The archive.

Adam Smith did not lay the foundation stone of political economy but its keystone: with this revision Mises opens his 1953 introduction to a selection from The Wealth of Nations, recasting Smith less as a solitary inventor than as the synthesizer who gave the liberal tradition durable architecture and impeccable literary form. Smith's importance, he argues, is civilizational—his laissez-faire principles dismantled mercantilism and secured even the less industrious a standard of living above the well-to-do of earlier days, all under the discipline of consumer sovereignty. Against socialist caricatures of Smith as an apologist for greed, Mises enlists Buckle and Bagehot. Yet the essay ends in warning: read Smith for the origins of freedom, never as a substitute for studying modern economics, any more than reading Euclid replaces mathematics.

Its publication date—1776, the year of the American Declaration of Independence—marks the dawn of freedom both political and economic.

What broke postwar Europe into protected national compartments—the free market, or the governments that overrode it? Reviewing Hans F. Sennholz's book of that title, Mises turns the reigning diagnosis on its head. Where pseudo-economists and statesmen blamed capitalism for poverty, unemployment, depression, and international disintegration, he answers that Europe's economic fragmentation is the work of state regulation and protectionism, not of laissez-faire. A government that fixes prices, wages, or output cannot leave foreign competition free to undermine its controls, so isolation follows from planning as a matter of course. Conventions, conferences, and American subsidies, he argues, cannot restore unity while domestic interventionism persists. Europe's survival depends not on new supranational architecture but on removing the national controls that make open exchange impossible.

The economic disintegration of Europe is not an outcome of the unhampered operation of the capitalist system.

Inequality, on Mises's reading, is not a defect for policy to correct but the very mechanism by which consumers steer production—rewarding entrepreneurs who serve them and stripping resources from those who fail. He distinguishes capitalist fortunes, built by supplying the masses with goods once beyond reach, from feudal wealth won by conquest, and argues that confiscating high incomes diverts capital from investment into consumption or state spending. Redistribution, he warns, has no principled stopping point once inequality is branded an evil: progressive taxation becomes a slope toward socialism. Invoking Henry Ford and the fate of the 1895 business structure, he presses the alternative to its edge—consumers or the state, market economy or socialism, with no third solution. The essay opens the collection's broader case against interventionism and the night-watchman state.

Inequality of wealth and incomes is the cause of the masses’ well-being, not the cause of anybody’s distress.

That the United States had become the world's most prosperous nation was, by 1955, a fact no one contested; what puzzled Mises was why so many treated that abundance as a crime to be redistributed rather than an achievement to be explained. Reviewing William E. Rappard's study, he accepts its four causes—mass production, applied science, the passion for productivity, competition—but drives them toward a single Austrian conclusion: American wealth was not extracted from poorer nations but built at home through capital accumulation. Better tools, plants, and mines raise the marginal productivity of labor, and technical know-how is worthless where saving is discouraged and property insecure. Against Marx, Keynes, and the anti-saving doctrines of the New Economics, he makes the secret plain—prosperity is accumulated, never seized.

America is prosperous because its people wanted prosperity and resorted to policies fitted to the purpose.

The fork, soap, the automobile, nylon stockings, television, frozen foods: each entered the world as an elite extravagance before becoming an ordinary necessity, and that compression is capitalism's real social achievement. Drawing on Gabriel Tarde's observation that innovations descend from the wealthy few to the many, Mises argues that large-scale enterprise, far from serving a closed aristocracy, requires mass markets and so multiplies consumers, steadily shortening—and finally almost abolishing—the lag between invention and common use. Capitalism, in his definition, is production at scale aimed not at a privileged few but at ordinary buyers. The essay's polemical target is the Marxist doctrine of increasing immiseration: the diffusion of once-exclusive goods is offered as empirical refutation, the old gulf between mobility and immobility having narrowed into the difference between first-class and coach.

Capitalism is essentially mass production for the satisfaction of the wants of the masses.

To ask an economist for the date a boom will break is to ask for the one thing economics cannot deliver—yet businessmen, knowing an artificial boom must end, press for exactly that. The monetary theory of the cycle is 'irrefutable,' Mises grants in this 1956 essay: forcing interest rates below their market level through bank credit distorts production and guarantees an eventual depression. But economics is qualitative, not quantitative; it can say the boom will not last, never precisely when it will break, for human action offers none of the constant relations natural science exploits. Statistics only describe the past. And a correct public forecast would annul itself—if everyone believed it, they would sell at once and bring the crash forward on the spot.

At the very instant this forecast was uttered and accepted as correct, the crisis would already be consummated.

No accidental byproduct of capitalism, lasting mass unemployment is for Mises the predictable effect of wage rates held above what the market would clear—by minimum-wage law, or by unions that raise members' pay only by excluding outsiders. From marginal productivity and consumer sovereignty he builds toward a monetary argument: unwilling to confront union power, governments turned to currency devaluation to cut real wages by stealth, until unions learned to index their demands to the cost of living. Keynes enters as no true theorist but the man who gave old inflationism a fresh watchword. The only genuine cure for mass unemployment, Mises concludes, is the return of freedom to the labor market; sound money and free labor pricing stand or fall together.

All Keynes accomplished was to coin a new slogan — “full employment” — which became the motto of present-day policies of inflation and credit expansion.

The saver, in Mises's telling here—rendered into English from the 1957 German 'Der Sparer als Wähler'—is no marginal figure begging paternal favor but a structural pillar of capitalism, since to defend savings is to defend property, capital formation, and the rising real wages they finance. Genuine protection of savers, he insists, differs entirely from protectionist privilege: it means securing the legal and monetary order in which accumulated capital can survive. His sharpest move recasts the ordinary wage earner, with his savings account and life-insurance policy, as a creditor—one whom inflation quietly robs. The democratic danger is epistemic: voters mistake inflation for mere rising prices rather than an expansion of money and credit, and so demand the cheap-money policies that erode their own claims. Only patient explanation to the voter, he concludes, offers a way out.

The American "common man," as a saver and especially as an owner of life insurance policies, is a creditor to a much greater degree than was the average German of the Weimar Republic.

The decline of classical liberalism is, in Mises's telling, the one fact that renders modern history intelligible, the return of doctrines that pit class against class, nation against nation, and race against race in place of the market's harmony of rightly understood interests. Originally a reply to a 1957 questionnaire, this compact polemic defines capitalism not as rule by big business but as consumer sovereignty and mass production for the common man, and defends higher output as the moral condition of lower infant mortality and vanishing famine. There is no stable third way, he maintains: each interference with prices, wages, or profits distorts coordination and breeds the next, so reformism slides toward gradual socialization. Sound money, he adds, is the constitutional barrier against escape through inflation.

Interventionism cannot be considered a lasting system of society's economic organization. It is a method of realizing socialism by installment.

How could monetary expansion remain an implausible explanation of the mark’s depreciation to economists witnessing it? In this 1959 essay, Mises locates the roots of Germany’s 1923 currency catastrophe in an intellectual culture that made ethical intentions, national loyalty, and confidence in state authority tests of economic truth. His distinctive evidence is a surviving 1914 memorandum of objections raised against Böhm-Bawerk and himself: interest theory became a defence of unearned income, while monetary institutions were judged by their usefulness for war. Explicit about the limits of his recollections and missing notes, Mises offers a participant’s account of how rival explanations were excluded from debate. The essay’s particular interest lies in this connection between scholarly judgement and policy: arguments could lose a hearing not because they had been refuted, but because their presumed purposes were condemned.

Die Ideen, die die Politik der Völker leiten, fallen nicht vom Himmel.

English translation: “The ideas which guide the policies of nations do not fall from heaven.”

Every political conflict of the age, Mises insists, is at bottom economic, which makes economic theory a civic necessity rather than a specialist's luxury. This short review-essay uses the new complete English translation of Bohm-Bawerk's Capital and Interest to redefine the general reader as a citizen whose political judgment depends on theoretical literacy: whoever debates inflation, unions, taxation, or socialism without grasping economic fundamentals merely parrots what he has picked up from others no better informed. Mises supplies a reading order, beginning with the second volume on saving, capital, value, and price, then the critical history of interest theories in the first, and singles out the refutation of Marx's labor theory of value as the politically decisive chapter. Abstract theory, he argues, is the West's sharpest weapon against Soviet destructionism.

There is no doubt that Böhm-Bawerk's book is the most eminent contribution to modern economic theory.

Ownership gives entrepreneurs control over production—but, in Mises’s account, consumers continually put that control to the test. This encyclopedia entry from the Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften presents the market as a process in which purchases, profits, and losses redirect productive resources under conditions of uncertainty. Its central tension lies between private command over wealth and dependence on buyers’ choices. Mises sharpens the argument by distinguishing monopoly ownership from the ability to profit by restricting supply, and by explaining entrepreneurial profit as a temporary result of anticipating change rather than a permanent reward for possession. Readers can trace how consumer sovereignty becomes not only his explanation of market coordination but also his standard for defending inequality and criticizing redistribution.