The archive.

Bidding farewell to Bonn in July 1932, Schumpeter set aside politics and policy to ask where economics as a science stands and where it is going. His answer is a sequence of methodological theses: economics must become an ethically indifferent empirical discipline that says what is and what will be rather than preaching from the lectern; its logic differs in no way from the other sciences, so mathematical tools need no apology; and its future lies in uniting facts, statistics, and theory, with Trendanalyse the frontier. He calls practical interest the discipline's crown of thorns, refuses to found a Schumpeter school, and judges Walrasian equilibrium aged when set against concrete industrial reality, yet the animating ethos is discovery against authoritative impossibility.

Das Faszinierende an der Wissenschaft ist im Grunde nur der Spaß, den man hat, wenn man tut, was beste Autoritäten für unmöglich erklären; nur die Jagd nach solchen Gelegenheiten ist etwas wert.

English translation: “What is fascinating about science is at bottom only the fun one has in doing what the best authorities declare to be impossible; only the hunt for such opportunities is worth anything.”

A system of simultaneous equations can establish that prices, quantities, and marginal utilities are mutually compatible; it cannot show how any determinate price came to be. That distinction, between genetic-causal theories, which explain how prices arise, and functional theories, which merely describe correspondences once equilibrium is presupposed, drives this methodological reckoning with mathematical economics. Marching through Cournot's demand function, Jevons's and Walras's equilibrium equations, Pareto's indifference curves, and Cassel's scarcity model, Mayer argues that each mistakes a description of finished relations for an account of their formation, and that Pareto's curves rest on the mere fiction of an experiment. Writing from interwar Vienna in the long shadow of the Methodenstreit, he does not spurn formalization but demands a return to causal inquiry into subjective valuation and its temporal sequence.

Das Problem hat sich damit geändert und nicht nur die Betrachtungsweise.

English translation: “The problem itself has thereby changed, and not merely the point of view.”

As the European gold-exchange order broke apart in the early 1930s, states began seizing, centralizing, and rationing foreign means of payment—and Kerschagl sets out to explain, in strictly economic terms, why. Foreign-exchange control (Devisenbewirtschaftung) is treated here not as a currency system but as an emergency bridge forced by the convergence of trade deficits, capital flight, and reserve losses across the trade balance, the payments balance, and what he calls the Währungsbilanz. Its defining move—allocating scarce exchange—is a form of partial planning that inevitably reaches into imports, production, and consumption. Clearing arrangements, priority lists, and blocked accounts follow the same logic of restriction. Controls can buy time, he argues, but cannot themselves restore the equilibrium whose absence created them.

Der Weg zu dauernd gesunden Währungen führt über wirtschaftliche Vernunft.

English translation: “The road to permanently sound currencies leads through economic reason.”

As the Depression hardened public opinion into a verdict, capitalism has failed and only planned economy or socialism remains, Mises answers that the verdict mistakes its object. What collapsed was not liberal capitalism but decades of anti-capitalist policy: nationalization, municipal enterprise, tariffs, union privilege, unemployment relief, social insurance, inflation, militarism. Economics, he argues, discovered market laws no coercive power can override, and liberalism is simply the practical application of that discovery, not a class morality; the isolated intervention cannot reach its aim and produces effects its own authors never wanted. Even businessmen turned interventionist prove only that they too absorb their age's ideas, as success comes to hinge on connections rather than serving consumers well and cheaply. The crisis, he concludes, belongs to interventionism: not Bastiat but Marx and Schmoller failed.

Gegen Logik setzten sie Ethik, gegen Theorie Ressentiment, gegen Argumente den Hinweis auf den Willen des Staates.

English translation: “Against logic they set ethics, against theory resentment, against arguments the appeal to the will of the state.”

Half memoir and half post-mortem, this three-part volume moves from Sieghart's own rise through the Ministerratspräsidium under Koerber, Gautsch, and Beck to a structural anatomy of the empire that employed him. Writing in 1932, after Saint-Germain had already dismembered the monarchy, he insists that its unresolved national problems survived in the successor states, and that the Danube basin's true foundation was an economic community of small peoples that dualism had corroded. He portrays universal suffrage as a state-preserving clamp, defends the reformers against the militarism of Conrad von Hötzendorf, and rejects the determinist verdict—associated here with Ludwig Mises—that internal decay doomed the realm: only a world war of unprecedented scale, he argues, could destroy it.

Von allen Einrichtungen der Monarchie war der Dualismus, wie er sich herausgebildet hatte, die unseligste!

English translation: “Of all the institutions of the Monarchy, Dualism, as it had developed, was the most calamitous!”

Karl Bücher's picture of an original closed household economy, sealed off from trade, is the adversary this third volume keeps returning to; Thurnwald rejects it as a construction unsupported by ethnography or history. Reciprocal giving, barter, ceremonial exchange, and market fairs, he shows, reach down to hunters and gatherers; the Trobriand Kula circulates armrings and necklaces as prestige rather than property, while Northwest Coast potlatch turns wealth into power through ceremonial dispersal, not hoarding. He coins Naturkapital for the self-renewing capital of seed and herds in moneyless economies, traces money from preferred exchange objects to cowries and cattle, and reads women and slaves as the earliest concentrated labor capital. Against Durkheim and Bücher he denies that economic development reduces to a growing division of labor, calling economic activity a psychically and socially conditioned process.

Was wir Wirtschaft nennen, kommt erst durch die Organisierung der Menschen eines bestimmten technischen Könnens zustande.

English translation: “What we call economy comes about only through the organization of people possessing a certain technical capability.”

The evolutionary set-pieces of ethnology are dismantled one by one in this second volume: primordial promiscuity and group marriage, read by Morgan and MacLennan out of Hawaiian kin-terms, and bride capture as an original form of marriage, which Thurnwald re-explains as staged ritual resistance rather than real abduction. Family, kinship, and the men's houses, initiations, and secret societies that overlay them are his subject. Mother-right and father-right, he insists, almost never appear in pure logical form; classificatory kinship sorts people by social obligation, not genealogical degree. Marriage orders teem with positive prescriptions, not only prohibitions, and what Europeans call incest is often better named social disgrace. Milk kinship and blood brotherhood extend the same logic, binding strangers into kin through the magical power of substance.

Es gibt ja keinen Menschen an sich, sondern nur männliche oder weibliche, junge oder alte.

English translation: “There is no such thing as a human being in the abstract, but only male or female, young or old ones.”

Profit-seeking, this comparative survey insists, is no natural law of economic life but a peculiarity of modern society. Ranging across Melanesia, Micronesia, East Africa, Sumer and archaic Babylon, Thurnwald treats economics not as mere food-getting but as a social system woven from household reciprocity, rank obligation, ritual, and the conservative force of tradition. He dismantles the tidy evolutionary sequence of hunting, pastoralism and agriculture, follows Edward Hahn in separating hoe from plough cultivation, and reads kula exchange, potlatch display, wergeld and temple redistribution as forms in which wealth circulates for prestige rather than gain. Against Max Weber he derives the Babylonian governor's estate from earlier temple administration, and against Carl Bücher he denies the self-sufficient manor. Capital first appears, he argues, in herds and standing crops.

A characteristic feature of primitive economics is the absence of any desire to make profits either from production or exchange.

A seventy-one-page pamphlet on price formation in the German scholarly antiquarian book trade, trailing a bibliography of theoretical works 'von Gossen bis Wicksell,' is exactly the mismatch of apparatus and achievement Hayek finds intolerable. His single-paragraph notice grants that the subject—rare, heterogeneous goods with widely dispersed valuations—could have been theoretically revealing, then denies that Bruck makes anything of it. The yield for price theory is meagre; the factual information is thinner than a regular reader of booksellers' catalogues could assemble unaided, especially on the two matters that would have mattered most: the movement of antiquarian prices over time and the 'Streuung' of simultaneous prices for identical works. The verdict is disciplinary—casual market observation, bibliographic display and genuine value theory are not the same thing, and Bruck has confused them.

Die preistheoretische Ausbeute ist recht mager.

English translation: “The yield for price theory is decidedly meagre.”

Reviewing Husserl's newly published Cartesian Meditations—still available only in French—Schütz reads it as an attempt to ground all philosophy in transcendental subjectivity, taking up Descartes's radical doubt while correcting its errors through the epoché and the phenomenological reduction. He follows Husserl's analyses of intentionality, the noetic-noematic correlation, and the transcendental ego as a monadic field structured by habitualities and passive genesis. Special weight falls on the difficult fifth meditation and its account of how the alter ego is constituted through appresentation and pairing, yielding an objective world valid for everyone. Schütz marks the work's transcendental idealism and its opposition to psychologism, points toward the tasks it opens for a phenomenologically grounded social science, and closes with the wish that Husserl make the book available to German readers.

„Gegenstände“ sind daher – in der reduzierten Sphäre sowohl als auch in der natürlichen Einstellung – nichts anderes als intentionale Korrelate ihrer Bewußtseinsweisen.

English translation: “Objects" are therefore – in the reduced sphere as well as in the natural attitude – nothing other than intentional correlates of their modes of consciousness.”

Statutes, reserve rules, and central-bank independence all fail, Strigl warns, against the one authority that can suspend them — the state itself. Written amid the crisis after 1929, as several central banks drifted back toward expansionary “accommodating” policy, this essay asks whether a currency can be secured against political manipulation rather than mere mismanagement. Its conceptual pivot is a reversal of Gresham’s law: where people are free to denominate contracts, wages, and credit in a sounder foreign currency, good money drives out bad, and depreciating money survives only through ignorance, habit, or coercion. Strigl’s remedy is not a new currency scheme but a legal one — treaties binding states never to prohibit a partner’s currency, creating an automatic and sensitive index of monetary health. A state that cannot outlaw the foreign money cannot inflate.

Der Geist der Zeit ist inflationistisch und manche Völker werden für ihre Heilung von währungspolitischen Irrtümern jetzt wieder schweres Lehrgeld zahlen müssen.

English translation: “The spirit of the age is inflationist, and some peoples will now once again have to pay dearly to be cured of their monetary-policy errors.”

Beginning from the ambiguity buried in the word "Wert," this 1886 essay — revived here as No. 11 in the London School of Economics series of reprints of scarce economic tracts — separates subjective value from objective exchange value and makes the former the base of the whole science. A good's worth, Böhm-Bawerk argues, is not a property lodged in things but its marginal utility: the least important want its available stock still covers, dramatized by an isolated colonist ranking five sacks of grain from survival down to feeding parrots, and by the old puzzle that diamonds command more than water. He then carries the same logic into market price, formed through the valuations of the "marginal pairs" of buyers and sellers, and shows that the law of cost operates not beside marginal utility but within it.

Eine Nationalökonomie, die die Theorie des subjektiven Wertes nicht entwickelt, ist in die Luft gebaut.

English translation: “An economics that does not develop the theory of subjective value is built on air.”