction of President Hoover's 1932 proposals to reduce world arms by one-third. Despite initial interest, these proposals were bogged down by French reservations and technical disagreements, leading to a provisional resolution by Edvard Benes to conclude the first phase. [German Withdrawal and the Five-Power Declaration]: This segment covers the crisis caused by Germany's refusal to accept the July 1932 resolution due to the denial of 'equality of rights.' Germany suspended its cooperation, leading to a period of 'work by proxy.' The deadlock was temporarily resolved in December 1932 through a Five-Power declaration (UK, France, Italy, USA, Germany) that recognized the principle of equality of rights within a system of security, allowing Germany to return to the conference. [The Third Phase and the French Memorandum of 1932]: The third phase of the conference began with the return of Germany and a new French memorandum (November 1932) proposing a League army and the standardization of European continental forces into short-service armies. This plan was heavily criticized by Italy (Aloisi) and Germany (Nadolny) for being overly complicated and for prioritizing international organization over actual armament reduction. The advent of Hitler to power in Germany occurred during these discussions, further complicating the political landscape. [The Failure of Technical Discussions and the MacDonald Plan]: As technical discussions on effectives and material reached a deadlock and Japan announced its withdrawal from the League, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald intervened in March 1933. He submitted a comprehensive draft convention (the MacDonald Plan) designed to bridge the gap between security and disarmament. The plan proposed specific limits on troop numbers (e.g., 200,000 for major European powers), the abolition of bombing from the air, and a consultative mechanism to strengthen the Kellogg Pact. [The MacDonald Plan and the British Initiative for Disarmament]: This segment details the introduction of the 'MacDonald Plan' by the United Kingdom delegation at the Disarmament Conference. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald delivers a frank speech arguing that the Conference must move past compartmentalized discussions toward a complete, unified plan. He addresses the tension between French demands for security and German demands for equality, framing the proposal as a necessary risk to avoid the certainty of catastrophe and the collapse of civilization. [International Reactions to the British Proposals]: Rappard describes the immediate aftermath of MacDonald's speech, noting the initial praise from delegates like Daladier and Gibson, followed by a week of study. The text highlights the embarrassment of major powers, as smaller nations were the first to speak during the subsequent debate. A significant intervention by China's Wellington Koo underscores the reality of insecurity for disarmed nations facing external aggression. [Franco-German Antagonism and the German Claim for Equality]: This section analyzes the diverging responses of France and Germany to the British plan. France, represented by Massigli, shows extreme reserve and treats the plan merely as a 'method of work.' In contrast, Germany's Nadolny welcomes the plan as a step toward justice and the end of 'discriminations' from the peace treaties. Nadolny argues that Germany has already fulfilled its disarmament obligations and demands that other states now follow suit to achieve equality of status. [The Adoption of the Draft Convention and Polish Opposition]: The General Commission adopts the British draft as the basis for future discussions despite a sharp attack from the Polish delegation, which felt excluded from the 'concert of Great Powers.' The segment includes the text of the resolution passed on March 27, 1933, which scheduled a chapter-by-chapter examination of the draft after the Easter vacation. [American Intervention and the Roosevelt Message]: As the situation deteriorates due to secret German rearmament and French suspicion, the United States intervenes. Norman Davis outlines the U.S. position on consultation, followed by a major message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt proposes a four-step plan: adopting the MacDonald Plan, setting a procedure for further steps, freezing current armaments, and entering a universal pact of non-aggression, while identifying aggressive weapons as the primary threat to peace. [The Failure of Negotiations in London and Geneva]: The Conference adjourns to allow for negotiations during the London Economic Conference, but President Arthur Henderson finds himself ignored and unable to make progress. The text describes the 'pathetic' scene of Henderson's isolation in London. Upon his return, he reports a long list of unresolved points, including supervision, sanctions, and the definition of aggression, leading to a further adjournment of the General Commission until October 1933. [The Final Franco-German Clash and Germany's Withdrawal]: The final collapse of the Conference is precipitated by a bitter exchange between Nadolny and Massigli, with France accusing Germany of violating the Versailles Treaty and Germany accusing the armed powers of bad faith. On October 14, 1933, Baron von Neurath sends a telegram announcing Germany's withdrawal from the Conference, effectively sealing its doom. Rappard notes that although technical bodies continued to meet, the death of Henderson in 1935 marked the symbolic end of the effort. [Reflections on the Responsibility for Failure]: Rappard reflects on the causes of the Disarmament Conference's failure. He argues that while official documents might blame French intransigence, history shows that the most vocal advocates for disarmament (Germany, Italy, Japan, USSR) were the actual aggressors. He concludes that disarmament failed not because the methods were wrong, but because a true 'international community' did not exist to support it. The chapter transitions into a final retrospect and prospect for the future. [Recapitulation: The Emergence and Evolution of Organized Peace]: Rappard provides a comprehensive summary of the book's preceding chapters, tracing the evolution of the ideal of organized peace from its origins during World War I to its institutionalization in the League of Nations. He argues that while the war began as a conflict of nationalisms, it was transformed by British liberal statesmen and Woodrow Wilson into a crusade for international justice and democracy. The segment evaluates the Peace Treaties of 1919, defending their territorial settlements as being largely consistent with the principle of self-determination, despite later criticisms. Rappard concludes that the failure of the peace was not due to inherent injustice in the treaties, but rather the withdrawal of the United States and the subsequent lack of force to back international law. [The Failure of Disarmament and the Rise of Dictatorships]: This section reviews the failed efforts to achieve international disarmament and the collapse of collective security. Rappard analyzes the tension between 'security creditors' (like France) who demanded guarantees before disarming, and 'security debtors' (like the British Dominions) who were reluctant to assume international obligations. He details the technical and political hurdles faced by the Preparatory Commission and the Disarmament Conference. Ultimately, he attributes the failure to the rise of aggressive dictatorships in Germany, Italy, and Russia, arguing that the refusal of democratic powers to disarm was a necessary precaution against regimes that did not respect international law or self-determination. [Why and Whither? Theoretical Possibilities for Lasting Peace]: In the concluding section, Rappard reflects on the total failure of the post-war quest for peace and proposes four theoretical hypotheses for lasting international relations: autarky, cooperation, subordination, and federation. He critiques the League's reliance on a 'peace of cooperation,' which he views as a mere truce in international anarchy. He suggests that the only stable solutions are either a 'peace of subordination' (hegemony) or a 'peace of federation' (the sacrifice of sovereignty for common law). He concludes that the current plight of Europe resulted from the 'excessive debility' of the successors to the 1919 peacemakers, who failed to defend the conquests of freedom with a strong international organization. [Index of Names, Places, and Subjects]: A comprehensive alphabetical index for the entire volume, including entries for key historical figures (Wilson, Lloyd George, Mussolini, Hitler), specific geographic locations, international treaties, and specific articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Front matter for 'The Quest for Peace since the World War', including library gift records, publication details from 1940, and a dedication to A. Lawrence Lowell. It features a quote from Pascal's Pensées regarding the necessity of combining justice with force.
Read full textRappard explains the origins of the book as a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute, written during the onset of WWII. He outlines his methodology: a focus on primary official sources, a desire to be a 'modest producer' of historical facts rather than a playwright, and a commitment to analyzing the past rather than predicting the future.
Read full textA detailed table of contents covering the six chapters of the book, detailing the evolution of peace as a war aim, the Peace Conference, twenty years of arbitration, the fluctuations of collective security, and the 'tragedy' of disarmament.
Read full textRappard addresses an American audience, acknowledging their disillusionment with European affairs following WWI. He explores the paradox of why European peoples who yearn for peace are repeatedly led into war by their rulers, setting the stage for a detailed examination of failed peace efforts.
Read full textRappard defines three types of peace: peace as military victory, peace as a lasting superiority of the victors, and peace as a legal organization of the world (the 'Wilsonian' view). He discusses the difficulties in identifying true national war aims, noting how they fluctuate based on military success and the need to maintain coalitions.
Read full textThe segment analyzes the 1914 origins of WWI, arguing that initial motivations were purely national. It contrasts the German inability to set up a 'world thesis' with the Allied use of humanitarian slogans. It concludes that the sentiment of 'never again' and the goal of making future wars impossible became the dominant popular war aim by 1918.
Read full textThis segment traces the evolution of 'peace' from a vague sentiment to a concrete war aim during the early years of World War I. It contrasts the initial British focus on national interests and treaty obligations (neutrality of Belgium) with the later rhetorical shift toward universal principles like the 'enthronement of public right' and the protection of small nationalities. The text highlights the pivotal role of Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in foreshadowing the League of Nations, and details how these ideas were transplanted to the United States. It further examines President Woodrow Wilson's transition from a policy of strict isolationism and being 'too proud to fight' toward an active advocacy for a universal association of nations, influenced by confidential correspondence with British officials.
Read full textThis section analyzes President Wilson's final attempts to mediate the conflict as a neutral party, most notably through his 'peace without victory' address. Rappard explains that while Wilson sought a peace between equals to avoid the 'quicksand' of resentment, both the Central Powers and the Entente were too invested in total victory to accept such terms. Following the escalation of German submarine warfare, Wilson transitioned the U.S. to a belligerent status but maintained his ideological crusade, arguing that political freedom within states is a prerequisite for international peace. The segment also notes Wilson's deliberate avoidance of precise legal definitions for the proposed 'association of nations' to prevent premature controversy.
Read full textRappard examines the varied reception of the League of Nations idea among the European Allies. In Great Britain, while the government remained skeptical, committees like the Phillimore Committee began technical drafting. In France, the primary focus remained on restitution (Alsace-Lorraine) and security against future invasion, with Clemenceau openly deriding the League as impracticable. The segment also touches upon the purely territorial aims of Italy defined in the Treaty of London and the shift in Russia following the 1917 revolution. It concludes that while the League was a secondary concern for European leaders compared to national security and territorial gains, they adopted the rhetoric to maintain domestic morale and secure continued American support.
Read full textThis segment discusses the 1917 peace appeal by Pope Benedict XV, which proposed disarmament and obligatory arbitration, but was rejected by the belligerents who were unwilling to accept a stalemate. Rappard then synthesizes the factors that both favored and hindered the evolution of peace as a war aim. Favoring factors included the need to inspire the masses with a 'just cause' and the strategic necessity of enlisting U.S. support. Hindering factors included the reluctance to sacrifice national interests (like the British Grand Fleet), a profound distrust of German signatures, and the psychological reality that wartime leaders (like Clemenceau and Lloyd George) were temperamentally unsuited for pacifist institution-building. It highlights Balfour's prophetic warning against attempting to forcibly modify Germany's internal policy.
Read full textThe final segment of this chunk introduces the dual nature of the 1919 Peace Conference: settling specific national grievances (reparations, territory) while simultaneously establishing a new international order to prevent future anarchy. Rappard argues that these tasks were inextricably linked, as a lasting peace required a settlement that was perceived as just. He notes that even skeptical European leaders wanted a 'strong league' to guarantee the specific territorial gains they had secured. The segment sets the stage for a detailed examination of the Franco-German territorial settlement and the disposal of German colonies as case studies in the tension between national aspirations and the quest for organized peace.
Read full textRappard examines the Franco-German territorial settlement following WWI as a case study of the conflict between national aspirations and international peace efforts. He details the internal French divisions over war aims, contrasting the public desire for the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine with secret government designs on the Saar Basin and the left bank of the Rhine. The text highlights the tension between Marshal Foch's military-strategic vision of a Rhine frontier and President Wilson's insistence on self-determination and the avoidance of 'new Alsace-Lorraines.' Ultimately, France accepted a compromise involving the demilitarization of the Rhineland and a tripartite guarantee, though Rappard notes these securities eventually failed.
Read full textThis section analyzes the disposal of German overseas possessions through the lens of the newly established Mandate System. Rappard describes the military conquest of German territories in Africa and the Pacific and the subsequent secret agreements among the victors (Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Dominions) to divide these spoils. He explains how the Mandate System emerged as a Wilsonian compromise to prevent outright annexation while satisfying the conquerors' demands for control. While acknowledging the hypocrisy and partiality of the settlement, Rappard argues that the transition from sovereignty to international trusteeship under League of Nations supervision represented a significant step toward world organization.
Read full textRappard transitions to the broader problem of establishing an international order, contrasting the 'New World' idealism of Woodrow Wilson with the 'Old World' security concerns of European leaders. He argues that Wilson's focus on a League of Nations was facilitated by America's geographic isolation, whereas European nations like France were driven by the immediate physical threat of a resurgent Germany. The segment outlines the fundamental Wilsonian propositions accepted at the conference, including open diplomacy, the removal of economic barriers, and the reduction of armaments, while explaining why European victors remained skeptical of moral guarantees in favor of tangible strategic protections.
Read full textRappard identifies three fundamental ideas essential to the quest for peace: the pacific settlement of international disputes, collective security, and disarmament. He argues that while individuals have courts and legislatures to curb violence, sovereign nations lack supreme judges or legislators, necessitating a subordination of sovereignty to a superior authority to ensure peace. The segment explores how the 1919 peacemakers in Paris perceived these truths but struggled to draw the necessary logical conclusions, ultimately failing to establish a fully secure peace because they were unwilling to sufficiently arm the international community or fully subordinate state sovereignty.
Read full textThis section traces the origins of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes within the League of Nations. Rappard notes that Wilson initially relied on international morality rather than specific machinery, making the elaboration of these methods a primarily European contribution, specifically through the British Phillimore plan and the French plan led by Léon Bourgeois. While the French proposed a more ambitious system of compulsory settlement and an international tribunal, the final Covenant adopted a more voluntary, political approach based on Anglo-American ideas, though it did eventually include the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Read full textRappard discusses the Wilsonian origin of collective security, specifically the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence found in Article 10. He details the internal debates regarding the inflexibility of such guarantees, which led to the inclusion of Article 19 for the periodic revision of obsolete treaties. The segment highlights the tragic irony that Article 10, Wilson's most personal contribution, became the primary reason for the U.S. Senate's rejection of the League, despite warnings from his advisers like David Hunter Miller.
Read full textThis section examines the development of Article 16 and the concept of sanctions. While the British Phillimore Commission provided the framework for automatic economic and military sanctions, the French proposed a much more robust system including a permanent international staff and army. However, the Anglo-American preference for maintaining national sovereignty prevailed, leading to a Covenant that rejected a super-state structure. Léon Bourgeois's impassioned warnings about the future impotence of a League without sufficient coercive power are highlighted as prescient.
Read full textRappard analyzes the difficulties of defining and implementing disarmament (Articles 8 and 9). The conflict between French security needs and the Anglo-American desire for demobilization resulted in a program of future action rather than immediate reduction. The segment concludes by describing the disillusioned post-war atmosphere in Europe and the paralyzing effect of the United States' refusal to ratify the treaty, which undermined the League's potential for collective security and disarmament from its inception.
Read full textThis section details the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) under the League of Nations. It explores the tension between the desire for compulsory jurisdiction, championed by the Committee of Jurists and figures like Elihu Root and Léon Bourgeois, and the resistance from Great Powers like Britain and France who favored optional jurisdiction. The segment highlights the 'Root-Phillimore' compromise regarding judge selection and the eventual adoption of the 'optional clause' to reconcile the principle of state equality with the practical influence of major powers.
Read full textRappard discusses the role of ex-neutral states, particularly the Scandinavian countries, in pushing for stronger legal and conciliation mechanisms within the League. While this led to the 1922 resolution favoring conciliation conventions, the author notes that the practical results of the hundreds of resulting bilateral commissions were negligible due to the prevailing political climate in Europe.
Read full textAn analysis of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which attempted to link disarmament, security, and arbitration into a 'water-tight' system. The Protocol aimed to make the PCIJ's jurisdiction compulsory and prohibit aggressive war unconditionally. Rappard explains its failure following the rise of the Conservative government in Britain, which objected to the expansion of collective sanctions and the lack of American participation.
Read full textThis segment covers the regional security efforts of the Locarno Treaties (1925) and the broader General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1928). It describes how Locarno integrated arbitration into a regional framework to build confidence between Germany and its neighbors, while the General Act provided a menu of model conventions for states to adopt according to their willingness to accept compulsory settlement.
Read full textRappard critiques the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), noting its symbolic importance in involving the United States but highlighting its practical weakness. Because it failed to define aggression or provide for enforcement, and explicitly allowed for wars of self-defense as determined by each sovereign state, the author argues it was a 'nebulous' document that denounced war without effectively preventing it.
Read full textThe author reflects on the failure of international peace mechanisms in the 1930s. He argues that while the 'means' (legal procedures and courts) were highly developed, the 'will' to use them and the 'policeman' (collective security) failed. He specifically addresses the rigidity of Article 19 regarding treaty revision and concludes that the lust for conquest by Japan, Italy, and Germany could not have been satisfied by any peaceful procedure.
Read full textRappard presents the Aaland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden as a counter-example where peace was maintained despite the absence of formal treaties or the World Court. He details the historical context of the islands and the legal conflict between Finland's claim of domestic jurisdiction and the inhabitants' desire for self-determination. The Council of the League utilized a Commission of Jurists (including Max Huber) to resolve the preliminary legal questions.
Read full textThis segment details the League of Nations Council's decision to declare itself competent in the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland. It includes the statement by British member H. A. L. Fisher, who argued that the situation presented an international aspect due to the political transformation of Finland and the public interest of Europe, despite Finland's claims of domestic jurisdiction.
Read full textRappard describes the appointment and findings of the Commission of Rapporteurs regarding the Aaland Islands. The commission's report provides a significant theoretical discussion on the principle of self-determination, concluding that while it is a principle of justice, it is not an absolute rule of international law that allows small minorities to secede from a definitely constituted state, as this would lead to international anarchy.
Read full textThis segment covers the Council's final decision in June 1921, which recognized Finnish sovereignty over the Aaland Islands while mandating international guarantees for the Swedish population's language and culture. It highlights the 'profound disappointment' expressed by Swedish representative Branting and the eventual agreement between the parties to place these guarantees under the supervision of the League and the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Read full textRappard introduces the Italo-Ethiopian conflict as a stark contrast to the Aaland Islands success. He argues that despite more advanced legal machinery in 1935, the League failed because of Italy's will for war. The segment begins a detailed historical survey of the conflict, referencing the works of Pitman B. Potter and Charles Rousseau, and notes that the procedures of the League served mainly to provide world publicity rather than prevent the conquest.
Read full textThis section outlines the diplomatic history preceding the 1935 conflict, including the 1896 Treaty of Addis Ababa, the 1906 Tripartite Agreement between France, Great Britain, and Italy regarding the integrity of Ethiopia, and the 1915 Treaty of London where Italy was promised colonial compensation for its participation in WWI.
Read full textThe segment describes Ethiopia's admission to the League of Nations in 1923, sponsored by France and eventually supported by Italy. It also discusses the 1928 Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration, which Rappard characterizes as a piece of 'sharply clever diplomacy' by Italy to shield itself from more certain forms of third-party judgment.
Read full textUsing the memoirs of Marshal De Bono and Marshal Badoglio, Rappard demonstrates that Mussolini had decided on the conquest of Ethiopia as early as 1933. The segment proves that the Italian military buildup in Eritrea was not defensive but a premeditated offensive aimed at the 'utter destruction' of the Ethiopian state, with a target date of October 1935.
Read full textThis segment details the Wal Wal incident of December 1934 and the subsequent legal maneuvering. Italy used the arbitration process to delay League action while continuing military preparations. Despite evidence of Ethiopian sovereignty over Wal Wal, the commission (under Italian pressure and Council restrictions) issued a verdict that failed to find Italy responsible, which Rappard views as a diplomatic victory for the aggressor.
Read full textRappard analyzes the September 1935 Italian memorandum which argued that Ethiopia had forfeited its rights as a League member due to its 'backward' state. This document signaled the inevitability of war. The segment concludes that the League's failure to apply Article 16 effectively led to the conquest of Ethiopia and the subsequent collapse of international order, highlighting the necessity of a 'policeman' to enforce judicial findings.
Read full textRappard examines the origins of collective security in the League of Nations, emphasizing President Woodrow Wilson's pivotal role in drafting Article 10. He discusses how the United States' refusal to ratify the Covenant undermined the moral and physical force of the League, leading to European anxiety that the lack of an American guarantee would eventually lead to renewed attempts to crush the new nations of Europe.
Read full textThis section details the sustained efforts by Canada to amend or delete Article 10 of the Covenant, driven by concerns over national sovereignty and the absence of the United States. Rappard describes the shift from the radical proposal of deletion to more moderate amendments that emphasized geographical circumstances and parliamentary consent. The debate culminated in a 1923 interpretative resolution that, while technically failing due to a negative vote by Persia, effectively weakened the article's status as an automatic mutual guarantee.
Read full textRappard analyzes the erosion of Article 16, the 'British contribution' to collective security focused on economic sanctions. He traces the transition from post-war optimism regarding the 'economic weapon' to a more cautious approach as the International Blockade Committee and various Assemblies introduced reservations. Key issues included the right of individual states to judge the casus foederis, the protection of small states' economic security, and the realization that sanctions were less effective without the participation of non-members like the United States.
Read full textThis segment explores the attempts to restore confidence in collective security through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923). Rappard highlights the fundamental disagreement between France, which demanded security guarantees before disarming, and Great Britain, which viewed disarmament as the prerequisite for security. The draft treaty attempted to combine a general non-aggression pact with regional defensive agreements and increased executive powers for the Council, but it was ultimately rejected by the British government and the United States, leaving the League's security framework in a state of failure by 1924.
Read full textThis section details the emergence and structure of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, described as the boldest attempt to realize collective security. It explains how political shifts in Great Britain and France facilitated the protocol's creation, emphasizing the 'three-legged' relationship between arbitration, security, and disarmament. The text includes a detailed analysis of Article 11, which sought to clarify and strengthen the application of sanctions under the League of Nations Covenant, as explained by Mr. Benes.
Read full textRappard discusses the rapid downfall of the Geneva Protocol following the rise of a Conservative government in Great Britain. Sir Austen Chamberlain's rejection of the protocol is highlighted, based on the argument that organizing peace through the threat of war (sanctions) was contrary to British common sense. The author reflects on the irony of this rejection in light of Britain's later 1939 bilateral treaty with Poland, suggesting that the 'ounce of prevention' offered by the Protocol was lighter than the 'tons of cure' eventually required.
Read full textThis section examines the Locarno Treaties as a regionalized alternative to the universal collective security of the Geneva Protocol. It describes the German initiative to guarantee the territorial status of the Rhine and the subsequent British support for a limited, circumscribed responsibility. The text highlights the roles of Chamberlain and Stresemann in creating a sense of mutual security between Germany and its neighbors within the framework of the League of Nations.
Read full textRappard analyzes the period following Locarno, where the League attempted to generalize regional security agreements. Despite the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, the movement toward disarmament stalled. The text notes a shift back toward traditional defensive alliances and the eventual disintegration of international confidence due to the economic depression, the rise of Hitler, and Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Henri Rolin's eventual despair regarding contractual security is cited as a turning point.
Read full textThe final section of the chunk details a 1926 Finnish proposal for a scheme of financial assistance to states that are victims of aggression. The proposal argued that small states without war industries needed pre-arranged credit to fund defense. This led to the 1930 Convention on Financial Assistance, which was ultimately tied to the failed Disarmament Convention. Rappard concludes by noting that when Finland was attacked in 1939, it had to rely on its own credit and voluntary aid rather than the formal League mechanism that never came into force.
Read full textRappard transitions from a theoretical analysis of collective security to an empirical study of its historical failure between the two World Wars. He notes that while statesmen spent significant effort defining schemes for mutual protection, these were rarely put into operation when actual aggression occurred. He lists numerous instances where League members' territorial integrity was violated—including cases involving Poland, Lithuania, Italy, Greece, China, and Finland—concluding that international solidarity was consistently too hesitant or feeble to overcome aggressive law-breakers.
Read full textThis section examines the final phase of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, focusing on the League's attempt to apply economic sanctions. It details the diplomatic maneuvers in late 1935, including Sir Samuel Hoare's famous speech pledging British support for collective security and Pierre Laval's more ambiguous stance regarding French loyalty to the Covenant versus friendship with Italy. Rappard analyzes the motivations behind the British and French positions, suggesting that domestic pressures and strategic interests in Africa and Europe heavily influenced their willingness to oppose Mussolini's aggression.
Read full textRappard details the proceedings of the League Assembly in October 1935, where members were asked to record their positions on Italy's resort to war. He highlights the embarrassment of states like Austria, Hungary, and Albania, who were economically or politically dependent on Italy and thus refused to support sanctions. The section also explores Switzerland's complex position, where Foreign Minister Motta attempted to reconcile League solidarity with traditional military neutrality, arguing that economic sanctions should not be viewed as hostile acts.
Read full textThis segment surveys the diverse reactions of League members to the Ethiopian crisis, from the USSR's vocal support for collective security to the cautionary warnings of General Nemours of Haiti. Rappard explains how the lack of military resolve from Great Britain and France rendered economic sanctions ineffective. He describes the eventual Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, the use of chemical weapons, and the moving appeal of Emperor Haile Selassie to the League Assembly, where he questioned the value of international promises to small states.
Read full textRappard analyzes the 'depressing' Assembly session of June-July 1936, which met to consider the annexation of Ethiopia and the future of sanctions. He contrasts the Italian government's defiant letter (Count Ciano) with the principled but isolated stand of South Africa, which argued that abandoning sanctions would destroy the League's authority. Maxim Litvinov's critique of the 'capitalist' members' failure to fully apply Article 16 is also examined, alongside the general trend among members to prioritize peace over the justice of the Ethiopian cause.
Read full textThe final section of the chapter traces the formal abandonment of collective security between 1936 and 1938. Rappard discusses the work of the Committee of Twenty-eight and the various proposals to reform the Covenant. He highlights the shift of many states (the 'ex-neutrals' and others) toward a 'non-obligatory' interpretation of Article 16. The text concludes with a stark contrast between the idealistic proposals of New Zealand and the harsh reality of the Munich Agreement, which saw Czechoslovakia sacrificed while the League Assembly admitted its own corporate impotence.
Read full textRappard introduces the 'trinity' of international reform—arbitration, security, and disarmament—arguing that they are logically interdependent. He explores the French view that security must precede disarmament versus the British view that disarmament is a prerequisite for security. The section defines disarmament not merely as a technical goal but as a psychological and political necessity to prevent the insecurity generated by competitive armaments. Rappard justifies the title 'The Tragedy of Disarmament' by noting that despite unprecedented intellectual and diplomatic effort over twenty years, nations have failed to organize a world community that renders armaments obsolete, resulting in a massive return to war preparations.
Read full textThe author divides the post-war disarmament efforts into three distinct chronological periods: the Franco-British period (1920–1926) focused on initial League debates and Locarno; the period of global participation (1926–1932) involving Germany, the US, and the USSR; and the final period of failure (1932–1934) marked by the rise of Nazi Germany and its subsequent withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.
Read full textThis section examines the first period of disarmament (1920–1926), focusing on the legal foundations established by the Treaties of Peace and the League Covenant. Rappard highlights that the disarmament of defeated states was intended as a precursor to general international disarmament. He analyzes Article 8 of the Covenant and the specific assurances given by the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany, which framed general disarmament as a 'fruitful preventive of war' and a primary duty of the League.
Read full textAnalyzes the legal and moral obligations for general disarmament following the Treaty of Versailles. It discusses the debate over whether the Allied powers were contractually bound to reduce armaments after enforcing German disarmament, citing perspectives from de Madariaga and Paul Boncour. The section also highlights the political pressure from post-war populations for tangible peace measures.
Read full textCovers the establishment of the Permanent Advisory Commission (PAC) in 1920 under M. Léon Bourgeois. It details the tension between the Commission's technical military focus and the public's desire for general disarmament. It also notes the Council's unsuccessful attempt to invite the United States to participate in a consultative capacity, which was declined by President Wilson.
Read full textDescribes the 'disarmament offensive' during the First Assembly of the League in 1920, led by Scandinavian countries. Christian Lange proposes the 'common factor' of budgetary expenditure as a basis for reduction and suggests a civilian-led commission. This leads to the creation of the Temporary Mixed Commission (TMC) to provide political and economic perspectives that the military-heavy PAC lacked.
Read full textExamines the early debates in the Sixth Committee and the Assembly regarding the link between security and disarmament. It details the adoption of Resolution 3, which established the TMC and proposed a two-year financial truce on military spending. The section traces how these efforts evolved into the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) and the Geneva Protocol (1924), where disarmament was made contingent on mutual assistance guarantees.
Read full textContrasts the 'indirect method' of security-first with the 'direct method' exemplified by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. It details Lord Esher's failed attempt to apply the Washington naval ratio model to European land forces. The failure of the Esher scheme highlighted the complexity of land armaments (reserves, material, war potential) compared to naval tonnage.
Read full textDiscusses the renewed hope for disarmament following the 1925 Locarno Treaties and Germany's entry into the League. It describes the reorganization of advisory bodies into the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (PCDC), which included non-members like the US and USSR. The section details the political questionnaire designed to define 'armaments' and the start of technical work by Sub-Commissions A (military) and B (economic).
Read full textDetails the opening sessions of the Preparatory Commission, highlighting the divergent stances of the Great Powers. Lord Cecil (UK) emphasizes economy and security; Count Bernstorff (Germany) demands equality and the fulfillment of Allied promises; Hugh Gibson (US) advocates for regional land agreements and naval limitation. The section explores the fundamental clash between the French insistence on security/inspection and the German demand for a 'levelling down' of armaments.
Read full textTraces the final years of the Preparatory Commission, marked by the controversial 1928 Anglo-French compromise and Litvinoff's radical Soviet proposals for total disarmament. It describes the eventual adoption of a 'framework' Draft Convention in 1930, which many delegations (especially Germany and the USSR) found deeply disappointing. The section concludes with the Council's decision to finally convene the General Disarmament Conference in 1932 despite a deteriorating political and economic climate.
Read full textThis segment details the opening of the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva on February 2, 1932, highlighting the massive diplomatic and military representation. Rappard outlines the five distinct phases of the conference's life, from its optimistic opening to its eventual agony by mid-1934. He notes the significant impact of external political events, such as the invasion of Manchuria and the rise of Hitler, on the conference's proceedings and eventual failure.
Read full textRappard describes the initial general debate of February 1932, contrasting the British and French approaches to disarmament. Sir John Simon advocated for the 'direct method' and qualitative disarmament (outlawing specific weapons like gas and submarines), while André Tardieu presented the French case for disarmament only after the organization of collective security through a League-controlled international force. The segment also notes the 'pathetic' reading of petitions from private organizations that based their hopes on the inconceivable nature of failure.
Read full textThis section examines the contributions of the United States, Germany, and Italy to the disarmament debate. Hugh Gibson (USA) supported the direct method and qualitative restrictions on offensive arms. Dr. Brüning (Germany) made a moving plea for equality of rights and security, warning that failure would wreck the conference. Dino Grandi (Italy) dismissed the security-first argument as 'sophistry' and supported the abolition of aggressive weapons like capital ships, tanks, and bombing aircraft.
Read full textRappard analyzes the speeches of Japan and the Soviet Union, noting the irony of Japan's call for peace while invading China. Maxim Litvinoff (USSR) delivered a lengthy, clever critique of the capitalist powers, proposing total and general disarmament as the only way to ensure 'security against war.' Litvinoff also listed specific aggressive weapons for destruction while asserting that the Soviet Union's focus on internal socialist construction made it naturally disinterested in territorial expansion.
Read full textFollowing the general debate, the conference shifted to the General Commission and various technical bodies. Rappard discusses the adoption of qualitative disarmament as a principle and the introduction of President Hoover's 1932 proposals to reduce world arms by one-third. Despite initial interest, these proposals were bogged down by French reservations and technical disagreements, leading to a provisional resolution by Edvard Benes to conclude the first phase.
Read full textThis segment covers the crisis caused by Germany's refusal to accept the July 1932 resolution due to the denial of 'equality of rights.' Germany suspended its cooperation, leading to a period of 'work by proxy.' The deadlock was temporarily resolved in December 1932 through a Five-Power declaration (UK, France, Italy, USA, Germany) that recognized the principle of equality of rights within a system of security, allowing Germany to return to the conference.
Read full textThe third phase of the conference began with the return of Germany and a new French memorandum (November 1932) proposing a League army and the standardization of European continental forces into short-service armies. This plan was heavily criticized by Italy (Aloisi) and Germany (Nadolny) for being overly complicated and for prioritizing international organization over actual armament reduction. The advent of Hitler to power in Germany occurred during these discussions, further complicating the political landscape.
Read full textAs technical discussions on effectives and material reached a deadlock and Japan announced its withdrawal from the League, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald intervened in March 1933. He submitted a comprehensive draft convention (the MacDonald Plan) designed to bridge the gap between security and disarmament. The plan proposed specific limits on troop numbers (e.g., 200,000 for major European powers), the abolition of bombing from the air, and a consultative mechanism to strengthen the Kellogg Pact.
Read full textThis segment details the introduction of the 'MacDonald Plan' by the United Kingdom delegation at the Disarmament Conference. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald delivers a frank speech arguing that the Conference must move past compartmentalized discussions toward a complete, unified plan. He addresses the tension between French demands for security and German demands for equality, framing the proposal as a necessary risk to avoid the certainty of catastrophe and the collapse of civilization.
Read full textRappard describes the immediate aftermath of MacDonald's speech, noting the initial praise from delegates like Daladier and Gibson, followed by a week of study. The text highlights the embarrassment of major powers, as smaller nations were the first to speak during the subsequent debate. A significant intervention by China's Wellington Koo underscores the reality of insecurity for disarmed nations facing external aggression.
Read full textThis section analyzes the diverging responses of France and Germany to the British plan. France, represented by Massigli, shows extreme reserve and treats the plan merely as a 'method of work.' In contrast, Germany's Nadolny welcomes the plan as a step toward justice and the end of 'discriminations' from the peace treaties. Nadolny argues that Germany has already fulfilled its disarmament obligations and demands that other states now follow suit to achieve equality of status.
Read full textThe General Commission adopts the British draft as the basis for future discussions despite a sharp attack from the Polish delegation, which felt excluded from the 'concert of Great Powers.' The segment includes the text of the resolution passed on March 27, 1933, which scheduled a chapter-by-chapter examination of the draft after the Easter vacation.
Read full textAs the situation deteriorates due to secret German rearmament and French suspicion, the United States intervenes. Norman Davis outlines the U.S. position on consultation, followed by a major message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt proposes a four-step plan: adopting the MacDonald Plan, setting a procedure for further steps, freezing current armaments, and entering a universal pact of non-aggression, while identifying aggressive weapons as the primary threat to peace.
Read full textThe Conference adjourns to allow for negotiations during the London Economic Conference, but President Arthur Henderson finds himself ignored and unable to make progress. The text describes the 'pathetic' scene of Henderson's isolation in London. Upon his return, he reports a long list of unresolved points, including supervision, sanctions, and the definition of aggression, leading to a further adjournment of the General Commission until October 1933.
Read full textThe final collapse of the Conference is precipitated by a bitter exchange between Nadolny and Massigli, with France accusing Germany of violating the Versailles Treaty and Germany accusing the armed powers of bad faith. On October 14, 1933, Baron von Neurath sends a telegram announcing Germany's withdrawal from the Conference, effectively sealing its doom. Rappard notes that although technical bodies continued to meet, the death of Henderson in 1935 marked the symbolic end of the effort.
Read full textRappard reflects on the causes of the Disarmament Conference's failure. He argues that while official documents might blame French intransigence, history shows that the most vocal advocates for disarmament (Germany, Italy, Japan, USSR) were the actual aggressors. He concludes that disarmament failed not because the methods were wrong, but because a true 'international community' did not exist to support it. The chapter transitions into a final retrospect and prospect for the future.
Read full textRappard provides a comprehensive summary of the book's preceding chapters, tracing the evolution of the ideal of organized peace from its origins during World War I to its institutionalization in the League of Nations. He argues that while the war began as a conflict of nationalisms, it was transformed by British liberal statesmen and Woodrow Wilson into a crusade for international justice and democracy. The segment evaluates the Peace Treaties of 1919, defending their territorial settlements as being largely consistent with the principle of self-determination, despite later criticisms. Rappard concludes that the failure of the peace was not due to inherent injustice in the treaties, but rather the withdrawal of the United States and the subsequent lack of force to back international law.
Read full textThis section reviews the failed efforts to achieve international disarmament and the collapse of collective security. Rappard analyzes the tension between 'security creditors' (like France) who demanded guarantees before disarming, and 'security debtors' (like the British Dominions) who were reluctant to assume international obligations. He details the technical and political hurdles faced by the Preparatory Commission and the Disarmament Conference. Ultimately, he attributes the failure to the rise of aggressive dictatorships in Germany, Italy, and Russia, arguing that the refusal of democratic powers to disarm was a necessary precaution against regimes that did not respect international law or self-determination.
Read full textIn the concluding section, Rappard reflects on the total failure of the post-war quest for peace and proposes four theoretical hypotheses for lasting international relations: autarky, cooperation, subordination, and federation. He critiques the League's reliance on a 'peace of cooperation,' which he views as a mere truce in international anarchy. He suggests that the only stable solutions are either a 'peace of subordination' (hegemony) or a 'peace of federation' (the sacrifice of sovereignty for common law). He concludes that the current plight of Europe resulted from the 'excessive debility' of the successors to the 1919 peacemakers, who failed to defend the conquests of freedom with a strong international organization.
Read full textA comprehensive alphabetical index for the entire volume, including entries for key historical figures (Wilson, Lloyd George, Mussolini, Hitler), specific geographic locations, international treaties, and specific articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
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