The archive.

From a Salzburg lecture delivered in 1970 comes Hayek's most concentrated assault on constructivism—the seemingly innocuous belief that because human beings made their institutions, they may redesign them at will. The error, he argues, confuses human origin with deliberate design: reason did not precede culture but grew with it, so it cannot stand outside language, morality and law to remake them from nothing. Social order depends on inherited rules, mostly negative prohibitions, whose function exceeds the understanding of those who obey them; the market itself is neither miracle nor natural harmony but the unintended product of property and contract. Yet this is no defence of blind tradition. Legitimate criticism, he concludes, must be immanent, testing contested values against those a society still presupposes rather than rebuilding the whole from scratch.

Die Vorstellung vom Menschen, der sich dank seiner Vernunft über die Werte seiner Kultur erhebt, um sie wie von einer höheren Warte von außen zu beurteilen, ist eine Illusion.

English translation: “The notion of the human being who, by virtue of his reason, rises above the values of his culture in order to judge them, as it were from a higher vantage point, from outside, is an illusion.”

Presented frankly as a mystery story, this essay treats the explosive growth of Euro-dollar deposits as a conceptual puzzle before an empirical one. Machlup's verdict is a disciplined agnosticism: Euro-banks may have created dollar money, but the statistics cannot say how much, because the debate keeps confusing deposits with loans, credit with money, and flows with stocks. He polices those categories relentlessly — distinguishing legal form from economic function, primary from derivative deposits, genuine money creation from the interbank redepositing that inflates gross totals through London-Zurich-Milan chains. His preferred analogy is the American nonmember bank, holding claims on member banks as reserves and building liabilities atop them. Offshore dollars, he concludes, are real, regulation-sensitive, and largely invisible to any national money-stock measure — stateless money.

Words guide the attention of the audience; the use of the word "market" may divert attention from the important nonmarket aspects of the Euro-dollar system.

Two kinds of foreign money confront each other in this 1970 pamphlet: private investment that works through ownership, prices, and profit-and-loss discipline, and government aid allocated by political fiat. Hazlitt defends the first as an intensified form of trade—capital arrives with management, technical skill, and the market test of possible loss, and it answers the "taking money out" complaint by first creating the wages, purchases, and productive capacity that make any profit possible. Aid embodies the opposite principle. He treats the Marshall Plan as an emergency wrongly made permanent and Point Four as the globalization of that error, crediting West Germany's recovery to Erhard's currency reform rather than to grants. Financed by taxes, borrowing, or inflation, aid diverts capital, empowers planners, and pauperizes the recipients who come to depend on it.

We cannot grow rich by giving our goods or our dollars away. We can only grow poorer.

A uniform tax on all imports plus an equal subsidy on all exports is, for commodity trade, identical to a currency devaluation, an equivalence Haberler accepts as an analytical benchmark and then spends the chapter refusing as policy. The device breaks the moment it meets institutions: it omits services and tourism, invites exemptions, and never stays uniform, sliding toward commodity-by-commodity and country-by-country discrimination and, eventually, exchange control. On the microeconomic side he wields Ricardo to reject the GATT distinction between border-adjustable indirect taxes and non-adjustable direct ones; what matters is whether a tax alters relative costs, not whether it is nominally shifted. Tracing the idea from Keynes's 1931 tariff-and-bounty proposal through Hicks, Triffin, and European VAT practice, he concludes that a valid model equivalence is no sound recommendation.

I conclude that the border tax on imports and tax refund on exports is an inferior, messy, wasteful, and inefficient substitute for exchange-rate adjustments.

Liberal Catholicism was not the work of one man; it arose from the confluence of many springs. Engel-Janosi's essay reconstructs that current as a transnational Catholic response to the collapse of throne-and-altar certainties between the Enlightenment, Napoleon, 1848, and the Syllabus of 1864. He tracks its national forms—Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Montalembert seeking liberty of press and conscience under the banner "Dieu et la liberté"; Gioberti and the neo-Guelphs imagining the pope as leader of a federated Italy; Döllinger and Acton in Germany turning historical scholarship itself into a discipline of conscience, where popes and councils stand under the same moral law as everyone else. The hopes briefly raised by Pius IX's election died with 1848, and Quanta cura and the Syllabus turned condemnation into lasting rupture.

Das Mark aller Kulturgeschichte ist ethisch und nicht metaphysisch.

English translation: “The marrow of all cultural history is ethical and not metaphysical.”

Even the laissez-faire economist, Rothbard charges, harbors a contradiction: he defends market liberty yet keeps a tax-funded monopoly over police and courts, though the state can supply protection only by violating the very property it claims to guard. Concluding the treatise—here as the German translation of Power and Market (1970)—this volume sketches competing defense agencies and private courts, then anatomizes intervention itself. Following Oppenheimer, Rothbard divides the economic means from the political means and classifies every intrusion as autistic, binary, or triangular—price controls that breed shortages and black markets, licensing and tariffs as monopoly privilege, patents that curtail rather than defend property, and a taxation that, whatever its form, can never be made neutral.

Die einzigen Menschenrechte sind, kurz gesagt, die Eigentumsrechte.

English translation: “The only human rights, in short, are property rights.”

Strip a share of its metaphysics and nothing intrinsic remains—only a valuation sustained transaction by transaction. From that deflationary premise Granger and Morgenstern mount an empirical assault on market folklore, insisting first that 'prediction' be defined before it is tested. Deploying spectral analysis across daily, weekly, and monthly series, they find price changes broadly following a random walk—not because the future is unknowable, but because past prices yield no usable linear forecast. The book's discipline lies in its distinctions: absolute price versus relative movement, direction versus magnitude. Volume, they show, says nothing about whether a stock will rise or fall, yet tracks the size of its swings. Optimal-allocation claims, seasonal cycles, and profitable filter rules fall in turn.

The value of a stock is only what someone else will pay for it — in cash, in another stock or whatever it may be.

A privately owned railroad cannot enrich its owner unless it carries the public and their goods, and that homely fact carries Hazlitt's thesis that property used in market production already serves a public purpose more faithfully than state ownership. Grounding the argument in Adam Smith and illustrating it with Henry Ford's reinvested profits, he shows that income saved and put to work in tractors, furnaces and housing benefits society as fully as any nationalization. From property he turns to saving, mounting a sustained attack on Keynes's 'cake' analogy: saving is not permanent nonconsumption but the precondition of capital formation, and a world where thrift was sin would grow steadily poorer. His austere conclusion is that the rich do most good not through extravagance or expropriation but by living simply and investing productively.

What the advocates of all expropriation schemes fail to realize is that property in private hands used for the production of goods and services for the market is already for all practical purposes public wealth.

A development plan that promises higher average income need not offer greater security against disappointing results. Gerhard Tintner and N. S. Raghavan make this tension explicit by introducing uncertain productive returns into the Mahalanobis two-sector planning model for India. Rather than calculate a single income target, they estimate distributions of terminal national income and compare how investment allocations alter expected performance, low-income thresholds, and relative variability. Their tested policies show why these measures cannot be treated as interchangeable: an allocation preferred for its average return may lose its appeal when stability becomes the priority. The article offers a concrete encounter with planning as a choice among risk criteria, while openly acknowledging the limitations of its aggregated model, independence assumption, and rough numerical approximations.

"It is high time," Rothbard announces, that someone blew the whistle on Women's Liberation. His 1970 polemic answers Betty Friedan and NOW with Austrian economics rather than sympathy: women's lower average wages, he contends, reflect interrupted careers, childrearing, turnover costs, and marginal productivity, not irrational discrimination—which a competitive market would punish anyway, since a biased employer forfeits profit and labor to rivals. He dismisses the feminist "brainwashing" thesis as unfalsifiable, recasts domesticity as a freely chosen division of labor, and reinterprets marriage as a contract binding men to support women and children. Turning from Friedanite liberalism to the anti-family "New Feminism" of Valerie Solanis and Robin Morgan, he treats objections to women as "sex objects" as an assault on heterosexual attraction itself. The result is a combative fusion of libertarian theory and cultural backlash.

Woman as “sex objects”? Of course they are sex objects and, praise the Lord, they always will be.

How can an econometric model guide policy when the statistics needed to build it are missing? Gerhard Tintner, Isabella Consigliere, and José T. M. Carneiro confront this problem in their 1970 article, published in parallel Portuguese and English texts. Using Brazilian data for 1952–1964, they construct a compact Keynesian system to estimate how spending, wages, and population affect output, consumption, prices, and employment together. The revealing tension lies between policy ambition and restrictive assumptions: without capital-stock data, production depends on labor alone, and higher wages yield declines in real output and employment that the authors themselves question. Readers can trace both the appeal of simultaneous policy responses and the dependence of those responses on proxy data, theoretical choices, and what the model leaves out.

Record American deficits piled up through the late 1960s, yet confidence in the dollar held—a puzzle Haberler and Willett resolve by arguing that the world had drifted onto a de facto dollar standard in which the currency was inconvertible into gold for large official sums, and that the very gap between the gold stock and dollar liabilities made mass conversion unthinkable. From this they draw the case for what they call benign neglect: because the United States cannot unilaterally devalue a currency everyone else pegs to, it should pursue domestic stability and curb inflation while leaving adjustment to surplus countries, which may accumulate dollars, appreciate, expand, or lower trade barriers. Written just before the August 1971 suspension of convertibility, the essay presses for modest exchange-rate flexibility—crawling pegs, wider bands, floating—over the distortions of capital and trade controls.

whenever a serious dilemma or conflict between the requirements of external and internal equilibrium arises, domestic policy objectives should take precedence over balance-of-payments considerations