Der Kapitalzins kritische Studien

[Title Page and Preface: The Revision of Interest Theory]: The author, Emil Sax, introduces his critical study on capital interest, positioning it as a fundamental revision of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk's theories. Sax explains his long delay in publishing these views, citing the need for the 'Austrian School' to first gain academic recognition before internal critiques could be voiced. He outlines the book's development from 1889 to 1914 and emphasizes that while he uses Böhm-Bawerk's work as a starting point, his own theory is rooted in his earlier 'Grundlegung der theoretischen Staatswirtschaft'. [Methodological Foundations and Table of Contents]: Sax discusses the methodological differences between his approach and Böhm-Bawerk's, focusing on the concepts of need and value. He introduces the 'Robinson' figure as a tool for analyzing elementary economic phenomena outside of social exchange. The segment includes a brief critique of Friedrich von Wieser's 'Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft' and concludes with a detailed table of contents covering nine chapters on topics such as the three reasons for interest, capital in the isolated economy, and interest in a socialist state. [Chapter 1: Robinson's Economy and Elementary Economic Concepts]: Sax begins his critique by examining Böhm-Bawerk's claim that the 'core' of interest (the growth in value of future goods) would exist even in an isolated economy like Robinson Crusoe's. Sax challenges this, arguing that interest is a socio-economic category, not an elementary one. He provides a detailed psychological analysis of 'needs', distinguishing between objective states of deprivation and subjective feelings of desire, and argues that subjective needs cease once the means of satisfaction are secured. [Psychological Analysis of Future Needs and Value]: Sax critiques Böhm-Bawerk's psychological explanation of how future needs motivate present action. He finds Böhm-Bawerk's distinction between present 'suffering' and future 'intellectual judgment' contradictory. Sax argues that future needs are felt as present desires through memory and anticipation. He then transitions to value theory, critiquing the distinction between subjective and objective value, specifically arguing that 'objective exchange value' is a misnomer because value is a psychological judgment, not a physical property of goods. [The Measurement of Value and the Role of Intellect vs. Feeling]: Sax examines the logic of quantifying value. He critiques Böhm-Bawerk's use of a 1-10 scale for the 'importance' of needs, noting that if value is purely an intellectual judgment, it lacks a clear basis for numerical precision. Sax explores the tension between value as an intellectual judgment and value as a feeling of intensity (pleasure/pain). He references contemporary psychological debates (Kraus, Čuhel) to argue that value is an emotional state that precedes and motivates intellectual 'value judgments'. [Chapter 2: The Value Relationship Between Present and Future Goods]: Sax begins his critique of Böhm-Bawerk's 'three reasons' for the higher valuation of present goods. He distinguishes between three types of valuation: 'choice valuation' (choosing when to use a good), 'present valuation' (the current value of a future good), and 'future valuation' (the value a good will have in the future). He argues that without the 'three reasons', present and future goods would be valued equally under identical circumstances, and sets out to prove these reasons are logically flawed. [Critique of the First and Second Reasons for Interest]: Sax critiques the first reason (difference in supply/demand over time) and the second reason (psychological underestimation of future needs). He argues that the first reason is not a universal law but a situational occurrence. Regarding the second reason, he rejects the idea that humans 'systematically' underestimate the future due to lack of imagination or weak will, calling these exceptions rather than the rule for 'rational' economic actors. He also disputes that the uncertainty of life (mortality) leads to a systematic discount of future goods in normal economic planning. [The Perspective of Value and the Role of Labor]: Sax introduces the concept of 'Value Perspective' (Wertperspektive) as an alternative to Böhm-Bawerk's psychological defects. Using a visual analogy, he argues that future values appear smaller from the standpoint of the present, just as distant objects appear smaller to the eye. This is a natural psychological phenomenon, not a 'mistake'. He links this to the motivation for production: an actor only undertakes labor if the 'present value' of the future product outweighs the 'disutility' (Unlust) of the work required. [The Concept of Costs and Present Value in Production]: Sax examines the relationship between present value and the use of goods as means of production. He critiques Oskar Kraus's foundation of the cost concept, arguing that the value of productive goods is derived from the present value of the final product. The transition from present to future value during production manifests as an increase in the derived value of productive means, and costs are defined as the combination of labor and the loss of present satisfaction. [Capital Formation and the Valuation of Durable Goods]: This section discusses capital formation and the valuation of durable goods that provide services over multiple periods. Sax explains that the present value of a durable good is the sum of the present values of its sequential utility services. He uses a numerical example (Robinson Crusoe) to illustrate how the value of a stock of goods decreases as it serves recurring needs over time, providing a basis for economic decisions regarding labor and future enjoyment. [The Psychological Basis of Value Perspective]: Sax explores the psychological and emotional origins of value, arguing that value belongs to the realm of feelings rather than pure intellectual judgment. He explains that the present estimation of future goods is weaker because the anticipated need is less intense than an immediate one. He contrasts his 'value perspective' with Böhm-Bawerk's theories, emphasizing that his approach does not require 'intermediate causes' but follows directly from the nature of human desire and time. [Critique of the Third Reason: Technical Superiority of Present Goods]: Sax begins a detailed critique of Böhm-Bawerk's 'third reason' for the higher value of present goods: their technical superiority in production. He challenges the idea that 'roundabout' production methods necessarily lengthen the total production time or that quantity increases can be generalized to quality. He specifically questions the subsumption of labor under the concept of a 'good' and argues that the technical advantage of present labor is often a logical illusion based on how production periods are defined. [Mathematical Analysis and Refutation of Böhm-Bawerk's Tables]: Sax provides a rigorous mathematical critique of the numerical tables used by Böhm-Bawerk to prove the superiority of present productive means. He demonstrates that within a single production period, labor units are effectively equal in value. He identifies a logical error in Böhm-Bawerk's calculation: the failure to adjust marginal utility figures to correspond with the specific quantities produced in shorter versus longer periods. Sax concludes that the 'third reason' fails to prove a value difference between present and future productive means. [Application to Consumption Goods and Final Summary]: In the final section of this chunk, Sax examines whether the 'third reason' applies to consumption goods. He critiques the idea that present consumption goods are more valuable because they 'free up' labor for future-oriented production (the subsistence fund argument). Using a fishing example, he argues that the true cause of value difference is the ratio of need to coverage (scarcity), not a technical causal link. He concludes that the 'third reason' is invalid and prepares to summarize his findings. [Summary of Value Differences and Critique of Böhm-Bawerk]: Sax summarizes the results of his investigation into the temporal differences in value between present and future goods. He critiques Böhm-Bawerk's 'three reasons' for the higher valuation of present goods, arguing that the psychological subtleties and dialectical defenses offered by Böhm-Bawerk lack real cognitive gain and resemble scholastic hair-splitting. Sax maintains that while a lower valuation of future goods relative to their future value exists, it must be explained through a subjective value theory rather than production technology or systematic underestimation. [Chapter III: Capital in the Economy of Robinson Crusoe - The Concept of Capital]: Sax explores the role of capital in an isolated economy (Robinson Crusoe). He provides an extensive 'interjection' on the definition of capital, distinguishing between the 'original concept' (Urbegriff) of capital as intermediate products/instrumental goods and the 'exchange concept' (Verkehrsbegriff) used in market economies. He critiques J.B. Clark's metaphysical 'true capital' as a fiction and discusses the 'subsistence fund' theory. Sax argues that capital is essentially a collective term for goods that enable future welfare gains through production, excluding direct consumption goods. [Technical Production and Capital Formation in the Isolated Economy]: Sax analyzes Robinson's use of technical production means like bows, nets, and agricultural tools. He disputes Böhm-Bawerk's characterization of simple seed-sowing as 'roundabout production,' arguing that capital economy only truly begins when labor actively enhances natural processes (e.g., fertilization). Capital formation is described as a temporal 'welfare balance' where present consumption is restricted to enable greater future satisfaction. Sax emphasizes that in an isolated economy, the value of production means is derived from the total utility of the expected product. [Value Transmission and the Absence of Interest in Isolated Production]: Sax examines whether 'interest' (a value surplus) exists in Robinson's isolated production. He argues that while the value of the product is imputed to the production means, this does not create a surplus (interest) in the isolated economy. The 'value swelling' observed as a product nears completion is merely a psychological 'value perspective' and not the cause of the welfare gain. He critiques Wieser's imputation theory for smuggling market-economy concepts (like exchange value units) into the analysis of isolated production. Sax concludes that in Robinson's economy, the welfare gain stems from physical production, not from a value surplus. [Critique of Capital as an Independent Factor of Production]: Sax critiques the elevation of capital to an 'independent' factor of production, specifically targeting Wieser's 'Grundriß der Sozialökonomie.' He argues that the perceived 'unconsumability' or 'self-renewal' of capital is a linguistic trick that ignores the constant human effort and present-utility sacrifice required to maintain it. He asserts that the 'net yield' attributed to capital is actually a result of labor and natural forces, and that the appearance of capital as an automatic source of income is a specific development of the exchange economy, not an inherent property of capital itself. [Chapter IV: The Emergence of Interest in the Private Economy]: Sax transitions from the isolated economy to the private (market) economy, where interest first appears. He illustrates this through a scenario where Robinson interacts with a second settler. Interest is defined as an exchange gain resulting from the different valuations of present and future goods by different subjects. Sax argues that interest is a form of 'exchange gain' (Tauschgewinn) enabled by private property. He also discusses the relationship between capital owners and laborers, where the entrepreneur's profit (interest) arises from buying future labor products with present subsistence goods. [Interest in the Money Economy and the Concept of Abstinence]: Sax discusses interest in the context of a money economy, where it reaches its full development. He critiques the 'abstinence theory,' arguing that interest is not a reward for sacrifice but a motivation for it. He explores the ethical and economic dimensions of interest, including 'usury' (Wucher), where one party exploits another's distress. The section also covers the 'risk premium' and the role of labor effort (Arbeitsmühe) in the welfare balance of both the lender and the borrower. Sax concludes that interest is necessarily proportional to the duration of the exchange because the welfare loss of deferring consumption increases over time. [The Exchange Concept of Capital and Market Price Formation]: Sax defines the 'exchange concept' of capital (Verkehrskapital) as goods that provide their owner with a periodic interest gain through repeated exchange. He critiques Böhm-Bawerk's market price theory, specifically the idea that present goods have a 'universal' higher value. Sax argues that market interest rates result from the intersection of individual subjective valuations. He also dismisses Böhm-Bawerk's 'time arbitrage' theory as a fantasy, asserting that interest is inherently proportional to time and does not require market arbitrage to become so. [The Loan Interest and the 'Value Swelling' Fallacy]: Sax critiques Böhm-Bawerk's explanation of loan interest. Böhm-Bawerk argues that interest arises because future goods 'ripen' or 'swell' in value as they become present goods. Sax contends this is a circular argument that presupposes interest to explain it. He clarifies that in a private economy, 'value' often refers to exchange value (market price). He also provides an 'interjection' on discounting and compound interest, explaining that these are tools of the developed exchange economy and should not be confused with subjective psychological valuations of future utility. [Chapter VI: Robinson as Homeowner - Interest from Durable Goods]: Sax examines whether durable goods (like a house) yield interest in an isolated economy. He critiques Böhm-Bawerk's view that the 'value swelling' of future services from a durable good constitutes interest. Sax argues that for Robinson, the use of a house is a direct consumption of utility, not a source of interest. Interest only appears when the services of the durable good are exchanged (rented) in a market. He distinguishes between the 'original' use of durable goods and their role as 'exchange capital' in a private economy, where rent includes both depreciation and interest. [Chapter VII: Interest in the Private Economic Production Process]: Opening of the seventh chapter regarding interest within the production process of a private economy. [I. Abschnitt. Die Theorie der Produktionsumwege (§ 51-54)]: Sax begins a critical examination of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk's theory of roundabout production (Produktionsumwege) as applied to private capitalist production. He argues that while the core idea of utilizing nature's forces is sound, characterizing this path strictly as a 'roundabout' leads to errors when generalized into a total theory of interest. He specifically critiques the assumption that technical progress necessarily lengthens the production period, noting that inventions often shorten the total time required. [Kritik der zeitlichen Messung und des Subsistenzfonds (§ 55-62)]: Sax critiques the mathematical and conceptual precision of the 'average production period' and 'waiting time' (Wartezeit). He argues that these metrics are practically uncalculable for individual entrepreneurs and that the relationship between the subsistence fund (Subsistenzmittelfonds) and the production period is logically inconsistent in Böhm-Bawerk's work. He also challenges the idea that the subsistence fund only needs to cover half the production period, citing J.B. Clark's concept of synchronized production to show that capital requirements are higher than Böhm-Bawerk suggests. [Versagen der Theorie in der organischen Produktion (§ 63-65)]: Sax argues that the theory of roundabout production fails completely when applied to organic production (agriculture and forestry). He contends that waiting for biological growth (the vegetation process) is fundamentally different from a technical 'roundabout' of labor. He critiques the absurdity of viewing primitive forestry as more 'capitalistic' than chemical synthesis simply because of the time elapsed, and concludes that the theory suffers from internal contradictions and a lack of logical closure. [2. Abschnitt. Der Zinsgewinn der Unternehmer (§ 66-72)]: Sax examines the entrepreneur's interest profit, reframing it as a result of exchange between present goods (subsistence) and future goods (labor's product). He critiques Böhm-Bawerk's 'value swelling' explanation, arguing instead that the interest arises from the specific social condition where workers lack the means to wait for their product's completion. He highlights a self-contradiction in Böhm-Bawerk's theory regarding the competition of entrepreneurs for the subsistence fund, which would logically make entrepreneurs interest-payers rather than interest-receivers. [Kritik der Zurechnung und des mehrstufigen Produktionsbeispiels (§ 73-80)]: Sax provides a detailed critique of a five-year production example used by Böhm-Bawerk to justify interest. He disputes the claim that earlier labor is 'more productive' or 'more valuable' than later labor within the same process. Sax argues that the equal wage paid throughout the process is a result of a contract where the worker sells their future product share for present subsistence. He also discusses how land rent and trade profits integrate into this capitalist framework, concluding that competition cannot eliminate interest because entrepreneurs would simply cease production if no profit were available. [VIII. Kapitel. Zins im Sozialistenstaat? (§ 81-87)]: Sax investigates whether interest would exist in a socialist state. He rejects Böhm-Bawerk's claim that interest is a 'natural' phenomenon that persists under socialism. Using the example of forestry, Sax argues that a socialist community would distribute the total product among members without an interest deduction, as the social power dynamic of private property (the true source of interest) would be absent. He concludes that while a socialist state must plan for the future using a 'value perspective,' this does not result in the economic category of interest. [IX. Kapitel. Ergebnisse (§ 88-94)]: In the concluding chapter, Sax summarizes his findings. He acknowledges Böhm-Bawerk's critical contributions but rejects his positive theory as overly complex and logically flawed. Sax contrasts his own theory—which roots interest in private property and social exchange—with the 'imputation' (Zurechnung) and 'dynamic' (Schumpeter) theories. He argues that interest is a specific historical and social category of the private economy, influenced by social power relations, and that understanding this can bridge the gap between socialist and bourgeois economic perspectives. [Anzeigen und Verlagsverzeichnis]: Publisher's advertisements for contemporary works in political science and economics by authors such as Johann Plenge, Hermann Levy, and Wilhelm Gerloff, focusing on topics like discount policy, war economy, and imperial finance reform.