The archive.

Preserving railway tracks and rolling stock is not necessarily preserving capital. In this 1936 article, Oskar Morgenstern uses the conflict between railways and motor transport to test whether Austria’s transport policy coheres with its commitments to currency stability, budgetary balance, and competitive exports. He challenges protection based on past investment without assuming that every low road-haulage price reflects genuine efficiency: losses shifted to creditors and unequal obligations can distort the comparison. His distinctive concern is the economy beyond the carriers. Freight tariffs can effectively move factories farther from foreign markets, while restrictions on new transport can postpone rather than prevent costly adjustment. The article offers a concrete way to distinguish protection of inherited assets from policies that sustain productive activity.

Similar borrowing techniques can serve very different state purposes. That distinction gives Helene Lieser’s brief 1936 review of Heinrich Stuebel’s study of Prussian state borrowing its historical edge: many loans financed the nationalization of private railways rather than budget deficits. Lieser values the book’s archival substance, particularly its reproduced syndicate agreements, without equating documentary abundance with successful history. Her praise rests equally on its integration of economic and political context and foreign comparisons. The review offers a concise appraisal of what specialists and nonspecialists can gain from Stuebel’s work, while drawing attention to the difference between how a state borrows and what it borrows for.

What makes a mathematical model economically persuasive rather than merely tractable? In this review of Charles Frederick Roos’s Dynamic Economics, Gerhard Tintner welcomes new ways of analysing time lags and demand while questioning the assumptions that make their calculation possible. Linear demand curves and quadratic costs may be useful approximations, he argues, but conclusions drawn from them need explicit qualification. His sympathy for Roos’s methods sharpens rather than softens his criticism: analyses of particular markets cannot by themselves explain economy-wide employment, expectations, or cyclical fluctuations. The review offers a concrete encounter with the tension between mathematical innovation and economic justification, showing why Tintner values dynamic methods yet asks for stronger theoretical constraints and closer attention to systemic interdependence.

What makes a statistical handbook useful for tracking economic fluctuations? In this brief review of Ernst Wagemann’s Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch 1936, Helene Lieser looks beyond the accumulation of figures to their selection, comparability and accessibility. Her approval is expressly limited to a first inspection, but her criteria are concrete: series should illuminate conditions across the economy and within individual industries, while a clear arrangement and subject index should make the evidence retrievable. The review offers a compact example of judging an economic reference work by what its users can actually do with it.

A gift given, a service rendered, a wrong avenged: beneath these Thurnwald finds one impulse toward counter-performance, and here he raises reciprocity into the organizing principle of social life. Association begins in the bio-psychical complementarity of the sexes and ages—marriage as durable mutual care, parent and child bound by deferred return, the living tied to ancestors through offerings. He rejects any primitive communism of products, reads barter, kula, and potlatch as personal repayment rather than impersonal purchase, and interprets Buin shell money as a memory-sign of obligation. Stratification bends reciprocity into clientage, feudalism, serfdom, and slavery—equilibria that turn unjust once valuations shift—while law, morality, and revenge appear as its formalized demands. Cultures decline, he warns, when this balance is lost.

Jede Leistung aus der „Spezialität“ des einen Partners soll zur Erwiderung beim anderen anregen.

English translation: “Every service arising from the "specialty" of one partner is meant to prompt a reciprocal response from the other.”

What makes a statutory handbook usable beyond its domestic readership? In this brief 1936 review, Helene Lieser singles out the practical aids in the eighth edition of the German Commercial Code, revised by Heinrich Höninger with an introduction by Max Hachenburg. Her endorsement rests on concrete features: amendments incorporated through January 1935, a compilation of amending laws, a clear introduction, and a detailed subject index. Rather than interpreting commercial law, the notice records Lieser’s criteria for a dependable reference work—and her attention to the foreign reader’s need to navigate it.

Economic statistics can guide governments and businesses without giving researchers a mandate to make policy. That distinction anchors Gerhard Tintner’s 1936 article on international business-cycle research, written in connection with a congress of research institutes in Vienna. Tintner treats these institutes as necessary responses to economies too complex to understand through personal experience alone, while insisting that their figures remain probabilistic and require economic interpretation. His account brings statistical methods into contact with the Austrian institute’s theoretical commitments, showing why neither data collection nor theory can suffice independently. Readers can discover a concrete conception of research cooperation: shared methods and comparable reports should improve the evidence available for international policy, while independence from state influence and private interests protects the institutes’ capacity to report objectively.

For Helene Lieser, the test of a legal reference work is practical: can banking professionals use it without mastering every intricacy of German tax law? Her brief 1936 review of Burghard Kessler’s annotated edition of the Capital Transactions Tax Act of 16 October 1934 singles out its clear commentary and time-saving index. Covering company, securities and stock-exchange turnover taxes, the edition serves foreign as well as domestic users. The review offers a compact example of Lieser’s attention to the accessibility of specialist legal knowledge, rather than an assessment of the taxes themselves.

For Helene Lieser, the value of Korek-Stark’s bibliography lies in the searching it saves—not only for librarians, but for anyone studying Central Europe. Her brief 1936 review identifies the practical merits of arranging literature from 1919–1934 by country and recurring subject categories. She also marks the first part’s limits: agriculture, trade policy, and efforts toward regional integration. This compact assessment offers a researcher’s view of a reference tool, welcoming its clarity while calling for a second part to cover the questions left outside its scope.

Three movements organize a century and a half of Swiss constitutional history in Rappard's telling: the emancipation of the individual, the triumph of democracy, and the rise of the state. He begins with the great paradox — that the Helvetic Constitution imposed by French bayonets in 1798, with its liberty, equality, and unitary citizenship, came to shape modern Switzerland more than the old Confederation ever did — and traces the sequence through the Act of Mediation, the reactionary Pact of 1815, the liberal cantonal revolutions of 1830, the federal Constitution of 1848, and the centralizing revisions after 1874. The individual who freed himself from the aristocratic state, and then mastered it through referendum and initiative, ends by surrendering to a federal statism of tariffs, railways, insurance, and subsidies whose swelling debt Rappard reads as the measure of lost independence.

Pour triompher définitivement en Suisse, le libéralisme avait donc dû faire appel au moins libéral des arguments.

English translation: “To triumph definitively in Switzerland, liberalism had thus been obliged to resort to the least liberal of arguments.”

The Methodenstreit had hardened into a war of slogans, naturalism against Verstehen, nomothetic against idiographic, value-free against normative, and this 1936 German treatise sets out to disarm every one of them. Kaufmann offers not a doctrine but a critique of principles: methods earn their place by problem-type and research aim, never by metaphysical prestige. Physical objectivity itself rests on schemas and measurement; social science differs because its objects include alter egos, projects, and socially available meanings, so understanding is indispensable yet never sovereign. Drawing on Weber and Schütz for controlled interpretation, he recasts marginal utility theory as an analysis of purpose-rational choice within a ranked goal-order, treats ideal types as instruments of causal control, and credits Kelsen with purifying legal dogmatics while rejecting the Sein/Sollen dualism. Plurality is preserved; its inflation into pseudo-conflict is what must go.

Demgemäß ist alle Kritik in diesem Buche Prinzipienkritik.

English translation: “Accordingly, all criticism in this book is criticism of principles.”

Keynes defines the multiplier as the reciprocal of one minus the marginal propensity to consume — and in that definition, this methodological critique argues, the celebrated result is already smuggled in. To infer a large multiplier from a high propensity to consume explains nothing, Haberler contends, unless that propensity has been established independently; otherwise the argument merely renames the unknown magnitude it claims to illuminate. He separates the formal aggregate propensity, which is just the algebra of the multiplier, from the psychological propensity describing how people actually spend, and shows that leakages, time lags, monetary velocity and displaced investment stand between them. The same defect, he adds, runs through Keynes's Treatise, where saving and investment are defined into equality and then made to explain one another. Identities can clarify accounts while misleading theory when mistaken for mechanisms.

By assuming something about the marginal propensity to consume he assumes something about the multiplier, but this is no more an explanation of the multiplier that pauvreté is an explanation of poverty.