Wirtschaftspolitik in der Schweiz in kritischer Sicht

[Front Matter and Table of Contents]: Title page, dedication to Professor Fritz Marbach, and table of contents for the book 'Wirtschaftspolitik in der Schweiz in kritischer Sicht' (1959). [The Swiss Economic Order: Theory and Reality]: Amonn defines the 'economic order' as the legal framework for economic activity, distinguishing between individualistic market economies and collectivist systems. He argues that the modern Western world, including Switzerland, has become a 'mixed economy' or 'mishmash economy' (Röpke) where state interventions have corrupted the market mechanism. He explores the relationship between freedom and prosperity, the distinction between objective wealth and subjective welfare, and the problematic nature of the welfare state. [Constitutional Basis of the Swiss Economy]: Analysis of the Swiss economic order through the lens of the Federal Constitution, specifically the 'New Economic Articles' of 1947. Amonn argues that while economic freedom (Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit) is nominally guaranteed, it is severely restricted by constitutional exceptions for agriculture, housing, and cartels. He details the specific competencies granted to the federal government to intervene in banking, labor relations, and crisis prevention. [Price and Wage Policy: Inflation and Cost of Living]: Amonn examines the relationship between prices and wages, defining price policy as direct state intervention in price levels. He critiques the use of price controls and subsidies (like bread prices) and analyzes the causes of inflation in Switzerland. He argues that 'teuerung' (rising cost of living) is primarily a result of monetary expansion (credit and gold inflows) rather than just state price adjustments, emphasizing that price increases require an expanded money supply to be sustained. [Productivity, Trade Unions, and the Ethics of Wage Increases]: A discussion on how productivity gains should be distributed. Amonn argues against the automatic link between productivity and nominal wage increases, suggesting that price reductions would be a more socially just way to distribute gains. He critiques the trade union view that productivity stems solely from labor effort, attributing it instead to entrepreneurial innovation and capital investment. He also acknowledges the historical necessity of unions while warning of their monopolistic power on the labor market. [The Futility of General Price Controls in Peacetime]: Amonn argues that general price controls in peacetime are ineffective and harmful. He explains that for price controls to work, they must be accompanied by wage controls and isolation from world markets, otherwise they lead to 'money overhangs' and black markets. He suggests that instead of bureaucratic control, the state should focus on promoting competition and preventing inflation. [Working Hours and the 44-Hour Week Initiative]: An analysis of the historical reduction of working hours and the contemporary Swiss initiative for a 44-hour week. Amonn argues that while the 8-hour day was a social necessity, further reductions should be handled through private contracts rather than constitutional mandates. He discusses the trade-off between shorter hours and higher wages, noting that in a modern mechanized economy, productivity gains are the only sustainable way to reduce hours without lowering living standards. [Cartel and Monopoly Policy: The Role of Competition]: Amonn introduces the problem of cartels in Switzerland, defining competition as the essential condition for a functioning market economy. He distinguishes between 'performance competition' (Leistungswettbewerb) and 'illoyal' competition. He discusses the paradox where legal freedom is used to restrict actual competition through private agreements. The segment concludes by introducing the work of the Swiss Price Formation Commission and its major 1957 report on cartels led by Professor Marbach. [Begriffsbestimmung und Abgrenzung von Kartell und Gewerkschaft]: This section outlines the Price Commission's definition of a cartel, rejecting 'market dominance' and 'profit' as essential characteristics in favor of a broader definition focused on income preservation through competition restriction. It also provides a conceptual and political distinction between cartels and labor unions, arguing that labor competition serves a different functional role in the economic system than product competition. [Historische Entwicklung und Aspekte des Kartellproblems in der Schweiz]: The author summarizes the historical context of the cartel debate in Switzerland since the 1920s, focusing on the tension between cartels and economic freedom. It examines various aspects of the problem, including economic impacts on distribution and productivity, sociological implications for Swiss village culture, and the necessity of state intervention to prevent abuse of power. [Kartellpolitische Bestrebungen und die Kartellenquête]: This segment reviews past Swiss parliamentary efforts regarding cartel policy from 1924 to 1955 and introduces the 'First Part' of the report, which evaluates the national cartel inquiry. It notes the lack of federal competence prior to 1947 and describes the structural analysis of cartels across various economic sectors, characterizing Switzerland as one of the most 'cartel-dense' countries. [Organisatorischer Aufbau und horizontale Bindungen]: A detailed look at the organizational characteristics of Swiss cartels, including legal forms, leadership, and monitoring mechanisms. It enumerates various 'horizontal' agreements used to restrict competition, such as price-fixing, customer allocation, and production quotas, while noting the limitations of the data due to the absence of a formal cartel register. [Vertikale Bindungen, Marktschliessung und Boykott]: This section analyzes vertical agreements between different stages of production and trade, which the report considers more effective at eliminating competition than horizontal ones. It details mechanisms like exclusivity agreements, market enclosure, and various forms of boycotts (intimidation, submission, and displacement) used to discipline outsiders and maintain cartel power. [Vertikale Integration und Bindungen mit Arbeitnehmerverbänden]: The final section of this chunk discusses 'vertical integration' and the role of collective labor agreements (GAV) in enforcing cartel structures. It highlights how multi-stage market orders often lack a balance of power, leading to price shifting onto consumers, and describes how labor unions are sometimes used to secure employer-side price and calculation rules through exclusive employment clauses. [Vertical Competition Restrictions and Individual Contract Systems]: This section examines collective vertical competition restrictions and coordinated systems of individual contracts. It defines how market-dominant firms use uniform contracts to regulate market behavior, specifically through resale price maintenance (Preisbindung der zweiten hand) and exclusivity clauses that restrict the sale of competitor products. [Historical Development and Motives for Cartelization]: A detailed analysis of the historical shift in cartel motivations from pure profit-seeking to defensive measures against 'ruinous competition'. The text argues that modern cartels often emerge from economic necessity and the need to protect substance, wages, and jobs. It also discusses the role of labor unions in preventing wage compression, which in turn necessitates price-side coordination by employers to maintain margins. [Sector-Specific Motives for Cartelization]: The text explores specific reasons for cartelization across different economic sectors. In industry, fixed costs and overcapacity drive cartels; in trade, the fear of being bypassed and the rise of large-scale retailers are key; in agriculture, natural production fluctuations lead to state-sanctioned 'compulsory cartels'; and in crafts, the lack of calculation knowledge and fear of industrial displacement are primary drivers. [Conditions for Cartel Effectiveness and Market Forms]: This section classifies market forms (monopoly, oligopoly, atomistic competition) and their relationship to cartel effectiveness. It examines three classification systems: structural (number of participants), accessibility (open vs. closed markets), and product type (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous goods). It concludes that while cartels are incompatible with pure atomistic competition, they can exist in almost any other market form, with homogeneity often facilitating their formation. [Kartellinterne und kartellexterne Faktoren der Wirksamkeit]: This segment details the internal and external factors that determine the effectiveness of a cartel and the degree of competition restriction it can achieve. Internal factors include structural elements like the number and size of members, product nature, cost structures (fixed vs. variable), and subjective traits like trust and 'security thinking.' External factors include competition from outsiders, foreign products, substitute goods, and the threat of potential new market entrants. [Vertikale Marktverhältnisse und Kritik der Kartellwirkungen]: The author examines how market structures on preceding or succeeding economic stages (suppliers and buyers) influence cartel effectiveness, noting that vertical agreements often shift higher prices onto the unorganized final consumer. It also catalogs complaints against cartels from various perspectives: members feeling coerced, outsiders facing discriminatory practices like exclusive contracts, and consumers suffering from high prices and restricted quality competition. [Volkswirtschaftliche Auswirkungen und das Allgemeininteresse]: This section analyzes the impact of cartels on the general interest, specifically regarding production and distribution. It argues that price-fixing leads to the preservation of inefficient capacity and misallocation of capital, ultimately reducing national productivity and prosperity. Furthermore, it discusses the distributional disadvantages where cartel-driven income gains for some groups lead to the relative impoverishment of unorganized groups like pensioners and civil servants. [Gesetzliche Wettbewerbsregelung: Verbots- vs. Missbrauchsprinzip]: The text transitions to the second part of the report concerning legal regulation. It rejects a total ban on cartels as impractical and potentially disruptive to the social and economic order. Instead, it advocates for a modified abuse-control system where specific harmful practices are prohibited 'per se' while others are monitored. This approach is presented as a pragmatic solution that minimizes administrative effort while providing clarity for businesses. [Funktion und Schutzwürdigkeit des Wettbewerbs]: This segment explores the theoretical and practical functions of competition as a means to increase general welfare. It concludes that while absolute, unrestricted competition is not the goal, competition must be preserved as an organizing principle to incentivize productivity and rationalization. It emphasizes 'performance-based competition' (Leistungswettbewerb) to prevent unearned monopoly income, while acknowledging that social or non-economic goals may necessitate certain limitations on this principle. [Wettbewerbspolitische Zielsetzungen: Freiheit vs. Bindung]: This segment examines the practical implications of competition policy goals, specifically the tension between unrestricted competition and the freedom of contract that allows for competition-restricting agreements. Amonn discusses the difficulty of establishing objective criteria for 'unfair' competition or 'abuse of power,' noting that such judgments are often subjective and interest-driven. The commission concludes that a perfect balance is practically impossible due to the conflicting nature of these values in the Swiss context. [Das Prinzip des «Möglichen Wettbewerbes»]: Amonn outlines the commission's core proposal: the principle of 'Possible Competition' (Möglicher Wettbewerb). Since a perfect balance of interests is unattainable, the focus shifts to a macroeconomic minimum standard where competition must remain functional as a market regulator. The goal is not to force competition through state coercion, but to ensure that any willing participant has the legal and social possibility to compete based on performance, preventing total market foreclosure. [Beurteilung der Kartelltätigkeit und Konkurrenzbeschränkungen]: This section evaluates the dual nature of cartels, acknowledging potential benefits like stability and rationalization while highlighting the dangers of excluding competition. Amonn distinguishes between voluntary internal cartel rules, which may be acceptable if market forces remain active (e.g., through outsiders or imports), and aggressive measures aimed at market monopolization or coercing others. The latter are deemed incompatible with the principle of 'Possible Competition' because they violate the personal freedom of economic activity. [Unzulässige kartellistische Massnahmen und Einzelsanktionen]: The text provides a detailed list of specific cartel practices that are incompatible with the 'Possible Competition' framework. These include vertical exclusivity agreements (boycotts), discriminatory pricing, targeted predatory pricing against outsiders, excessive exit barriers for cartel members, and the misuse of public policy (like customs or subsidies) to shield monopolies. Conversely, purely horizontal internal agreements on prices or conditions are considered acceptable as long as they do not result in market foreclosure. [Oligopole und Einzelmonopole im Wettbewerbssystem]: The final section of this chunk addresses individual market power held by oligopolies and monopolies. Similar to cartels, these positions are viewed as neither inherently good nor bad. The 'Possible Competition' principle dictates that their exercise of power is permissible only as long as it does not exclude others from competing. While this doesn't eliminate all risks of high prices or stifled progress, it is presented as a pragmatic safeguard to keep such effects within tolerable limits. [Assessment of Oligopolistic and Monopolistic Market Behavior]: The author analyzes the behavior of oligopolies and monopolies through the lens of 'possible competition'. He discusses specific phenomena like price leadership and resale price maintenance, arguing they are generally compatible with competition unless combined with exclusionary measures like boycotts or discrimination. The section concludes that while monopolies have greater potential for harm through price inflation and supply restriction, the primary goal of competition policy should be preventing market closure. [Instruments of Competition Policy and the Principle of Possible Competition]: This section outlines practical measures for a competition order based on 'possible competition'. It rejects absolute cartel bans and general abuse control as impractical, favoring a specific focus on preventing the elimination of competitors. Proposed measures include prohibiting vertical boycotts, price discrimination, and predatory pricing, alongside reforms to internal cartel sanctions and arbitration to ensure individual freedom and market dynamism. [Competition Policy within General Economic Policy and Historical Context]: The author explores how public administration (procurement, concessions, tariffs) can influence competition. He provides a historical overview of the 'freedom of trade' (Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit) in the Swiss Constitution, noting the shift from viewing it as a right against the state to an objective organizational principle of the economy, credited to legal scholars like Hans Merz. This shift provides the basis for modern Swiss cartel legislation. [Critique of Neoliberalism and the Role of Economic Expertise in Law]: Amonn critiques the 'neoliberal' approach of the Eucken-Böhm circle, which demands integral competition regardless of consequences. He defends the Swiss approach's flexibility and exceptions. Crucially, he argues that the failure of past abuse-of-power laws (like the German 1923 ordinance) was due to 'incompetent judges' who lacked economic training, advocating for a stronger integration of economics into legal education for those judging economic matters. [Business Cycle Policy: Theory, Goals, and Instruments]: This chapter defines the nature of business cycles (expansion, contraction, crisis) and the goals of cycle policy (mitigation and smoothing). Amonn identifies investment fluctuations, driven by entrepreneurial expectations and demand, as the primary cause of cycles. He argues that while cycles are inherent to economic dynamics, the state should use monetary policy—specifically interest rate manipulation—to prevent over-investment during booms and stimulate activity during depressions. [Monetary Instruments and the Critique of Keynesianism]: Amonn discusses the mechanics of credit creation by banks and the tools available to central banks (discount rates, open market policy, minimum reserves). He provides a critical assessment of John Maynard Keynes, arguing that while Keynesianism offered a valid 'theory of depression' for the 1930s, its assumptions of 'economic maturity' and chronic oversaving are invalid for the post-war era of capital shortage and high investment demand. [Inflation, Purchasing Power, and 'Creeping Inflation']: A detailed explanation of inflation as an expansion of money supply beyond economic demand, leading to rising prices. Amonn distinguishes between cyclical price increases and 'creeping inflation' caused by excessive public spending and cheap money policies. He also introduces Wilhelm Röpke's concept of 'imported inflation,' where trade surpluses in countries with lower inflation lead to domestic price increases due to money inflow. [Swiss Business Cycle and Credit Policy (1950s)]: Amonn reviews Swiss economic policy during the 1950s boom. He critiques the authorities (Federal Council and National Bank) for acting too late with interest rate hikes and relying too much on warnings rather than hard measures. He discusses the tension between 'inflationism' (prioritizing full employment via credit expansion) and 'anti-inflationism' (prioritizing currency stability), emphasizing that stable money is essential for long-term capital formation and saving. [Capital Formation and the Global Economic Challenge]: The author distinguishes between private and national economic saving, noting that capital formation requires actual investment in production goods. He addresses the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's high growth rates, which he attributes to forced saving and consumption restriction. Amonn argues that the West must increase voluntary saving and investment to maintain its technological and military standing without sacrificing the market principle. [Agricultural Policy: Structural Problems and Objectives]: Amonn critiques Swiss agricultural policy as being focused on 'preservation' (status quo) rather than 'health' (economic independence). He argues that the decline in the number of farms is a natural result of technical progress and limited land. The current policy of price supports and subsidies creates a 'sick' peasantry dependent on state 'crutches'. He advocates for a policy that accepts structural concentration into medium-sized, efficient units. [The Failure of Price Guarantees and the 'Cost-Covering' Principle]: A critique of the 'cost-covering price' principle in agriculture. Amonn argues that fixing prices based on average costs removes the incentive for rationalization and leads to overproduction (e.g., the 'milk flood'). He highlights the contradiction of taxing imported fodder (raising costs) while simultaneously trying to lower consumer prices. He suggests that price supports primarily benefit large, efficient producers rather than the small farmers they are intended to help. [Proposals for Agricultural Reform: Bachmann's Neutral Subsidies]: Amonn discusses Professor Hans Bachmann's proposal to separate market order from financial support. Bachmann suggests 'neutral subsidies' (based on area or labor) while allowing prices to be determined by the world market. Amonn expands on this, proposing a targeted debt relief program for farmers to restore their market viability, rather than global subsidies that inflate land prices. He emphasizes the need for a policy compatible with European integration (Free Trade Area). [Housing Policy: The Crisis of Rent Control]: Amonn attacks Swiss housing policy as the 'pinnacle of irrationality'. He argues that maintaining rent control for 'old apartments' (Altwohnungen) while new apartments are subject to market prices creates a privileged class of tenants and discourages maintenance. This distortion causes housing shortages by preventing efficient space allocation. He calls for a return to market principles, where social hardships are addressed through direct subsidies rather than price caps. [Economic and Social Consequences of Rent Control]: This section contrasts the arguments of property owners (Raissig) and tenant advocates (Steinmann). Amonn argues that rent control is a form of 'partial expropriation' that leads to the decay of housing stock and prevents younger families from finding affordable space. He rejects the 'social' justification for general rent control, noting that many 'old tenants' are wealthier than those in expensive new builds. He views the persistence of these controls as a step toward collectivism. [Scientific Assessment and the Path to Housing Normalization]: Amonn cites UNO and German scientific reports to prove that rent control exacerbates housing shortages and hinders labor mobility. He proposes a 'constructive housing policy' involving the gradual lifting of rent controls, the introduction of targeted rent subsidies (Mietzinsbeihilfen) for the truly needy, and a focus on 'family-appropriate' housing. He critiques the Swiss consumer price index for providing a misleading picture of housing costs due to the mix of old and new rents. [Principles of Fiscal Policy and the 'Creeping' Abandonment of Logic]: The final chapter discusses fiscal policy, advocating for 'cyclically appropriate' budgeting (surpluses in booms, deficits in depressions). Amonn scolds Swiss politicians for implementing tax cuts during a high-growth phase (1957) instead of paying down debt or building reserves. He characterizes this as a failure of economic reason in the face of electoral opportunism, where short-term 'political' interests override long-term national economic stability. [Epilogue: The Crisis of Economic Policy and Democracy]: In the epilogue, Amonn reflects on the state of Swiss democracy and economic policy. Citing Professor Marbach, he laments the use of demagoguery in political campaigns (e.g., the cartel initiative). He argues that the policy of 'structural preservation' (Strukturerhaltung) in industries like tobacco, watches, and agriculture leads to stagnation. He concludes that a lack of economic expertise at the highest levels of government (the 'Juristenmonopol') prevents the implementation of necessary, albeit difficult, reforms.