by Schütz
[Introduction and Criticism of Realism and Idealism]: Schütz introduces Sartre's approach to the problem of the Other's existence, noting its independence from the broader tenets of existentialism. He critiques Sartre's rejection of both realism and idealism; realism fails by presupposing the Other's mind to explain the body, while idealism fails because the 'Other' cannot be reduced to a mere regulative concept or a system of presentations within the subject's own consciousness without destroying the unity of that consciousness. [Sartre's Criticism of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger]: This section details Sartre's critique of three major thinkers who attempted to solve the problem of the Other. Sartre argues that Husserl remains trapped in idealism because the Other is reduced to a noematic meaning rather than a real Being; Hegel's 'ontological optimism' fails because it treats the relationship between consciousnesses as an objective rapport rather than starting from a concrete consciousness; and Heidegger's 'Mitsein' (being-with) is criticized for being an aprioristic structure that fails to explain the encounter between concrete individuals. [Sartre's Theory of the Look and the Other as Subject]: Schütz outlines Sartre's positive theory, focusing on 'the Look' (le regard) as the primary mode of encountering the Other. When I am looked at, I experience myself as an object for another subject, which limits my freedom and defines my situation from an external perspective. This experience is not one of cognition but an irreducible ontological fact that reveals the Other's subjectivity through my own objectification, leading to a dialectic where I can only regain my subjectivity by objectifying the Other in return. [Sartre's Theory of the Body and Comparison with Husserl]: Schütz examines Sartre's three ontological dimensions of the body: the body as lived (being-for-itself), the body as it appears to the Other, and the body as I experience it being known by the Other. He compares these views to Husserl's 'Fifth Cartesian Meditation,' noting that while Sartre borrows heavily from Husserl's concepts of the 'primordial sphere' and 'appresentation,' he correctly identifies that Husserl fails to establish a truly coexisting transcendental Alter Ego, remaining instead within the mundane sphere. [Critical Observations and the Failure of Sartre's Social Theory]: In the final section, Schütz offers a stinging critique of Sartre's theory, arguing it results in a 'practical solipsism' where mutual interaction in freedom is impossible. He contends that Sartre's subject-object dichotomy fails to account for social reality, such as linguistic communication or shared projects, where both parties must recognize each other as co-performing subjectivities. Schütz argues that a true theory of the social world requires a 'tuning-in' relationship and a shared system of relevance that Sartre's conflict-based model cannot provide.
Schütz introduces Sartre's approach to the problem of the Other's existence, noting its independence from the broader tenets of existentialism. He critiques Sartre's rejection of both realism and idealism; realism fails by presupposing the Other's mind to explain the body, while idealism fails because the 'Other' cannot be reduced to a mere regulative concept or a system of presentations within the subject's own consciousness without destroying the unity of that consciousness.
Read full textThis section details Sartre's critique of three major thinkers who attempted to solve the problem of the Other. Sartre argues that Husserl remains trapped in idealism because the Other is reduced to a noematic meaning rather than a real Being; Hegel's 'ontological optimism' fails because it treats the relationship between consciousnesses as an objective rapport rather than starting from a concrete consciousness; and Heidegger's 'Mitsein' (being-with) is criticized for being an aprioristic structure that fails to explain the encounter between concrete individuals.
Read full textSchütz outlines Sartre's positive theory, focusing on 'the Look' (le regard) as the primary mode of encountering the Other. When I am looked at, I experience myself as an object for another subject, which limits my freedom and defines my situation from an external perspective. This experience is not one of cognition but an irreducible ontological fact that reveals the Other's subjectivity through my own objectification, leading to a dialectic where I can only regain my subjectivity by objectifying the Other in return.
Read full textSchütz examines Sartre's three ontological dimensions of the body: the body as lived (being-for-itself), the body as it appears to the Other, and the body as I experience it being known by the Other. He compares these views to Husserl's 'Fifth Cartesian Meditation,' noting that while Sartre borrows heavily from Husserl's concepts of the 'primordial sphere' and 'appresentation,' he correctly identifies that Husserl fails to establish a truly coexisting transcendental Alter Ego, remaining instead within the mundane sphere.
Read full textIn the final section, Schütz offers a stinging critique of Sartre's theory, arguing it results in a 'practical solipsism' where mutual interaction in freedom is impossible. He contends that Sartre's subject-object dichotomy fails to account for social reality, such as linguistic communication or shared projects, where both parties must recognize each other as co-performing subjectivities. Schütz argues that a true theory of the social world requires a 'tuning-in' relationship and a shared system of relevance that Sartre's conflict-based model cannot provide.
Read full text