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Behind the closed doors of the Austrian Cabinet Council on 8 July 1919, the finance secretary laid out how a bankrupt young republic might actually pay for its ambitions. Circulated as a strictly secret appendix, this memorandum tackles the financing of the Vermoegensabgabe, socialization, and industrial promotion not as slogans but as a single problem of credit. A brand-new state credit institute is rejected as too slow, too costly, and too weak in emission credit, in favor of converting an existing emission-capable house, the Austrian Credit-Institut fuer Verkehrs-Unternehmungen und oeffentliche Arbeiten, into a mixed-economy bank under state majority control. The ideological quarrel between public and private finance is thereby recast as a question of institutional form: private capital mobilized quietly, without alarming the public, through a vehicle the state commands.
In letzter Linie wird man daher doch gezwungen sein, wieder an das private Kapital zu appellieren, und es wird sich im Wesentlichen darum handeln, eine möglichst glückliche Form für diesen Appell zu finden.
English translation: “In the last analysis one will therefore be compelled once again to appeal to private capital, and it will essentially be a matter of finding as felicitous a form as possible for this appeal.”
Bankruptcy, narrowly defined as the repudiation of state debt, would wreck banks, enterprises, welfare institutions, and households alike, and still leave the budget unsolved. Written as a confidential financial plan appended to a cabinet protocol, this memorandum confronts postwar Deutschoesterreich's six-billion-kronen gap, its collapsing crown, and its exhausted credit. Its guiding principle is austere: not one further note is to be printed, yet any attempt to restore the prewar value of money would bleed the country dry. The real loss already inflicted by depreciation must fall on rentiers and public-debt holders while wages climb toward the new price level. The Vermoegensabgabe becomes the hinge, an instrument for cutting debt and compelling capitalists to place foreign assets at the state's disposal, and orderly socialization is postponed until a balanced budget exists.
Keine Hilfe gibt es für den Rentner.
English translation: “There is no help for the rentier.”
Why do states and ruling groups so often fight far beyond any concrete interest? Schumpeter's 1919 essay, first printed in the Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, answers by defining imperialism as an objectless disposition toward violent expansion without assignable limit, expansion for its own sake. Ranging across Egypt after the Hyksos, warrior Persia, sacred-war Assyria, the Bedouin conquests, Louis XIV's court, and Rome's senatorial landholders, he argues that such war-drives are atavisms, inherited habits of social structures whose original life-function has vanished. Against neo-Marxist theories that make imperialism the inner logic of advanced capitalism, he contends that a purely capitalist world could furnish no breeding ground for the will to conquer; tariffs, cartels, and export monopolies create real interests in aggression, but they descend from princely states, mercantilism, and feudal survivals, not from capital itself.
Der Imperialismus ist ein Atavismus.
English translation: “Imperialism is an atavism.”
A single corrective letter to a Vienna newspaper, dated 23 January 1920, defends the fine print of a financial program its author had not yet been able to present in public. Provoked by the finance secretary's remarks, Schumpeter clarifies what he had actually proposed: tax concessions on the wealth levy for those who secure fresh credit abroad for the state, not for foreign currency already circulating inside Austria. The distinction is the whole point. Rewarding domestic holdings of foreign exchange would only raise their local price and feed the black market, whereas privileging credit obtained abroad expands the state's external purchasing power. Brief and polemical, the note reveals a characteristic sensibility: incentives must be aimed with precision, and a carelessly framed tax preference can deepen the very scarcity it means to relieve.
Obsolete as policy the moment the peace terms arrived, yet indispensable as a diagnosis of the state's bare skeleton, the 1919/20 budget is here defended before the Constituent National Assembly on 28 July 1919. The finance secretary sets expenditures of roughly 6.5 billion crowns against revenues of 2.5 billion, a four-billion deficit, and traces the vicious circle in which rising prices force rising spending, which weakens the crown, which raises prices again. With extraordinary charges stripped out and a capital levy cutting war-debt interest, he argues Deutschoesterreich could have worked its way out of deficit finance in three arduous years. Then comes the indictment: the treaty's allocation of debts and war loans is not merely harsh but an economic riddle, intelligible only as a deliberate death sentence, worse than unacceptable and simply impossible.
Allein wie politisch, so ist auch ökonomisch dieser Friedensvertrag ein Rätsel, es sei denn, daß er ein gewolltes und beabsichtigtes wirtschaftliches Todesurteil sei.
English translation: “But just as it is politically, so too economically this peace treaty is an enigma—unless it be a deliberate and intended economic death sentence.”
Schumpeter measures Max Weber not by any single doctrine of parliamentarism or social policy but by the seriousness he forced upon a cautious, convention-bound German academy. Written as an obituary in 1920, this appraisal locates Weber's importance in a methodological achievement: the insistence that science cannot tell us what ought to be, that knowledge must be separated from political willing and from metaphysical presupposition. Weber's studies, Politik als Beruf, Wissenschaft als Beruf, and above all Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus and Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, are read as comparative inquiries into how belief, interest, discipline, and conduct interpenetrate, extending yet correcting Marx's economic interpretation of history. Economics supplied many of Weber's problems, Schumpeter concludes, but the governing form of his mind was sociological through and through.
Er war nicht konventionell. Er war nicht zugeritten. Er gehörte sich selbst.
English translation: “He was not conventional. He was not broken in. He belonged to himself.”
Three questions of the moment frame this 1921 newspaper interview: how to value securities as the krone depreciates, whether industrial finance bills are inflationary, and whether a reversal of the business cycle threatens. The finance secretary reframes the fashionable talk of Substanzwert against Ertragswert, since 'substance' names only assets whose prices have lagged behind depreciation, defensible so long as future earning capacity is plausible, for an unviable enterprise has neither. He concedes that a finance bill unmatched by new goods is, in principle, as inflationary as state note issue, yet distinguishes credit to industry from direct state emission. Against England's deflationary example, he pleads for stabilization without liquidationism: ample but high-interest central-bank credit as a bridge until world recovery arrives, plus relief from the taxes and controls that stifle private adaptation.
Ein lebensunfähiges Unternehmen hat weder einen Ertrags-, noch einen Substanzwert, denn ein produktiver Apparat, mit dem man nichts machen kann, ist überhaupt wertlos.
English translation: “An unviable enterprise has neither an earnings value nor an intrinsic asset value, for a productive apparatus with which nothing can be done is wholly worthless.”
The greatness of a life's work, this 1921 obituary proposes, can be tested by whether one decisive achievement alone would suffice to secure it, and Carl Menger passes. That achievement was the refounding of economic theory on subjective value and marginal utility, worked out in the 1871 Grundsaetze alongside the independent discoveries of Jevons and Walras. Menger did not attack the classical school from outside; he overcame Ricardo on his own analytical terrain by grounding price formation in the laws of human need and scarcity, redefining economics as a theory of prices. Schumpeter sets his originality above mere precursors like Gossen, credits the Methodenstreit writings as a defense of exact theory, and traces how Boehm-Bawerk and Wieser extended the work into the Austrian school that carried Menger's ideas into international science.
Menger gehörte zu den Denkern, denen eine solche Leistung von entscheidender, für die Wissenschaft historischer Bedeutung gelungen ist.
English translation: “Menger belonged to those thinkers who succeeded in an achievement of decisive, historically significant importance for science.”
Beneath the technical squabble over whether to borrow in crowns or in foreign currencies lies a single cause, and this 1921 policy essay drives straight to it: the krone stands low because of the enormous state deficit, not merely because of banknote issue. Further taxation cannot close the gap, since productive incomes are already heavily burdened and the slogan of taxing the propertied can scarcely be taken seriously. A forced or voluntary foreign-currency loan is dismissed as self-defeating, for it would strike the visible reserves businessmen hold for legitimate purposes while concealed hoards withdraw further from sight. Credit, Schumpeter insists, presupposes restored confidence rather than creating it. His conditional preference is therefore a large domestic crown loan, less destructive than the alternative and capable of automatically depressing foreign-exchange rates by absorbing crowns.
Unsere Krone steht tief infolge des ungeheuren staatlichen Defizits.
English translation: “Our krone stands low as a consequence of the enormous state deficit.”
The ministers' journey to London had not delivered the interim loan the public hoped for, yet it set the stone rolling, and that, this 1921 newspaper piece argues, was its real service. Large Entente credits will not come while Austria's policy suppresses its own production, above all in agriculture, which state interference treats as if the aim were to reduce it to a minimum. Credit here is a judgment on institutions: foreign lenders need assurance of effective savings and a genuine liberation of economic forces before they finance a country's habits. Schumpeter separates transitional state credits from the industrial capital that matters more, and that can only return through ordinary profitable transactions, not patriotic urgency. Reversing the fear of Ueberfremdung, he warns that a state cannot prosper while making capital feel unwelcome.
Es ist umsonst, die Welt einfach zwingen zu wollen, sich für uns zu interessieren, das Interesse kann nicht anders erwachen, als daß einzelne spekulativ angelegte Leute einzelne Transaktionen mit Erfolg durchführen.
English translation: “It is useless simply to try to force the world to take an interest in us; interest cannot be aroused otherwise than by individual, speculatively minded persons carrying out individual transactions with success.”
Postwar Vienna offered the starkest specimen of a disorder that ran across all of Europe: a fiscal and monetary breakdown so complete that buyers, sellers, credit, and prices could no longer meet in stable markets. Taxation that made ordinary transactions impossible, fear of the currency, blocked trade, and the flight of capital into speculation and hoarding define the crisis more than poverty itself. Schumpeter resists the easy culprits: neither labor militancy, nor socialism, nor capitalism's alleged exhaustion, nor currency depreciation alone explains it. Even inflation, he argues, might in another setting have financed the passage from war production to peace. Recovery cannot come from a monetary decree or the suppression of symptoms; it demands renewed confidence, usable credit, and the concrete entrepreneurial decisions that restore regular exchange.
Unsere Politik vertreibt das Kapital aus den Banken, macht die produktive Anlage immer schwerer und verurteilt es eben, so lange es geht, zum Schiebergeschäft und sowie das nicht mehr geht, zur Untätigkeit, respektive zum Spiel oder zur Konsumtion.
English translation: “Our policy drives capital out of the banks, makes productive investment ever more difficult, and condemns it, as long as this remains possible, to profiteering, and once that is no longer possible, to idleness, or to gambling, or to consumption.”
"You cannot eat your cake and keep it too" - the English proverb frames Schumpeter's cool assessment of Austria's credit plan and its League of Nations supervision. Foreign oversight may be humiliating, he concedes, but Austria humiliated itself; control is the consequence of an inability to stabilize alone, not an external injustice. His central move shifts the argument from honor to sequence. Domestic consolidation would demand restoring the budget first, then creditworthiness, then the currency and a note-issuing bank - a very painful path. Foreign credit reverses that order, letting stabilization begin with the currency rather than end with it, provided the krone is merely stabilized and never raised. Even so, an industrial crisis is unavoidable, and the slightest fiscal error could yield a catastrophe worse than the present.
Ein Geschenk wird uns sicher nicht gemacht.
English translation: “We are certainly not being given a gift.”