1,549 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Why do states and ruling groups so often fight far beyond any concrete interest? Schumpeter's 1919 essay, first printed in the Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, answers by defining imperialism as an objectless disposition toward violent expansion without assignable limit, expansion for its own sake. Ranging across Egypt after the Hyksos, warrior Persia, sacred-war Assyria, the Bedouin conquests, Louis XIV's court, and Rome's senatorial landholders, he argues that such war-drives are atavisms, inherited habits of social structures whose original life-function has vanished. Against neo-Marxist theories that make imperialism the inner logic of advanced capitalism, he contends that a purely capitalist world could furnish no breeding ground for the will to conquer; tariffs, cartels, and export monopolies create real interests in aggression, but they descend from princely states, mercantilism, and feudal survivals, not from capital itself.
Der Imperialismus ist ein Atavismus.
English translation: “Imperialism is an atavism.”
A single corrective letter to a Vienna newspaper, dated 23 January 1920, defends the fine print of a financial program its author had not yet been able to present in public. Provoked by the finance secretary's remarks, Schumpeter clarifies what he had actually proposed: tax concessions on the wealth levy for those who secure fresh credit abroad for the state, not for foreign currency already circulating inside Austria. The distinction is the whole point. Rewarding domestic holdings of foreign exchange would only raise their local price and feed the black market, whereas privileging credit obtained abroad expands the state's external purchasing power. Brief and polemical, the note reveals a characteristic sensibility: incentives must be aimed with precision, and a carelessly framed tax preference can deepen the very scarcity it means to relieve.
Before the railway, high freight costs locked inland economies into local self-sufficiency, arranging production in Thünen-style zones and spacing market towns a day's wagon journey apart. This second volume of Sax's transport treatise anatomizes the older and slower media that the railway displaced and then redefined: land roads and their administration across France, Austria, and England; natural and artificial waterways, canals, and the sea as the great highway of world trade; and the news traffic of post, telegraph, and telephone. Roads become feeders to rail and, with the bicycle and motor vehicle, candidates for revival; canals prove superior only at very high freight volumes; and the telegraph earns its price wherever a twelve-minute advantage in a cotton market outweighs its cost. Throughout, the choice of financial principle follows from whether a use is individual or collective.
When the Habsburg monarchy dissolved, its unified currency shattered into a spread of national monies, and every successor state raced to stamp the notes of the Austro-Hungarian Bank as its own. Kerschagl tracks that fragmentation country by country—Czechoslovakia's pioneering stamp and Rašín's forced-loan experiment, Yugoslavia's crown-dinar compromise, Poland's chaos of marks, rubles and crowns, Hungary under Béla Kun—while forged stamps spread panic across the region. At its core stands a scathing critique of Article 206 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, whose confused provisions for liquidating the Bank he judges both unjust and technically impossible, treating Austria as sole successor and the Bank as a state institution. Left unrevised, he warns, the arrangement risks becoming a Central European economic problem in its own right.
Der Traum der Donaukonföderation war der letzte Traum der Österreichisch-ungarischen Bank.
English translation: “The dream of a Danubian confederation was the last dream of the Austro-Hungarian Bank.”
Abolish private ownership of the means of production, Mises argues, and you abolish the market prices of producer goods along with it—and without money prices there is no common denominator by which a planning authority can weigh one production method against another. This 1920 essay, which opened the socialist calculation debate, grants that a socialist commonwealth could still let consumers exchange and even use money for consumption goods, but insists that subjective use value cannot be measured and that labor cannot serve as a unit, since labor is heterogeneous and ignores scarce material inputs. State and municipal enterprises only appear calculable because they float within a surrounding market. Technical efficiency, he concludes, is not economic rationality: deprived of calculation, socialist production must grope in the dark.
Sozialismus ist Aufhebung der Rationalität der Wirtschaft.
English translation: “Socialism is the abolition of rational economy.”
Obsolete as policy the moment the peace terms arrived, yet indispensable as a diagnosis of the state's bare skeleton, the 1919/20 budget is here defended before the Constituent National Assembly on 28 July 1919. The finance secretary sets expenditures of roughly 6.5 billion crowns against revenues of 2.5 billion, a four-billion deficit, and traces the vicious circle in which rising prices force rising spending, which weakens the crown, which raises prices again. With extraordinary charges stripped out and a capital levy cutting war-debt interest, he argues Deutschoesterreich could have worked its way out of deficit finance in three arduous years. Then comes the indictment: the treaty's allocation of debts and war loans is not merely harsh but an economic riddle, intelligible only as a deliberate death sentence, worse than unacceptable and simply impossible.
Allein wie politisch, so ist auch ökonomisch dieser Friedensvertrag ein Rätsel, es sei denn, daß er ein gewolltes und beabsichtigtes wirtschaftliches Todesurteil sei.
English translation: “But just as it is politically, so too economically this peace treaty is an enigma—unless it be a deliberate and intended economic death sentence.”
Philippovich treats modern economic policy not as occasional intervention but as the very medium through which markets operate: transport, trade, banking, insurance, and poor relief all shape the formation and distribution of income, so the boundary between economic and social policy is porous from the start. The transport books argue that railway technology becomes economic power only once organized — duplicated lines waste capital, competition tends toward fusion and monopoly, and the railway is thus a public-monopolistic institution even in private hands, its rates poised between own-cost and value-of-service. Trade, banks, and the bourse extend the theme of organized concentration and ineradicable speculation. The final book grounds an independent income policy in labor exchanges, unemployment relief, and compulsory social insurance, converting aid from charity into enforceable right.
In diesen Vereinheitlichungsbestrebungen zeigt sich deutlich, daß das Lebensprinzip aller Verkehrsanstalten die Zentralisation ist.
English translation: “In these efforts at unification it becomes plainly evident that the vital principle of all transport enterprises is centralization.”
Schumpeter measures Max Weber not by any single doctrine of parliamentarism or social policy but by the seriousness he forced upon a cautious, convention-bound German academy. Written as an obituary in 1920, this appraisal locates Weber's importance in a methodological achievement: the insistence that science cannot tell us what ought to be, that knowledge must be separated from political willing and from metaphysical presupposition. Weber's studies, Politik als Beruf, Wissenschaft als Beruf, and above all Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus and Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, are read as comparative inquiries into how belief, interest, discipline, and conduct interpenetrate, extending yet correcting Marx's economic interpretation of history. Economics supplied many of Weber's problems, Schumpeter concludes, but the governing form of his mind was sociological through and through.
Er war nicht konventionell. Er war nicht zugeritten. Er gehörte sich selbst.
English translation: “He was not conventional. He was not broken in. He belonged to himself.”
A short foreword to L. Galin's study of Russian courts and penal practice becomes, in Lederer's hands, an occasion to ask what law can be under Bolshevism. He opens by admitting he has never been to Russia and depends on sparse, contradictory reports, then advances a striking claim: even a revolution that ruptures every legal continuity generates continuity of its own, as old institutions, trained specialists, and popular habit reassert themselves. The dictatorship of the proletariat, he argues, has become institutional — sustained by leadership, propaganda, and transformed consciousness — yet has produced no genuinely new legal idea, an answer even Galin can give only unsatisfyingly. From that dissatisfaction he draws the essay's sharpest question: whether the Rechtsstaat itself is possible only within the bourgeois world.
So öffnet diese Darstellung den Ausblick auf die Frage: ob und inwieweit auch der Rechtsstaat nur in der bürgerlichen Welt möglich ist.
English translation: “Thus this account opens up the prospect of the question: whether and to what extent the Rechtsstaat too is possible only in the bourgeois world.”
Three questions of the moment frame this 1921 newspaper interview: how to value securities as the krone depreciates, whether industrial finance bills are inflationary, and whether a reversal of the business cycle threatens. The finance secretary reframes the fashionable talk of Substanzwert against Ertragswert, since 'substance' names only assets whose prices have lagged behind depreciation, defensible so long as future earning capacity is plausible, for an unviable enterprise has neither. He concedes that a finance bill unmatched by new goods is, in principle, as inflationary as state note issue, yet distinguishes credit to industry from direct state emission. Against England's deflationary example, he pleads for stabilization without liquidationism: ample but high-interest central-bank credit as a bridge until world recovery arrives, plus relief from the taxes and controls that stifle private adaptation.
Ein lebensunfähiges Unternehmen hat weder einen Ertrags-, noch einen Substanzwert, denn ein produktiver Apparat, mit dem man nichts machen kann, ist überhaupt wertlos.
English translation: “An unviable enterprise has neither an earnings value nor an intrinsic asset value, for a productive apparatus with which nothing can be done is wholly worthless.”
Because money satisfies no need directly, a buyer's maximum bid can only be the wealth left once more urgent wants are secured—never the monetary measure of a good's value. From this psychological foundation, drawn from Franz Brentano by way of Marty and Kraus, Engländer rebuilds price theory around ranked preferences, the 'price-willingness paradox' by which the bid per unit can fall faster than quantity rises, and prices that settle below a buyer's maximum. Competition among unequal buyers, he shows, fixes only upper and lower limits set by marginal and excluded strata, never a unique price; the missing determinant comes from the seller side and the cost law, in which labor stands as the terminal factor whose own price rests on the quantity actually employed.
Der Käufer hat keine Möglichkeit einer unmittelbaren Schätzung des Geldes in der Art, wie er eine unmittelbare Schätzung eines Gutes erster Ordnung nach der von diesem Gute abhängigen Bedürfnisbefriedigung vornimmt.
English translation: “The buyer has no possibility of directly appraising money in the way in which he directly appraises a first-order good according to the satisfaction of needs that depends on that good.”
The greatness of a life's work, this 1921 obituary proposes, can be tested by whether one decisive achievement alone would suffice to secure it, and Carl Menger passes. That achievement was the refounding of economic theory on subjective value and marginal utility, worked out in the 1871 Grundsaetze alongside the independent discoveries of Jevons and Walras. Menger did not attack the classical school from outside; he overcame Ricardo on his own analytical terrain by grounding price formation in the laws of human need and scarcity, redefining economics as a theory of prices. Schumpeter sets his originality above mere precursors like Gossen, credits the Methodenstreit writings as a defense of exact theory, and traces how Boehm-Bawerk and Wieser extended the work into the Austrian school that carried Menger's ideas into international science.
Menger gehörte zu den Denkern, denen eine solche Leistung von entscheidender, für die Wissenschaft historischer Bedeutung gelungen ist.
English translation: “Menger belonged to those thinkers who succeeded in an achievement of decisive, historically significant importance for science.”