1,549 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
The gold standard's real merit, on Hayek's telling, lay in nothing intrinsic to the metal but in its being an international, automatic, rule-bound money that no world authority had to administer; its real defect lay in the slowness with which its supply adjusts to demand. Written in German in 1943, the essay seizes the wartime collapse of gold's prestige to propose a rational substitute: the commodity-reserve currency of Benjamin and Frank Graham, under which money is issued and redeemed only against warehouse receipts for a fixed bundle of storable raw materials. The bundle's aggregate price is pegged while relative prices stay free. Hoarding would then pile up wheat, metals, and fibres instead of idle gold, and the scheme would buy in slumps and sell in booms—stabilization by standing rule, not administrative discretion.
Das Horten von Geld würde, anstatt zur Vergeudung von Produktionsmitteln zu führen, wie ein Auftrag wirken, Rohmaterialienvorräte auf Rechnung des Hortenden anzulegen.
English translation: “The hoarding of money, instead of leading to a waste of productive resources, would act as an order to lay up stocks of raw materials on the hoarder's account.”
To join a group as an adult is to discover that its world cannot simply be adopted like a coat. Taking the immigrant as his exemplary case, Schütz examines the newcomer who seeks lasting acceptance and finds that the host culture's 'thinking-as-usual'—its trusted recipes for interpreting and acting—rests on assumptions he does not share. Its history is available to him as history, not as lived biography, so to the group he is a person without history. He must test each recipe as mere subjective probability, misreading anonymity and intimacy alike into pseudo-intimacy and pseudo-anonymity. Language marks the limit sharply, for expressive mastery lies not in vocabulary and grammar but in connotation, idiom, and shared memory. The stranger's celebrated objectivity is forced explicitness born from the collapse of the taken-for-granted; belonging, Schütz shows, is an epistemic achievement, not a legal status.
Er ist wesentlich der Mensch, der fast alles, das den Mitgliedern der Gruppe, der er sich nähert, unfraglich erscheint, in Frage stellt.
English translation: “He is essentially the man who calls into question nearly everything that appears unquestionable to the members of the group he is approaching.”
Periodically, in the open air and by collective oath, the Swiss cantons swore their federal pacts anew—an institution Rappard studies under its German name, Beschwörung und Erneuerung der Bünde, from Rudolf Brun's Zurich charter of 1351 to its extinction in 1798. Born of one magistrate's fear of his enemies, the periodic public oath spread through the perpetual alliances and the Covenant of Stans until it formed part of Swiss public law. Then the Reformation turned a rite of unity into a confessional battlefield: Catholics would swear before God and the saints, the Reformed before God alone, and no formula could reconcile the two. The ceremony returned for a single day at Aarau, on the eve of the old Confederation's collapse—the oath, Rappard argues, being the very cement of the Eidgenossenschaft.
Une fois de plus les saints se dressèrent donc entre les Confédérés, non pour les bénir, mais bien pour les empêcher de renouveler leurs promesses de fidélité mutuelle !
English translation: “Once again the saints thus stood between the Confederates—not to bless them, but rather to prevent them from renewing their pledges of mutual fidelity!”
Kaufmann relocates the objectivity of social science from private conviction to public procedure: a proposition is valid only relative to the rules that govern how claims are accepted, rejected, connected, and corrected within inquiry. Written in English under the influence of Dewey's Logic, the book refuses to seek certainty before science begins, holding that every attempt to ground empirical knowledge in self-evident truths is foredoomed. Its recurring operation is a sorting of levels, separating facts, meanings, rules of procedure, and formal relations that disputants habitually let slide into one another. Economic theory supplies his sharpest cases. Demand curves and marginal-utility principles are not empirical laws falsifiable by a single instance but theoretical rules; and Mises's a priori derivation of value and price is shown to be analytic unless tied to empirical rules. Objectivity here is procedural, not absolute; formalism clarifies rather than reduces.
All attempts to base empirical science on ultimate grounds conceived as self-evident truths are foredoomed to failure.
The double meaning of the word Volk, Amonn contends, has quietly corrupted the foundations of economics by fusing the pure theoretical categories of the exchange economy with the practical concepts of Volkswirtschaftslehre. This introduction to economic thinking—second edition of 1944, essentially unchanged from the 1938 original—treats concepts frankly as instruments made by thought and defines each by the problem it is meant to solve. Moving from economic goods, scarcity, and Wohlstand through the production factors, prices, money, credit, and comparative costs, he denies that Volkswirtschaft is any real unit like a household, insisting it is only an ideational association of separate economies. Four appendices turn the method against Max Weber, Sombart, Gottl, and Englis, whose definitions he finds either candidly stipulative or objective merely in appearance.
Begriffe sind Denkwerkzeuge.
English translation: “Concepts are tools of thought.”
Three problems—development, individuality, and success—organize this genealogy of how history became the medium in which German thought grasped culture, politics, and human meaning. Tracing a line from Herder's Volksgeist through Humboldt, Goethe, Niebuhr, and the Romantic school to Hegel, Ranke, Marx, and Schopenhauer, Engel-Janosi shows historicism forming by refusing the Enlightenment's universal progress: each epoch, people, and life-form becomes an individual with its own inward justification. The culmination is Jacob Burckhardt, who abandons Hegelian purpose and moral progress for constants, types, and recurring forms, and who holds that political power is in itself evil even as culture depends upon it. Historicism thereby reaches its height as a disciplined art of memory—already shadowed by Nietzsche's counter-demand for an art of forgetting.
Ich aber behaupte, jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott.
English translation: “But I maintain: every epoch is immediate to God.”
Trade unions at the close of the 1920s boom pressed a seductive claim: that higher wages would themselves raise productivity and general welfare—the doctrine this book was written to dismantle. First published in 1930 and reissued in expanded form in 1945, it untangles the many senses buried in the word wage: relative share against absolute goods, nominal against real, the wage rate per unit against total wage income. A higher rate, Amonn warns, need not raise a worker's income at all, since it may cut employment, hours, or output. He works out wage formation under free competition, ties real wages to productivity and capital accumulation, and grants unions a genuine but bounded power to lift wages toward the competitive level while denying they can be pushed permanently above it at capital's expense.
„Lohnsteigerungen“ bilden also eine sehr zweischneidige Waffe im Kampfe der Arbeit mit dem Kapital und den Anteil am Gesamtprodukt. Wenn man sie benutzt, läuft man Gefahr, sich damit ins eigene Fleisch zu schneiden.
English translation: “Wage increases" thus constitute a very double-edged weapon in the struggle of labor with capital over the share in the total product. If one uses them, one runs the risk of cutting into one's own flesh.”
Where should a student of economics begin—thrown at once into the tangle of modern theory, or led through the history of the science's own errors? This guide answers plainly: the aim of study is the capacity to judge practical policy on a theoretically grounded understanding, and the surest path runs through the original works of Turgot, Smith, Ricardo, Menger, and Walras before any textbook. Amonn maps the terrain to be mastered—general value and price theory, the factor incomes of wage, interest, and rent, money and the quantity theory, comparative costs, business cycles, and Malthusian population theory—always separating theoretical questions from the political goal-setting that lies beyond science. A closing mathematical appendix reduces supply, demand, and equilibrium price to linear functions worked out by hand.
Das Primäre in einer Wissenschaft sind ihre Probleme.
English translation: “What is primary in a science are its problems.”
"Planning," in the mouths of its advocates, almost always means socialism, Russian socialization or German Zwangswirtschaft, yet Keynes, Beveridge, and Hansen promised a third road that could plan for freedom without embracing either. Delivered to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1945, this address answers that the supposed third way is only interventionism, the old Bismarckian doctrine of Schmoller and Wagner in new dress. Mises argues that isolated coercive commands, minimum wages, easy money, restricted profits, disrupt the integrated market and defeat their own authors' purposes; depression follows credit expansion, and enduring joblessness follows wage rates propped above market levels. Profit and loss, not planners, are how consumers govern production. Between totalitarian control and liberty, he concludes, there is no durable middle ground.
The market and its inescapable law are supreme.
Remembered chiefly as a moralist and forerunner of socialism, Simonde de Sismondi had his strictly theoretical economics undervalued for a century—an imbalance this first volume, offered as a belated centenary tribute, sets out to correct. Amonn reconstructs the 1803 De la richesse commerciale, in which capital governs production understood as a process of turnover, and translates key passages with commentary. He follows Sismondi's distinction of necessary from surplus wages, his national economic balance set against the mercantilist trade balance, his treatment of money as sterile wealth and credit as merely immaterial capital, and his consumer-centered case for free trade against tariffs, guilds, apprenticeship laws, and privileged companies. Throughout, he marks where Sismondi's labor-based reduction of land and capital anticipates the socialist value theories their author himself declined to draw.
«Die Regierung kann also» – so schließt Sismondi – «niemals in die Irre gehen, wenn sie in allen Fällen in Sachen der Handelsgesetzgebung nach dem wohlverstandenen Interesse des Konsumenten verfährt.»
English translation: “The government," Sismondi concludes, "can therefore never go astray if in all matters of commercial legislation it acts in accordance with the well-understood interest of the consumer.”
For the reigning doctrines of the age, conflict is the natural condition of intergroup relations: nations, races, and Marxian classes are read as groups whose gain must come at another's loss, so that war and civil war become the logical conclusion of what people already believe. Mises answers with the classical case for a harmony of rightly understood interests. Caste society, bound by inherited legal privilege, bred real antagonism; capitalism replaced it with equality under law, under which shoemakers are merely competitors, not enemies. The genuine conflicts of the day, tariffs, immigration barriers, pressure-group politics, spring not from the unhampered market but from interventionist policies that revive mercantilism, protectionism, and guild-style exclusion. Utilitarian ethics, he warns, stands or falls with the science of economics.
Mercantilism was a philosophy of war.
Borrowing William James's notion of many sub-universes of reality, Schütz asks not which worlds exist but how each becomes real for consciousness. Everyday life is the paramount reality—inherited, intersubjective, resistant, practically urgent—and within it he gives 'working' (Wirken), action planned in advance and carried out bodily, the privileged place where inner duration, public time, and social reciprocity intersect. Around it lie other finite provinces of meaning, each with its own cognitive style: the worlds of phantasy, of dreaming, and of scientific theory, whose aim is not to master the world but to observe it. One does not glide between them but crosses by a leap or shock—falling asleep, entering play, adopting detachment. Beneath every everyday relevance he locates a fundamental anxiety, the knowledge that one will die, alongside the epoché of the natural attitude that brackets not the world but doubt of it.
Unter allen beschriebenen Formen der Spontaneität ist das Wirken für die Konstitution der Wirklichkeit der alltäglichen Welt die wichtigste.
English translation: “Of all the forms of spontaneity described, working is the most important for the constitution of the reality of the everyday world.”