The archive.

Surveying business-cycle theory at a moment when the field was fragmenting into rival methods, Haberler imposes order with a single 'modest hypothesis': fluctuations in effective demand are the immediate cause of cyclical swings in output and employment. Written in German, the essay insists this is no narrowly monetary claim — Keynesian, Wicksellian, Austrian, and Schumpeterian accounts all fit beneath it — and reformulates the demand-output link through the elasticity of aggregate supply. He treats Hicks's multiplier-accelerator model as the synthesis's high point yet rejects any mechanical accelerator, keeping only the weaker claim that rising income stimulates investment. The essay's sharpest thrust names the Achilles heel of all Keynes-inspired theory: rigid prices and wages, and an aggregation so coarse it hides the structural maladjustments between production and demand.

Es ist den modernen Konstrukteuren mathematischer Modelle vorbehalten geblieben, über alle diese Dinge hinwegzusehen und ein mechanisches Funktionieren des Prinzips anzunehmen.

English translation: “It has been left to the modern constructors of mathematical models to overlook all these matters and to assume a mechanical operation of the principle.”

Sharing language, history, and culture with the Reich did not make Austrian resistance a mere province of German opposition to Hitler—so runs the thesis of this deliberately provisional survey. Prompted by the Moscow Declaration's call for Austria to earn its own liberation, Engel-Janosi roots the movement less in fresh ideology than in the will 'to remain what one had been,' a determination uniting monarchists, Catholics, socialists, communists, and anti-Prussian conservatives against absorption. Against the charge that resistance came only once defeat was obvious, he documents cells forming immediately after March 1938, from Tyrol to Vienna, and redefines resistance as cumulative and practical: aid to prisoners' families, intelligence networks, Wehrmacht cells, ingenious economic sabotage, the '05' organization, and finally the battle for Vienna and the rescue of bridges and art treasures from last-ditch destruction.

Auch in Österreich wurde die Saat der politischen und geistigen Erneuerung mit Blut getränkt; wir hoffen, daß sie in diesem Boden umso kräftiger gedeihen werde.

English translation: “In Austria too the seed of political and spiritual renewal was watered with blood; we hope that in this soil it will flourish all the more vigorously.”

There are, strictly speaking, no facts pure and simple: both common sense and science select and interpret a world according to purpose and relevance. From that anti-positivist premise Schütz derives the defining problem of social science—its objects already interpret themselves, so the scholar's models are second-degree constructs built upon the first-order constructs by which people understand their everyday lives. He maps the intersubjective lifeworld through typification, the reciprocity of perspectives, the social distribution of knowledge, and relations of We, You, and They, then anatomizes action as projected conduct governed by in-order-to and because-motives. Full rationality, he insists, is not a feature of ordinary conduct but a methodological device: the scientist builds puppet-like homunculi endowed only with the relevances his problem requires. Valid constructs must satisfy logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and adequacy—the scientist standing to his creatures, in the closing image, as a god to his.

The thought objects constructed by the social scientists refer to and are founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thought of man living his everyday life among his fellowmen.

When the textbooks of Hansen and Schneider reduced the quantity theory of money to the crude claim that prices simply track the money stock, Amonn set out to show they were attacking a straw man no serious theorist had ever held. Tracing the doctrine from Bodin and Hume through Mill and Fisher, he recasts it not as a mechanistic identity but as the application of ordinary supply-and-demand value theory to the special case of money, whose demand and supply enter as simple quantities rather than price-quantity functions. He defends Fisher's equation of exchange against the charge of empty tautology, distinguishes the money actually offered on the market from the total stock, and closes by likening the quantity-theory law to the law of free fall: never perfectly realized, yet valid when other factors are accounted for.

Man wird selbst in der ältesten geldtheoretischen Literatur vergeblich nach einer derart primitiven Fassung der Quantitätstheorie suchen.

English translation: “Even in the oldest monetary-theoretical literature one will search in vain for so primitive a formulation of the quantity theory.”

Reviewing Hannah Arendt's book of the same name, Voegelin reads totalitarianism as the symptom of a putrefaction in Western culture, a cadaveric poison scattering its pathogens through the body of humanity. He praises her eye for the concrete, above all her account of the 'superfluous' human beings left when national societies disintegrate, yet he pushes her origins backward and inward. The deeper source is not imperialism or bureaucracy but the spiritual disease of agnosticism and an immanentist faith that would manufacture salvation within history. His sharpest objection targets the ambition to transform human nature, which he calls a contradiction in terms: to meddle with the nature of a thing is to destroy it. The crisis, finally, is religious, a revolt against the limits of human nature and against transcendence itself.

Die wahre Trennlinie in der gegenwärtigen Krise verläuft nicht zwischen Liberalen und Totalitären, sondern zwischen den religiösen und philosophischen Transzendentalisten auf der einen Seite und den liberalen und totalitären Immanentisten auf der anderen.

English translation: “The true dividing line in the present crisis does not run between liberals and totalitarians, but between the religious and philosophical transcendentalists on the one side and the liberal and totalitarian immanentists on the other.”

Husserl withheld the second volume of his Ideen from print because the problem of intersubjectivity remained unsolved, and this posthumously edited text, reconstructed at the Louvain archive, exposes the difficulty rather than resolving it. Schütz follows its architecture from material things, whose reality he ties inseparably to causality, through the lived body and its "I can," to the moment where empathy makes the world shareable and every objectivity turns out to presuppose intersubjectivity. In the region of spirit, motivation displaces physical causality, and persons live among tools, works, and institutions rather than neutral objects. Husserl's boldest claim, that spirit holds ontological priority over a nature relative to consciousness, sets the stage; Schütz closes by marking the unfinished analyses of communication and collectivity as the book's weakest, and most consequential, seams.

Die Natur ist prinzipiell relativ, der Geist prinzipiell irrelativ (absolut).

English translation: “Nature is in principle relative, spirit in principle non-relative (absolute).”

Fear built cathedrals and greed built banking houses: across Brooks Adams's Law of Civilisation and Decay runs a single contest between the imaginative type—warrior, saint, priest—and the economic type of merchant, usurer, and financier. Engel-Janosi rescues this neglected American philosophy of history, written before Spengler and Toynbee, from the oblivion it met in optimistic America, reconstructing Adams's formation through the family inheritance, Harvard, Darwin, Spencer, and Guizot. Adams's narrative runs from Rome and Byzantium through the Crusades, Venice, the Reformation, England, and India to modern finance, everywhere charting centralization and the triumph of money power. Engel-Janosi finds the determinism crude beside Max Weber, yet preserves the severity of Adams's question: what governs civilization once belief in progress has collapsed?

Der Titel des geschichtlichen Hauptwerks von Brooks ist Beweis an sich: The Law of Civilisation and Decay.

English translation: “The title of Brooks's principal historical work is proof in itself: The Law of Civilisation and Decay.”

No final classification of taxes is possible, Amonn concedes at the outset, because real tax systems are the residue of historically uneven practice. What follows is a concise study aid to the special theory of taxation, tracing each levy—land, building, trade, capital-rent, labour, income, wealth, inheritance, consumption, and turnover taxes—through its object, assessment base, and above all its Überwälzung, the shifting and incidence that determine who truly bears the burden. He distinguishes objective yield taxes from the subjective income tax geared to ability to pay, judges the old yield taxes fit as principal taxes only in economically backward countries, and extends the analysis to public credit, the structure and conversion of state debt, and the fiscal equalization between a federation and its member states.

Eine Zwangsanleihe vereinigt die Nachteile sowohl einer Anleihe wie einer Steuer, ohne die Vorteile einer Anleihe bzw. die Vorteile einer Steuer zu bieten.

English translation: “A forced loan combines the disadvantages of both a loan and a tax without offering the advantages of either a loan or a tax.”

Historicism reaches its fullest force precisely when it dissolves every human form into a historically conditioned object—and at that same moment exposes its own insufficiency, as life, dogma, myth, and an 'Ur'-history press beyond mere appearance. Engel-Janosi stages the argument as a sequence of confrontations: Burckhardt's contemplative culture of remembering against Nietzsche's demand for an art of forgetting; Acton and Döllinger's historical method defeated by dogmatic reasoning at the First Vatican Council; Spengler's biological determinism against Toynbee's refusal to freeze history at the present. As the scale of comparison widens, factual narration yields to myth as a mode of truth, and the overcoming of historicism becomes a search for a history behind history—an ideal eternal history in Vico's sense, closing on Burckhardt's hope of hearing the valley's dissonances as harmony.

Acton hat den Gegensatz richtig gefühlt, als er notierte: „Le dogme a vaincu l'histoire.“ Für ihn war es ein großes Unglück.

English translation: “Acton sensed the antithesis correctly when he noted: "Le dogme a vaincu l'histoire" [Dogma has vanquished history]. For him it was a great misfortune.”

Drafted in 1912 beside Ideen I and never rewritten by Husserl or his assistants, the earliest of the three Ideen volumes reads, in Schütz's hands, as a preliminary to the harder second volume and as a manifesto for grounding empirical science. Its subject is the ordering of regions, material thing, animate body, soul, and the claim that every empirical discipline works within an a priori regional framework it cannot itself clarify. Eidetic science, Husserl argues, precedes the empirical; psychology therefore needs a rational, essential counterpart, and the objectivity of nature is constituted only among embodied egos in reciprocal communication. Schütz gives special weight to the final chapter on Klärung, the tracing of technically useful constructions back to intuitive givenness, and to Husserl's insistence that phenomenology grounds the sciences without ever replacing them.

So ist die Phänomenologie der Nährboden, aus dem alle ontologischen Einsichten erwachsen.

English translation: “Thus phenomenology is the fertile soil from which all ontological insights grow.”

Marginal utility was discovered long before it was believed. Kauder's puzzle is the gap: French, Italian, and Swiss writers had utility and scarcity, Bernoulli its mathematics, Lloyd its marginal insight, yet British classical economics clung to objective labor and cost value. His boldest explanation is theological. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century split was not ignorance but the antagonism of two moral worlds—Calvinist culture, which placed work at the center of social order and made labor value morally compelling, against an Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that oriented economic life toward need, satisfaction, and the good life. For the nineteenth-century delay Kauder shifts ground, rejecting hedonism, neo-Kantian revival, and bourgeois apologetics alike: what blocked marginalism was the prestige of Ricardian value and the anti-theoretical climate of the historical school, until Menger, Jevons, and Walras wrote where theory still had standing.

Before 1870 the history of the theory of value shows rather strange features, not easily paralleled in the history of any other science.

Full employment conjured from uncovered credit repeats, on Kerschagl's reading, John Law's old error: trying to replace scarce capital with purchasing power. This 1953 essay argues that printing money before consumable goods exist does not abolish scarcity but forces present consumers to finance future production through lower real consumption or higher prices—there are, he warns, no miracle cures. Keynes is placed within that line of reformers, and Dobretsberger's scheme to finance hydropower by note issue serves as the test case: domestically buildable, perhaps, but the new purchasing power would arrive long before the electricity. Against the illusion Kerschagl sets a real-factor remedy of deliberate austerity—new capital formed only through saving and work, weak accumulation traced to three inflations, and employment secured not by protected inefficiency but by rising productivity across all sectors.

Erhöhte Arbeitsleistung je Arbeiter zerstört nicht Arbeitsplätze, sondern schafft neue.

English translation: “Increased output per worker does not destroy jobs; it creates new ones.”