The archive.

By the time the IMF's Interim Committee met at Kingston in 1976, floating exchange rates were already the reality; Jamaica and the Manila assembly merely legalized and disciplined them while easing the Fund away from gold-centered convertibility toward surveillance of national policy. Haberler reads the collapse of Bretton Woods not as a descent into disorder but as the predictable end of an adjustable peg undone by inflation differentials and one-way speculative bets. Against Manila's critics he denies that floating causes inflation - it merely exposes domestic monetary excess sooner - and he sharply distinguishes legitimate smoothing of disorderly markets from "dirty floating," the split rates and multiple-currency schemes that mimic controls. Skeptical of reference rates and target zones, and of pressure on Germany and Japan to inflate away their surpluses, he defends managed but disciplined floating.

The conclusion is that widespread floating is here to stay.

Wide swings in the dollar and mounting protectionist pressure had, by the mid-1980s, revived the dream of governments steering exchange rates by agreement - a dream Haberler treats as more dangerous than the volatility it means to cure. The American trade deficit, he insists, is the counterpart of capital inflows financing federal borrowing when domestic saving falls short, not the product of foreign refusal to expand; the cure lies at home. Using an asset-market approach, he reads the Plaza Agreement and Baker-era activism as politicization of expectations rather than technical correction, since sterilized intervention moves rates only when it signals durable policy change. He rejects a return to fixed parities, target zones, and Group of Seven fine-tuning alike, holding that markets, though they err, err less persistently than politically committed states.

Inflation forced floating on reluctant policy-makers.

By 1979 the postwar liberal order, GATT, the IMF, convertibility, nondiscriminatory tariffs, faced a pincer: demands for a New International Economic Order from the South and resurgent protectionism in the North. Haberler answers with a historical defense whose recurring move is to distinguish liberalism from laissez-faire and market order from policy failure. Nineteenth-century growth he calls capitalist success confirmed even by Marx; the Great Depression he reads not as capitalism's contradiction but as monetary and banking collapse under a rigid gold standard. Reviewing Lipsey and UNCTAD data, he denies any secular deterioration in developing-country terms of trade and reverses the indictment: the damage came not from open markets but from quotas, voluntary restraints, and the wage and price rigidities that generate stagflation.

Obviously, it is not liberal policies that hurt the LDCs but deviations from liberalism.

Written in 1943 with postwar reconstruction already in view, this chapter poses a constitutional rather than merely tariff question: whether international cooperation should be built through universal institutions or through larger regional and continental federations. Haberler answers cautiously. Larger markets do permit mass production and a wider division of labour, but that gain belongs to nondiscriminatory liberalization, not to protected spheres, so he separates the complete customs union, which genuinely enlarges a market, from the incomplete preference, which merely diverts imports from cheaper outsiders to favoured insiders and hands them a windfall. Dismantling Pan-Europe, Pan-America, and Danubian schemes as geographically incoherent or coercive, he anticipates the later vocabulary of trade creation and diversion, and warns that partial blocs turn cooperation into exclusion.

To put the question the other way around: suppose that some machinery for international co-operation on a worldwide scale, like the League of Nations, is set up; should it be based on regional blocs or on independent states?

Three disorders defined the late-1980s world economy, and Haberler traces each to the same root: not technical malfunction but domestic policy failure. The persistent US budget and trade deficits, matched by German and Japanese surpluses; the volatility of a managed float in which governments pretend to know equilibrium rates and unsettle markets with interventions and communiques; and a debt crisis, opened by Mexico in 1982, that he reads less as a liquidity shortage than as the fruit of inflation, exchange controls, and bloated state enterprises. Rejecting Ricardian equivalence as psychologically false, he prescribes a credible multi-year phaseout of the structural deficit, funded by a stiff gasoline tax, and would leave currencies to competitive markets, contrasting Argentina's squandered decline with Chile's liberalization.

People just don’t think that way. Nobody knows what his future tax liabilities will be, let alone those of his children and grandchildren.

Why do socialist economies, for all their proclaimed internationalism, trade so little and so cautiously? Haberler's answer, offered as candid speculations of a theorist, is that comparative cost identifies gains from trade but never realizes them; someone must go looking. Marginal analysis and shadow pricing can aid socialist calculation, yet they cannot supply the entrepreneurial discovery that foreign markets demand: unfamiliar demand, currency risk, contractual hazard, the real possibility of loss. Private merchants chase profit across borders; plan-bound managers, rewarded for fulfilment and punished for failure, stay inward-looking and nationalistic. The predicted result is trade aversion and undertrading, volumes far below the comparative-cost optimum, together with bilateralism, barter, and imports confined to unavoidable necessities. It is comparative advantage recast from a static doctrine into an institutional argument.

Nationalism has proved to be an extremely hardy plant.

How does a country saddled with reparations actually hand real resources across its borders, and must its export prices fall to do so? That question, sharpened by Germany's post-Versailles burden, sets Haberler against Bertil Ohlin in these two essays, translated from the 1930 article and its 1931 rejoinder. Endorsing the Thornton-Mill view that price movements are almost always needed to force the required export surplus, he nonetheless refuses the standard conclusion that the terms of trade must turn against the payer, showing that they can conceivably improve. Against Keynes's transfer pessimism he judges a demand elasticity of one or less for German exports highly improbable, given Germany's competitive industries and small share of world markets, while carefully separating the international transfer problem from the domestic fiscal task of raising the sums.

One could say, therefore, that Keynes was right in theory but his opponents in practice.

Keynes defines the multiplier as the reciprocal of one minus the marginal propensity to consume — and in that definition, this methodological critique argues, the celebrated result is already smuggled in. To infer a large multiplier from a high propensity to consume explains nothing, Haberler contends, unless that propensity has been established independently; otherwise the argument merely renames the unknown magnitude it claims to illuminate. He separates the formal aggregate propensity, which is just the algebra of the multiplier, from the psychological propensity describing how people actually spend, and shows that leakages, time lags, monetary velocity and displaced investment stand between them. The same defect, he adds, runs through Keynes's Treatise, where saving and investment are defined into equality and then made to explain one another. Identities can clarify accounts while misleading theory when mistaken for mechanisms.

By assuming something about the marginal propensity to consume he assumes something about the multiplier, but this is no more an explanation of the multiplier that pauvreté is an explanation of poverty.

Ten years after The General Theory appeared — and in the year of Keynes's death — Haberler set out to weigh the book as a scientific system rather than an object of discipleship, a verdict he revisits sixteen years on without softening it. He grants Keynes the systematic use of income effects, the multiplier, and a transformed vocabulary of macroeconomic model-building, but denies any overturning of monetary and cycle theory's logical foundations. The demonstration of a static competitive underemployment equilibrium, he argues, rests entirely on money-wage rigidity; admit flexible wages and the Keynes and Pigou effects erode it. Say's Law, properly stated, had already been abandoned by serious neoclassical theorists. Praise without idolatry is the essay's discipline.

Hero worship is nowhere less appropriate than in science.