1,549 works, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Central planning, full employment, and inflationary pressure dominated postwar policy across most of the world, yet only the second, Hayek argues, is worth wanting in itself, and even it has been corrupted into a technique of permanent monetary stimulus. The Keynesian reflex treats all unemployment as deficient aggregate demand, ignoring the commoner case where idle labour in some trades coexists with scarcity in others. Extra spending cannot reach those workers; it only pulls labour into sectors that survive as long as credit expands, especially capital-goods industries, storing up displacement for when it stops. Worse, the causation runs in a circle: inflation invites price controls and rationing, controls sap the economy's resilience, and the resulting stagnation is then cited as proof that still more expansion is needed.
A government which uses inflation as an instrument of policy but wants it to produce only the desired effects is soon driven to control ever increasing parts of the economy.
Consumers never merely weigh today's helping of a good against tomorrow's; they confront recurring subsistence needs, postponable wishes, durable purchases, future-only aims, and precautionary reserves. On that typological insight Mahr rebuilds the theory of intertemporal choice, which he judges to have sought one general law where none exists. Present restraint, he shows, is undertaken not to enjoy the same want more intensely later but to fund a different project altogether—dissolving Böhm-Bawerk's doctrine of systematically undervalued future goods; where earlier satisfaction is genuinely preferred, the cause is stronger anticipatory pleasure, not faulty foresight. Interest therefore cannot rest on a universal discounting of the future, and long-term rationality can be judged only by the tendencies discernible when the decision was made, never by its later outcome.
Die Regel ist, daß Einschränkungen an der gegenwärtigen Bedürfnisbefriedigung nur vorgenommen werden, um in der Zukunft neue, anders geartete Bedürfnisse befriedigen zu können.
English translation: “The rule is that restrictions on present want-satisfaction are undertaken only in order to be able to satisfy new, differently constituted wants in the future.”
Bread and wine, bread and butter, coffee and milk: for Mahr these are never interchangeable along a smooth curve but combine in one determinate best proportion, which income and prices may put out of reach. On that observation rests his assault, first advanced in 1954, on the indifference-curve analysis then spreading from Anglo-American economics through Pareto and Hicks. Taking up Hans Mayer's objections—the fictive 'experiment,' infinite divisibility, unlimited substitutability—he denies that a field of equally valued bundles exists at all, and replaces indifference curves with curves of preferred combinations shifting with income and saturation. Extending the argument to the marginal-utility level, he separates broad need-classes from particular goods and locates the one clear margin in the marginal utility of money rather than in any equalization across commodities.
In Wahrheit gibt es regelmäßig nur ein optimales Kombinationsverhältnis zweier Konsumgüter.
English translation: “In truth, there is regularly only one optimal combination ratio of two consumer goods.”
Once policy accepts that no major group's money wages can ever fall, inflation stops being an accident and becomes the standing instrument of adjustment. Hayek's target is a practical conviction he attributes to the Keynesian revolution: because economic development constantly alters the wage relations needed among regions, trades, and skills, and because no nominal cut is permitted, every downward relative adjustment must be engineered by raising other wages instead, so the aggregate level climbs faster than real wages, which is inflation. And inflation stimulates only while it surprises; once expected, costs rise in advance, so the dose must accelerate to keep working. His conclusion reverses the accommodationist premise: the stream of money expenditure must be the fixed datum to which wages adapt, not the passive supply that ratifies whatever unions demand.
A society which accepts this is bound for a continuous process of inflation.
Postwar trade policy broke with the economic nationalism of the interwar years, and reciprocity became its governing principle—the ground on which Mahr, in 1955, builds a case that mutual liberalization, broad enough and paced with care, can raise national income without the feared wave of unemployment. He concedes the transition problem, that sheltered industries contract before resources migrate to exporting ones, but judges it commonly overstated. His decisive addition to foreign-trade multiplier analysis is the acceleration principle: expanding export industries call forth machinery, steel, and construction, a fresh investment demand that outweighs the replacement demand lost in shrinking sectors. Where prior protection ran very high, he allows devaluation over deflation; his caution is reversed against excessive speed, which would overstrain investment-goods capacity. The horizon is OEEC integration, with inner and outer circles of participation.
Therefore the removal of trade barriers, if carried out not too slowly and faint-heartedly, will bestow prosperity upon the industries which produce investment goods.
When general terms like 'planning,' 'social,' and 'positive' are narrowed into political slogans, the same fate threatens 'rationalism' itself, and it is that word Hayek sets out to rescue in this 1965 lecture, delivered in Japan and reprinted here. His quarrel is not with reason but with what he names rationalist constructivism: the Cartesian conceit, running from Bacon and Hobbes through Descartes to Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx, that useful institutions must be deliberately invented and remade from explicit premises. From this hubris, he argues, all modern socialism, planning, and totalitarianism derive. Against it he sets a modest, critical tradition of Hume, Smith, Menger, and Popper, in which reason is itself a product of evolved civilization, transmitted through language and unarticulated rules, and freedom under law becomes an instrument for using knowledge no single mind commands.
Reason is like a dangerous explosive which, handled cautiously, will be most beneficial, but if handled incautiously may blow up a civilization.
Business cycles and foreign trade feed on one another, and Mahr maps their interaction across six combinations of domestic and foreign boom and slump: a home upswing leaks abroad through imports, a downturn is cushioned by exports and cheaper foreign goods. From this he weighs the modern, Keynesian case for protection—full employment defended against multiplier leakage—only to warn that in depression protectionism spreads faster than at any other time, tipping into beggar-my-neighbour escalation. His distinctive contribution, written in 1957, is the 'Defensivzoll,' a defensive tariff justified strictly up to the point where it offsets, rather than compounds, the productivity loss inflicted by foreign barriers. List's infant-industry argument is confined to agrarian latecomers; the standing ideal remains reciprocal free trade, and OEEC liberalization, through the accelerator, is read as broadly expansionary.
Vor allem aber wirkt der Protektionismus zu keiner anderen Zeit so ansteckend wie in der Depression.
English translation: “Above all, however, protectionism is at no other time so contagious as during a depression.”
Written in 1933 as the United States' experiment in credit-controlled stabilization was collapsing, this pamphlet—introduced by Harry Gideonse—makes monetary law the guardian of production and employment rather than of abstract justice between creditor and debtor. Its rule is the stabilization of purchasing power through a wholesale-price index, chosen over broader cost-of-living standards that merely register productivity or contracts. Its sharpest theoretical stroke is the contrast between stable money and the Hayekian ideal of neutral money, which Mahr judges administratively unusable because velocity and money substitutes cannot be measured. Reconsidering the 1920s, he concedes that stable prices did not prevent the boom, yet blames the catastrophe on deflationary collapse—and licenses credit-financed public works, disciplined by a legally fixed price target, while demoting gold from principle to mere reassuring camouflage.
If currency policy, however, is legally directed toward the stabilization of purchasing power, the limit of credit expansion would coincide with the attainment of the intended level of prices.
Monopoly prices fall less sharply in a depression than competitive prices — a regularity Alexander Mahr had observed in 1932 and here places on a fuller analytical footing. Starting from the elasticity of demand as the decisive determinant of the monopoly price, he shows that under inelastic or unit-elastic demand a cost reduction is largely pocketed as profit rather than passed to buyers, so that monopoly price adjustment is systematically less elastic than competitive adjustment. Real monopolists, he argues, are nonetheless hemmed in by substitutes, latent competitors, tariffs, and the threat of state intervention. The stakes are macroeconomic: by defending prices through cuts to output and employment, monopoly and cartel pricing convert cyclical contractions into cumulative ones, and Mahr rejects the claim that cartels stabilize the Konjunkturzyklus.
Bei unelastischer Nachfrage oder wenn die Nachfrageelastizität gleich eins ist, wird also der Monopolpreis trotz Änderung der Kosten ganz überwiegend unverändert bleiben, während der Konkurrenzpreis sich durchaus der Kostenänderung anpassen würde.
English translation: “With inelastic demand, or when the elasticity of demand equals one, the monopoly price will therefore, despite a change in costs, remain overwhelmingly unchanged, whereas the competitive price would fully adjust to the change in costs.”
Multiplier theory, as Keynes bequeathed it, sums an endless sequence of income effects without ever fixing the accounting period national income actually requires—and for Mahr the neglect of the time factor is its cardinal defect. Since income is reckoned by the year, the multiplier too must be annual: he redefines it as the coefficient linking a rise in circulating money to the rise in monetary national income, and identifies it with the marginal velocity of circulation, the number of income-forming turnovers a newly issued unit performs within the year. Hoarding, on this account, is not an external leakage but a lowering of that average velocity. The Keynesian investment multiplier and the export multiplier become mere special cases of a broader principle: supplying a growing economy with means of payment. Marked here as previously unpublished.
Der entscheidende Mangel der herrschenden Multiplikatortheorie liegt in der Vernachlässigung des Zeitfaktors.
English translation: “The decisive defect of the prevailing multiplier theory lies in the neglect of the time factor.”
Entrepreneurs must advance wages and materials long before sales proceeds return, and when banks restrict credit, hoard cash, and slow velocity, consumers' purchasing power falls short of producers' costs—so money income and real market product drift apart. Correcting that drift is the task Mahr sets monetary policy in this 1964 study, defending stable purchasing power against 'neutral,' cost-oriented money that would merely finance the creeping inflation of monopoly wages and prices. His central move is to show that technological profit under stable money is non-inflationary, since it springs from falling costs rather than redistribution. Linking the multiplier to circuit velocity through the 'allocation period,' and rereading the New Deal's deficits as real but self-defeating, he shifts the modern danger from deflationary collapse to creeping inflation driven by pressure-group politics.
A policy of stable money creates profits of a non-inflationary character, if we define inflation as an increase of monetary national income beyond real net market product.
Hayek draws a distinction that, once stated, seems obvious yet is constantly confused: the rules an individual follows are not the same thing as the order of actions that emerges when many follow them. A rule may be innate or learned, genetic or cultural, and need never be consciously known; what natural selection tests is not the isolated rule but the viability of the whole group order it helps sustain. Moving from the flight patterns of geese and insect division of labour to kinship, property, and succession, he shows coordination arising without any actor grasping the design. He calls the theoretical reconstruction of such processes conjectural history, aligns social science with biology and geology rather than mechanics, and, invoking Mandeville, Hume, and Smith, defends explanation by function without any designing purpose.
Norms are thus an adaptation to a factual regularity on which we depend but which we know only partially and on which we can count only if we observe those norms.