by Rueff
[Front Matter and Bibliography of Jacques Rueff]: Title page and a comprehensive list of previous works by Jacques Rueff, spanning from 1922 to 1971, covering topics such as social order, monetary regulation, and the philosophy of economic systems. [Legal Notice and Prologue]: Legal copyright information followed by a prologue that introduces the urgency of the Western monetary problem. Rueff argues that the international monetary system is unsustainable and that temporary expedients only delay an inevitable collapse. [Chapter I: The Diagnosis of June 1961]: Rueff provides a historical diagnosis of the monetary situation in 1961, drawing parallels to the period preceding the Great Depression (1926-1929). He defines the 'gold-exchange standard' and notes his early warnings to the French government about the risks of accumulating dollar and sterling balances. He mentions his agreement on the diagnosis with Robert Triffin, despite differing on remedies. [The First Alarm: Articles from Le Monde (June 1961)]: A reproduction of Rueff's influential 1961 articles in 'Le Monde'. He critiques the gold-exchange standard for allowing 'deficits without tears,' where debtor nations (specifically the US) do not feel the corrective pressure of gold outflows. He explains how this system leads to a global duplication of credit and creates a fragile 'house of cards' structure that threatens Western stability. [Appendix to Chapter I: Technical Details on the Gold-Exchange Standard]: A technical appendix explaining the mechanics of money creation and the historical origins of the gold-exchange standard from the 1922 Genoa Conference. It details the evolution of French monetary law (1926-1937) and defines the distinction between a pure gold standard and the gold-exchange standard based on the proportion of foreign currency in central bank reserves. [Chapter II: Can the Western Monetary System Last?]: Rueff addresses critics of his 1961 articles. He argues against the idea that monetary authorities can manually simulate the corrective effects of the gold standard through credit policy, asserting that such interventions are usually 'too little, too late.' He disputes the notion that the gold-exchange standard is a necessary 'progress' for economic expansion, labeling it instead as a dangerous inflationary artifice. [Chapter III: Prudence, Discretion, and Diplomatic Efforts]: Rueff explains his strategic silence regarding the price of gold to avoid speculation. He recounts his attempts to persuade the French government and President de Gaulle to take an international initiative to reform the monetary system. Includes a 1961 letter to de Gaulle warning that the US Federal Reserve's insolvency could trigger a 'Great Depression' and urging France to lead a rescue operation. [Rueff's Influence on General de Gaulle and the French Administration]: Rueff describes his efforts to influence French financial policy between 1958 and 1965. He notes the resistance from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France, who attributed inflation to state spending rather than the international monetary system. Rueff highlights his close relationship with General de Gaulle's inner circle, including Etienne Burin des Roziers and Maurice Couve de Murville, who were more receptive to his warnings about the US balance of payments deficit and its inflationary impact on France. [Chapter IV: General de Gaulle's Press Conference on the Gold Standard]: This chapter reproduces General de Gaulle's historic press conference from February 4, 1965. De Gaulle argues that the Gold-Exchange Standard, established after the World Wars when the US held most of the world's gold, is no longer suited to reality. He criticizes the 'exorbitant privilege' of the dollar, which allows the US to export inflation and debt. He advocates for a return to an indisputable international monetary base—gold—which is impartial and has no nationality, calling for a concerted reform among major economic powers. [Chapter V: The Role and the Rule of Gold - Interview with The Economist]: A detailed transcript of Jacques Rueff's 1965 interview with Fred Hirsch of The Economist. Rueff clarifies that he does not ghostwrite for De Gaulle but shares his views. He provides a rigorous critique of the Gold-Exchange Standard, arguing it lacks the 'automatic' demand contraction necessary to balance payments, effectively allowing the US to export inflation. Rueff debates the feasibility of a return to gold, the necessity of increasing the gold price to liquidate 'dollar balances', and contrasts his views with Robert Triffin's proposal for international credit expansion. He emphasizes that gold is not a 'religious' fetish but a tool for restoring the price mechanism and international order. [Chapter VI: The Time for Action - A Program for Monetary Reform]: Writing in 1966, Rueff warns that the international monetary system is entering a terminal phase of collapse similar to 1928-1933. He proposes a concrete six-point plan: stopping the accumulation of dollar/sterling reserves, a simultaneous international doubling of the gold price, using the resulting nominal surplus to repay dollar/sterling balances, and providing long-term loans to the UK and developing nations. He argues this would trigger a global wave of prosperity by releasing hoarded capital and lowering interest rates, provided the US overcomes its 'infantile' attachment to the 1934 gold price. [Chapter VII: Triffin and Rueff - A Common Diagnosis, Different Remedies]: A 1966 debate between Jacques Rueff and Robert Triffin. Both agree on the diagnosis: the Gold-Exchange Standard is a 'sin against the spirit' that allows the US to finance deficits automatically, leading to global instability. However, they differ on the remedy. Rueff advocates for a return to the gold standard via a gold price increase to liquidate past debts. Triffin fears this would be inflationary and instead proposes an international reserve institution to manage credit. They discuss the urgency of the situation, the 'absurdity' of waiting for a US balance of payments equilibrium before reforming, and the specific difficulties facing the British pound. [Part III: The Entry of the Experts - Chapter VIII: The Environment]: Rueff reflects on the hostile reception of his ideas by 'young technocrats' and US officials. He defends the concept of 'monetary cybernetics'—automatic market regulations—against those who view economic structures as purely administrative. He cites Keynes's posthumous 1946 article to support the existence of 'natural forces' and the 'invisible hand' in balancing economies. Despite official rejection of his gold price proposal, Rueff notes the personal respect and interest shown by figures like William McChesney-Martin and Robert Roosa, and his 1965 meeting with future president Richard Nixon. [Chapter IX & X: Symptomatic Medication and the Error of Liquidity]: Rueff criticizes the international response to the dollar crisis between 1960 and 1964 as 'purely symptomatic.' Instead of addressing the root cause (the Gold-Exchange Standard), experts created palliatives like 'Roosa bonds,' 'swaps,' and increased IMF quotas to help the US and UK continue financing their deficits. He argues that the Group of Ten made a decisive diagnostic error by framing the problem as a 'lack of international liquidity' rather than a specific lack of non-US currencies for the debtor nations, thereby avoiding the necessary discussion on the price of gold. [Chapter XI: Irrigation Plans During the Deluge]: In this 1966 article, Rueff mocks the 'Ossola Commission' for studying how to create more liquidity (irrigation) while the world is suffering from an inflationary 'deluge' of dollars. He argues that the world has an excess of liquidity, not a shortage. The 'liquidity crisis' is merely a euphemism for the US and UK's inability to pay their debts without losing gold. He warns that creating new reserve instruments without requiring the repayment of existing dollar balances is a 'veritable attack' on Western stability. [Chapter XII & XIII: Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and 'Paper-Gold']: Rueff analyzes the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which he dismisses as 'Paper-Gold' or 'nothingness dressed as money.' He argues that SDRs are an inflationary tool that allows the US to continue its deficit without the discipline of gold. Unlike gold, which must be 'earned' through production or trade surpluses, SDRs are 'allocated' by administrative decision. He predicts that this system will lead to total inconvertibility and continued global inflation, as it fails to address the fundamental price discrepancy of gold since 1934. [Chapter XIV: The Economic Heresy of 'Recycling' Capital]: Rueff denounces the proposal to 'recycle' exported capital—returning speculative capital to its country of origin via loans. He calls this an 'art of erasing effects while leaving causes,' as it prevents the natural credit scarcity that would otherwise stop capital flight. He cites the Bank of France's 1968 failure to allow credit contraction during an exodus of capital as a prime example of this error. He warns that institutionalizing recycling would lead to a global monetary catastrophe. [Part IV: The Consequences - Chapter XV & XVI: The Irreversible Evolution]: Rueff observes the 'implacable rigor' of the consequences he predicted. He analyzes the failure of President Johnson's 1968 'San Antonio Plan,' which attempted to use administrative controls to fix the balance of payments—a task Rueff deems impossible without monetary discipline. He details the 'dislocation' of the system: the 1968 explosion of the gold pool, the rise of the euro-dollar, and exorbitant interest rates (8-9%). He reiterates that only a simultaneous international revaluation of gold can restore stability and prevent a new Great Depression. [Chapter XVII: The Precarious Hegemony of the Dollar]: Rueff argues that the decisions of March 17, 1968, transformed the international system from a Gold-Exchange Standard into a de facto 'Dollar Standard.' By closing the official gold market to private entities and pressuring central banks not to convert dollars, the US established a 'supervised convertibility.' Rueff warns this hegemony is precarious; it relies on other nations' willingness to be 'sheep' and absorb US inflation. He predicts a eventual 'revolt' of creditor nations and concludes that a return to gold is the only way to save Western civilization from monetary corruption. [Table of Contents (Partial)]: Partial table of contents for the volume 'Le péché monétaire de l'occident'. [Table of Contents: Chapters II to XVII and Epilogue]: This segment contains the detailed table of contents for the remainder of the book, outlining parts two through four. It lists chapters covering the gold exchange standard, General de Gaulle's press conference, debates with Robert Triffin, the problem of international liquidity, paper-gold (SDRs), and the eventual crisis of the dollar's hegemony leading up to 1971. [Publication Details and Colophon]: Technical publication data including the printing date (March 17, 1971), the name of the printer (Mourral), the publisher (Plon), and legal deposit information. [Back Matter: Summary and Author's Thesis]: A concluding summary of Jacques Rueff's central thesis. He argues that the West is committing a 'monetary sin' by abandoning convertibility and adopting the gold exchange standard and special drawing rights. Rueff invokes Lenin's warning about destroying a regime by corrupting its currency, criticizing the United States for policies that led to the 1968 monetary explosion and the depreciation of the dollar and sterling.
Title page and a comprehensive list of previous works by Jacques Rueff, spanning from 1922 to 1971, covering topics such as social order, monetary regulation, and the philosophy of economic systems.
Read full textLegal copyright information followed by a prologue that introduces the urgency of the Western monetary problem. Rueff argues that the international monetary system is unsustainable and that temporary expedients only delay an inevitable collapse.
Read full textRueff provides a historical diagnosis of the monetary situation in 1961, drawing parallels to the period preceding the Great Depression (1926-1929). He defines the 'gold-exchange standard' and notes his early warnings to the French government about the risks of accumulating dollar and sterling balances. He mentions his agreement on the diagnosis with Robert Triffin, despite differing on remedies.
Read full textA reproduction of Rueff's influential 1961 articles in 'Le Monde'. He critiques the gold-exchange standard for allowing 'deficits without tears,' where debtor nations (specifically the US) do not feel the corrective pressure of gold outflows. He explains how this system leads to a global duplication of credit and creates a fragile 'house of cards' structure that threatens Western stability.
Read full textA technical appendix explaining the mechanics of money creation and the historical origins of the gold-exchange standard from the 1922 Genoa Conference. It details the evolution of French monetary law (1926-1937) and defines the distinction between a pure gold standard and the gold-exchange standard based on the proportion of foreign currency in central bank reserves.
Read full textRueff addresses critics of his 1961 articles. He argues against the idea that monetary authorities can manually simulate the corrective effects of the gold standard through credit policy, asserting that such interventions are usually 'too little, too late.' He disputes the notion that the gold-exchange standard is a necessary 'progress' for economic expansion, labeling it instead as a dangerous inflationary artifice.
Read full textRueff explains his strategic silence regarding the price of gold to avoid speculation. He recounts his attempts to persuade the French government and President de Gaulle to take an international initiative to reform the monetary system. Includes a 1961 letter to de Gaulle warning that the US Federal Reserve's insolvency could trigger a 'Great Depression' and urging France to lead a rescue operation.
Read full textRueff describes his efforts to influence French financial policy between 1958 and 1965. He notes the resistance from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of France, who attributed inflation to state spending rather than the international monetary system. Rueff highlights his close relationship with General de Gaulle's inner circle, including Etienne Burin des Roziers and Maurice Couve de Murville, who were more receptive to his warnings about the US balance of payments deficit and its inflationary impact on France.
Read full textThis chapter reproduces General de Gaulle's historic press conference from February 4, 1965. De Gaulle argues that the Gold-Exchange Standard, established after the World Wars when the US held most of the world's gold, is no longer suited to reality. He criticizes the 'exorbitant privilege' of the dollar, which allows the US to export inflation and debt. He advocates for a return to an indisputable international monetary base—gold—which is impartial and has no nationality, calling for a concerted reform among major economic powers.
Read full textA detailed transcript of Jacques Rueff's 1965 interview with Fred Hirsch of The Economist. Rueff clarifies that he does not ghostwrite for De Gaulle but shares his views. He provides a rigorous critique of the Gold-Exchange Standard, arguing it lacks the 'automatic' demand contraction necessary to balance payments, effectively allowing the US to export inflation. Rueff debates the feasibility of a return to gold, the necessity of increasing the gold price to liquidate 'dollar balances', and contrasts his views with Robert Triffin's proposal for international credit expansion. He emphasizes that gold is not a 'religious' fetish but a tool for restoring the price mechanism and international order.
Read full textWriting in 1966, Rueff warns that the international monetary system is entering a terminal phase of collapse similar to 1928-1933. He proposes a concrete six-point plan: stopping the accumulation of dollar/sterling reserves, a simultaneous international doubling of the gold price, using the resulting nominal surplus to repay dollar/sterling balances, and providing long-term loans to the UK and developing nations. He argues this would trigger a global wave of prosperity by releasing hoarded capital and lowering interest rates, provided the US overcomes its 'infantile' attachment to the 1934 gold price.
Read full textA 1966 debate between Jacques Rueff and Robert Triffin. Both agree on the diagnosis: the Gold-Exchange Standard is a 'sin against the spirit' that allows the US to finance deficits automatically, leading to global instability. However, they differ on the remedy. Rueff advocates for a return to the gold standard via a gold price increase to liquidate past debts. Triffin fears this would be inflationary and instead proposes an international reserve institution to manage credit. They discuss the urgency of the situation, the 'absurdity' of waiting for a US balance of payments equilibrium before reforming, and the specific difficulties facing the British pound.
Read full textRueff reflects on the hostile reception of his ideas by 'young technocrats' and US officials. He defends the concept of 'monetary cybernetics'—automatic market regulations—against those who view economic structures as purely administrative. He cites Keynes's posthumous 1946 article to support the existence of 'natural forces' and the 'invisible hand' in balancing economies. Despite official rejection of his gold price proposal, Rueff notes the personal respect and interest shown by figures like William McChesney-Martin and Robert Roosa, and his 1965 meeting with future president Richard Nixon.
Read full textRueff criticizes the international response to the dollar crisis between 1960 and 1964 as 'purely symptomatic.' Instead of addressing the root cause (the Gold-Exchange Standard), experts created palliatives like 'Roosa bonds,' 'swaps,' and increased IMF quotas to help the US and UK continue financing their deficits. He argues that the Group of Ten made a decisive diagnostic error by framing the problem as a 'lack of international liquidity' rather than a specific lack of non-US currencies for the debtor nations, thereby avoiding the necessary discussion on the price of gold.
Read full textIn this 1966 article, Rueff mocks the 'Ossola Commission' for studying how to create more liquidity (irrigation) while the world is suffering from an inflationary 'deluge' of dollars. He argues that the world has an excess of liquidity, not a shortage. The 'liquidity crisis' is merely a euphemism for the US and UK's inability to pay their debts without losing gold. He warns that creating new reserve instruments without requiring the repayment of existing dollar balances is a 'veritable attack' on Western stability.
Read full textRueff analyzes the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which he dismisses as 'Paper-Gold' or 'nothingness dressed as money.' He argues that SDRs are an inflationary tool that allows the US to continue its deficit without the discipline of gold. Unlike gold, which must be 'earned' through production or trade surpluses, SDRs are 'allocated' by administrative decision. He predicts that this system will lead to total inconvertibility and continued global inflation, as it fails to address the fundamental price discrepancy of gold since 1934.
Read full textRueff denounces the proposal to 'recycle' exported capital—returning speculative capital to its country of origin via loans. He calls this an 'art of erasing effects while leaving causes,' as it prevents the natural credit scarcity that would otherwise stop capital flight. He cites the Bank of France's 1968 failure to allow credit contraction during an exodus of capital as a prime example of this error. He warns that institutionalizing recycling would lead to a global monetary catastrophe.
Read full textRueff observes the 'implacable rigor' of the consequences he predicted. He analyzes the failure of President Johnson's 1968 'San Antonio Plan,' which attempted to use administrative controls to fix the balance of payments—a task Rueff deems impossible without monetary discipline. He details the 'dislocation' of the system: the 1968 explosion of the gold pool, the rise of the euro-dollar, and exorbitant interest rates (8-9%). He reiterates that only a simultaneous international revaluation of gold can restore stability and prevent a new Great Depression.
Read full textRueff argues that the decisions of March 17, 1968, transformed the international system from a Gold-Exchange Standard into a de facto 'Dollar Standard.' By closing the official gold market to private entities and pressuring central banks not to convert dollars, the US established a 'supervised convertibility.' Rueff warns this hegemony is precarious; it relies on other nations' willingness to be 'sheep' and absorb US inflation. He predicts a eventual 'revolt' of creditor nations and concludes that a return to gold is the only way to save Western civilization from monetary corruption.
Read full textPartial table of contents for the volume 'Le péché monétaire de l'occident'.
Read full textThis segment contains the detailed table of contents for the remainder of the book, outlining parts two through four. It lists chapters covering the gold exchange standard, General de Gaulle's press conference, debates with Robert Triffin, the problem of international liquidity, paper-gold (SDRs), and the eventual crisis of the dollar's hegemony leading up to 1971.
Read full textTechnical publication data including the printing date (March 17, 1971), the name of the printer (Mourral), the publisher (Plon), and legal deposit information.
Read full textA concluding summary of Jacques Rueff's central thesis. He argues that the West is committing a 'monetary sin' by abandoning convertibility and adopting the gold exchange standard and special drawing rights. Rueff invokes Lenin's warning about destroying a regime by corrupting its currency, criticizing the United States for policies that led to the 1968 monetary explosion and the depreciation of the dollar and sterling.
Read full text