1,549 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Written in the spring of 1933, as Hitler consolidated power, this short essay confronts a comforting misreading head-on: that National Socialism was a conservative or capitalist reaction. Hayek argues the opposite, that it was a genuinely socialist and collectivist movement, the ripened fruit of an anti-liberal current running through German thought since the Bismarckian era. Its hostility to the Marxist parties, he contends, was national and cultural rather than economic, while its intellectual debts ran to Marxian relativism and anti-rationalism. Tracing how collectivist planning tends toward coercion, the suppression of intellectual freedom, and finally dictatorship, he warns that other Western nations expanding state control over economic life court the same descent. A compact statement of the themes Hayek would enlarge a decade later in The Road to Serfdom.
The inherent logic of collectivism makes it impossible to confine it to a limited sphere.
Governments will reach for inflation again and again, this 1976 lecture argues, because they answer to voters and organized interests, unless some mechanism restrains them. Hayek's remedy is radical in its simplicity: strip the state of its monopoly over money and legal tender, and let people contract, keep accounts, and hold balances in whatever currency they trust. He traces the disease to the Keynesian faith that expanding aggregate expenditure secures lasting prosperity, and contends that under free exchange rates good money would drive out bad, inverting Gresham's Law. Delivered for the Institute of Economic Affairs and reprinted here with commentaries from Ivor Pearce, Harold Rose, Douglas Jay, and Sir Keith Joseph, it closes with a historical appendix running from the French assignats to the German rentenmark.
Our only hope for a stable money is indeed now to find a way to protect money from politics.
Between the grown order that no one designed and the made order that serves a chosen purpose lies the whole of Hayek's mature legal and political theory. Across three volumes gathered here in the one-volume form he originally intended, he distinguishes cosmos from taxis, the judge-discovered law of liberty (nomos) from legislative command (thesis), and the market's spontaneous catallaxy from the deliberate economy. The middle volume mounts a sustained assault on 'social justice,' which he calls an empty, quasi-religious incantation, since a spontaneous process assigns rewards to no one's design and so can be neither just nor unjust. Behind these arguments stands a warning that unlimited democracy, captured by organized interests, drifts toward the very totalitarian power classical constitutionalism was built to restrain, a danger he answers with proposals for constitutional redesign.
The tragic illusion was that the adoption of democratic procedures made it possible to dispense with all other limitations on governmental power.
The health of business-cycle research is measured, Hayek insists in this 1933 Festschrift essay, not by the mounting heap of contemporary statistics but by insight into causes—facts being the ever-changing object against which theory is tested, never its substitute. Crisis theory, he judges, has outrun the theory of depression. He gathers the Wicksellian, Misesian and Spiethoffian strands into one diagnosis: credit expansion unbacked by voluntary saving lengthens and distorts the structure of production, and the resulting 'capital shortage' is identical with relative overconsumption. What remains unsolved is recovery—how relative prices, stocks and the direction of resources must be revalued, and how to distinguish price falls that undo prior maladjustment from secondary deflation that persists past its use. Capital maintenance, wage rigidity, expectations and cash balances he names as the field's next work.
"Overcapacity" is less an industrial fact, this 1936 lecture contends, than a political dogma — the belief that competition either adopts new techniques too slowly or squanders capital by scrapping serviceable machines. Hayek dissolves the charge by separating technical from economic capacity: a machine may still run yet be worth nothing, because new capital does not duplicate the old but economizes on labor and materials, freeing them for use elsewhere. Old plant should survive only while the new method's total cost exceeds its bare operating cost. From this he attacks "capital preservation" as a false end, whether protecting railways against motor traffic or shielding state assets, and ridicules forced standardization for letting an authority decide what consumers ought to like. Idle plant, he adds, may signal a scarcity of capital, not a surplus.
Die Normierungsfanatiker begeben sich da auf ein außerordentlich gefährliches Feld, und ich wenigstens kann mich nicht für die Idee begeistern, daß jemand anderer für mich entscheiden soll, was mir gefallen oder schmecken soll und was nicht.
English translation: “The fanatics of standardization are venturing here onto extraordinarily dangerous ground, and I, at least, cannot warm to the idea that someone else should decide for me what I ought to like or find tasty and what not.”
What Hayek defends under the name 'neutral money' is a tool of theoretical analysis, not a norm for central banks—a distinction he presses against Koopmans and Egle. The concept names an imagined case in which a money economy would leave relative prices to the 'real' determinants of barter-equilibrium theory, a counterfactual for detecting when money becomes an independent force. Its starting point is that money breaks the identity of supply and demand that barter enforces in every market: hoarding, dishoarding, newly created and destroyed money each inject demand without supply, or the reverse. From this follows the benchmark of a constant money stream. Yet sticky prices, long-term money contracts and downward wage rigidity create frictions, so practical policy may need a compromise—perhaps stabilizing an index of original-factor prices—which must not be confused with neutrality itself.
Der Begriff neutrales Geld war bestimmt, als Instrument der theoretischen Analyse zu dienen und sollte keineswegs in erster Linie eine währungspolitische Norm bilden.
English translation: “The concept of neutral money was designed to serve as an instrument of theoretical analysis and by no means was intended primarily to constitute a norm for monetary policy.”
Since Böhm-Bawerk, the interest problem had seemed to demand a single answer: capital yields interest because men systematically undervalue future wants. This 1927 essay refuses that psychological premise. Reframing the question, Hayek argues that the puzzle is not why present goods outrank the future products made from them, but why longer and shorter production processes are not extended until their yields carry equal value. Because time-consuming, roundabout methods raise physical output, such equalization would perversely require the larger future stock to fall below the present one in marginal utility. Drawing on Wieser, Mayer, Schönfeld and Strigl, he insists that whole temporal plans of provision, not isolated utility comparisons, govern intertemporal choice—and that interest belongs to static equilibrium, dissolving the 'dynamic' theories that treat it as an anomaly.
Macht die Böhm-Bawerksche Formulierung des Kapitalzinsproblemes die Annahme einer Minderschätzung künftiger Bedürfnisse unvermeidlich?
English translation: “Does Böhm-Bawerk's formulation of the problem of interest on capital make the assumption of an underestimation of future wants unavoidable?”